

Shri Bahadur Sheth Jivatalal Pratapshi and the late Sheth
Shantilal Khetshibhai Jaina Literature Series, No. 3

Anekantavada

By

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With a Foreword,

By

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FOREWORD.

The title of this book would seem to indicate that it deals with mere Logical or Epistemological inquiries. Primarily, however, it is an essay in Jaina epistemology. But in Indian philosophy metaphysics and epistemology always go together. For instance, every Indian system of philosophy takes for granted the necessity of a right theory of knowledge. Hence the acceptance of the *Pramanas* is a preliminary to every future metaphysical discussion. In the West, however, epistemology is of recent growth and has derived its impetus from the advancement of science. What can I know? Is what I know true? Are there limits to my knowledge? In short the problems of the origin, validity and limits of knowledge are the problems of epistemology. It is quite clear, that any theory of knowledge is bound to have implications regarding the nature of Existence which may be of vital importance to metaphysics. Fortunately for Jaina philosophy the bug-bear of agnosticism does not raise its head. The Jaina philosophy believes that every substance (द्रव्य) is knowable. The concept of

Omniscience (सर्वज्ञता) further declares that the soul in its pure condition is capable of knowing everything in the Universe.

In a sense the Jaina epistemology is a consequence of its metaphysics which is frankly pluralistic. Unlike Sankara's monism, it accepts the independent reality of the external world. Knowledge is a relation between the knower and the object known. It is possible that the mind may have before it more than one aspect of the given object. And quite legitimately it can construct a fabric of knowledge based on the perception of a particular aspect. But this will give us only one view of reality. It is at the most partial knowledge (एकान्त). If this partial knowledge usurps the place of full and complete knowledge, it is guilty of committing, what is called in western metaphysics the fallacy of exclusive predication. The Jaina philosophy very rightly declares that reality is many-faced (अनन्त-वर्मात्मकं वस्तु). Human knowledge at its best is after all partial knowledge and who can say that it is free from error and illusion? Anekanta-vāda or the Jaina theory of knowledge clearly recognises this fact. The use of 'Syat' in Saptabhangi is a reminder of that fact.

Another interesting feature of Jaina theory

of knowledge is its thorough-going realism. It takes into account all possible view-points and would not allow a single element given in experience to be rejected as false on the verdict of abstract Logic. The sevenfold predication takes into account not only the formal but also the material conditions of validity of a judgment. It is not merely a formal but a real dialectic designed for the attainment of truth in knowledge.

Now, a word about the author of *Anekānta-vāda*. Dr. Harisatya Bhattacharya is a life-long and devoted student of Jaina religion and philosophy. By a curious irony of events the Gujarati version of his *Anekānta-vāda* saw the light of the day earlier than the original. Shri Bhattacharya has, in a very scholarly way, expounded the principles of *Anekānta-vāda*. His exposition and interpretation are as thorough and exhaustive as they can be. The practical application of *Saptabhangi* by appropriate examples greatly enhances the value of the book and dispels the illusion created by books on philosophy that they are merely abstract, and academic and have nothing to do with the practical needs of man.

We are all very grateful to him for giving to the philosophical public a work embodying the main principles of *Anekānta-vāda* in clear and

concise language. So far as I know, such a good book on Jaina epistemology has not appeared for years. And it is hoped that the book will be hailed by the readers as a further mile-stone, as a distinct *Guṇasthānaka* in philosophical literature.

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 1953 }

J. B. Dave.



Rao Bahadur
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Publisher's Note.

The present book on Anekānta-vāda is the outcome of suggestions made by Rao Bahadur Sheth Jivatlal Pratapshi J. P. and the Trustees of the Shantilal Khetshibhai Charity Trust Fund. The idea is to popularise the Jaina religion and culture by preparing a series of books which can be readily understood and appreciated by both the Jainas and non-Jainas alike. The suggestion was made to us and we agreed upon the plan. The first fruit of the plan is 'Anekānta-vāda'. And we are extremely glad to present it to the public.

In the beginning of the plan, a prize-essay on 'Anekānta-vāda' in Gujarati, Hindi, Marathi or English was announced. In response to this announcement we had received a number of essays from learned writers, to whom we express our sincere and heart-felt thanks. The essays were placed before the Committee of experts. The essay written by Shri Harisatya Bhattacharya was unanimously declared to be of the first order of merit and the first prize was awarded to him.

Shri Harisatya Bhattacharya is deeply learned in Jaina philosophy and religion. He has written learned articles on Jainism in Bengali periodicals, some of which were translated in Gujarti and Hindi as they were very much appreciated by the reading public. He has also translated some Jaina works and he has also written commentaries on some of them. He has a firm grasp of the essentials of Jainism and also a comparative approach to the problems of philosophy. It is our good luck to have such a learned scholar for the inauguration of our series.

Anekanta-vāda is indeed a very recondite topic in philosophy. Its study is very essential in order to appreciate properly the spirit of Jainism. On the ethical plane it has great potentialities. It has the power to create the necessary atmosphere for racial concord and universal peace. In order that such a task can be undertaken some preliminary spadework is necessary. We have to prepare the ground for it. Good and easy literature embodying the principles of Jaina religion and culture must be placed before the public. Shri Harisatya Bhattacharya has very ably done it and it gratifies us to note that we have been able to present his essay to the readers. There is deep wisdom in each and every aspect



(Late) Sheth Shantilal Khetashibhai

of Jaina philosophy and if it is properly presented to the public, it would serve a very useful purpose of leading the world from conflict and chaos to universal peace and concord. Jainism has a rich heritage of Vratas; its emphasis of Tyaga (renunciation) and Aparigraha (non-possession) is highly praiseworthy. Its high idealism is also reflected in the duties enjoined by it. It is therefore proper that the world at large should know something of the noble traditions of Jaina Religion and culture.

It was decided from the very start that if the prize essay was approved by the committee, it would be printed immediately and if necessary, with slight additions and alterations of the original text. This is a very onerous task indeed. We approached Acharya Shrimad Vijaya Premasūriji Maharaj and Acharya Shrimad Vijaya Ramchandra sūriji Maharaj and requested them to undertake this task. We are glad to say that they readily accepted our request and examined the essay, for which we are deeply grateful to them. Their disciples also collaborated with them. We must specially mention the help rendered by Panyās-Shree Bhadankarvijayaji Maharaj. It was he who carefully scrutinised the essay and made the necessary additions and alterations, and wrote the

preface.. P. S. Bhadrakarvijayaji Maharaj also made various suggestions regarding the development and able management of series. To be sure, it was he who inspired us in the undertaking of this work and we are very much indebted to him.

We are also grateful to Professor J. B. Dave, M A, who, on a request made by us, evinced keen desire and readiness for the translation of the work into the Gujarati language, and wrote the Foreword to this book.

We deeply appreciate the truly religious fervour and enthusiasm of Sheth Saheb Jivatalal Pratapshi who has sponsored this series. The ever-victorious march of Jainism is the deepest desire of his heart. He has done much useful and good work in this direction. He has donated large sums for this purpose and we are glad to note that he is very enthusiastic about the plan and executions of this series. He is really very keen and eager to see that Jaina religion and culture are disseminated in every nook and corner of the world. We have received many useful suggestions from him for the present series. He has also liberally contributed funds towards the execution of the plan. In fact the whole thing could not have come into being without his inspiring guidance and financial help. We are deeply thankful to him.

We also thank the trustees of Sheth Shantilal Khetshibhai Charity Trust Fund for their liberal donation. This series is merely a beginning, only first step in the matter of systematic popularisation of Jaina religion and culture. It really cannot succeed without the help and co-operation of many. Now we find that, if the plan is assiduously pursued, we would be able to bring to light many more *savants* of Jainism like Shri Harisatya Bhattacharya. Also, it is necessary and desirable that many more scholars should receive training in this field for the propagation of Jaina religion and culture.

Every effort has been made to see that the thesis has used the terminology of Jainism properly. However, we crave the indulgence of the readers for any omissions or commissions that might have been crept in the book. Finally, we thank all, whose co-operation has brought out this book. We are particularly thankful to Shri S. P. Badami and Shri Fatechandbhai Jhaverbhai, who were the members of the examining committee. We are also thankful to Prin. K. C. Shah M. A., the Vice-President of this Sabha, whose enthusiasm and labour have been of invaluable help to us in the publication of this book. We place this book in the hands of our readers in the hope that they may be inspired by its message.

Publishers.

A Few Thoughts on Anekāntavāda.*

Thirst for Truth is in-born in Man. In every age it impels the best brains to search for a solution of the riddle of the universe. Whether the universe is self-existing or is a creation subject to annihilation in time to come, whether it is an abrupt occurrence or is a gradual growth, whether it is eternal or ephemeral, whether there is any guiding spirit behind it, whether it's constituents are real, whether it is all-spirit or all-matter or both and whether there is life beyond are some of the problems, which have puzzled man-kind from times immemorial.

In the quest of knowledge, thinkers have sacrificed their all. Their precious possessions, they have abandoned with delight. Neither hunger nor thirst, neither heat nor cold, neither storm nor lull have desisted them from the contemplation of the sublime. Their efforts have been glorious. But the truth reveals itself to a few. In spite of their best efforts, truth has

Bewritten from the Preface written in the Gujarati edition of the work with some changes.

eluded the grasp of most of them. Diverse doctrines, often each contradicting the other, have come to be propounded by exponents of philosophy. In the bewildering mass of philosophic literature a man is likely to get lost. It is a Herculean task to comprehend the innumerable theories about the universe and to catch hold of the right one.

A science which can dispassionately scrutinise the diverse doctrines, which can reconcile the apparently inconsistent and which can give to each one its rightful place is eminently a science which is indispensable to one in search of Truth. That science is known as the science of *Syād-vāda*. *Sāpeksha-vāda*, *Naya-vāda* and *Anekānta-vāda* are all synonyms of *Syād-vāda*. It is to the credit of Jainism that it has given to the world the science of *Syād-vāda*, which has greatly enriched the world-philosophy.

The doctrine of *Syād-vāda* means a doctrine which entertains within its fold every possible theory. By possible theory is meant a theory, which really exists from a particular standpoint and not an imaginary or unreal theory. An imaginary or unreal theory exists only in imagination and is not a possible theory. A man,

whose vision is not clear, sees something before him and doubts whether the object lying before him is a rope or a serpent. It is either a rope only or a serpent only but it cannot be both. That it may be a rope or that it may be a serpent are theories about it. But in as much as they are based on suspicion, they are imaginary or unreal theories and are not *possible* theories, as understood by *Syād-vāda*. Here, the length and breadth of a rope resemble those of a serpent. Therefore, viewed from the stand-point of dimensions, the rope resembles a serpent, but viewed from the stand-point of the static quality, it does not resemble a serpent. That the rope resembles a serpent is a *possible* theory; that the rope does not resemble a serpent, is equally a *possible* theory. Both the theories are *possible* ones and both are correct and real. As such, they are not *imaginary* or unreal theories. Another well-known illustration may be cited here. A blind man, who happens to touch the trunk of an elephant, regards it as similar to a post. Another blind, who happens to touch the ear of an elephant, regards it as similar to a fan. The blind, who imagines the elephant as pillar-like, is right from his own view-point, but is wrong from the view-point of

the other, who regards it as a fan-like. Theories of both are *possible* theories and not *imaginary* ones as understood by *Syād-vāda*. But to have a complete picture of the elephant, one ought to know it from all available angles. The sum-total of all possible theories derived from all available angles will amount to real and complete knowledge, aimed at by *Syād-vāda*.

The innate nature of an object has infinite facets. Viewed from different angles, every object reveals itself differently. In order to comprehend the diverse *Dharmas* of an object, it must be viewed from a number of stand-points. Then alone, we can get a fairly reliable picture of the object. If we ignore and belittle any stand-point from which an object can be looked at, we get a false and unreal picture of the object. Intelligence, which confines itself to one particular *Dharma* of an object, is necessarily narrow and limited. The limited view is bound to give rise to obstinacy. But the intelligence, which is adorned with *Anekānta-vāda*, comprehends the nature of the object rightly, as it discerns the object from all its angles. Ability to scan the object from various angles is indispensable for a dispassionate consideration of the object. Once, right knowledge is attained by a dispassionate and impartial

consideration of an object, predilections and prejudices disappear and one gets nearer to the Truth.

Truth of an object can never be attained, if an object having diverse *Dharmas* were viewed from one particular stand-point. A proposition about an object mainly states one of its *Dharmas* and contains partial truth only. It is true so far that particular *Dharma* is concerned. But the same proposition is untrue if it is made with regard to another *Dharma* of the object or if made in utter disregard of the remaining *Dharmas* of the object. Therefore, to arrive at complete Truth regarding the object, the remaining *Dharmas* of the object have to be constantly kept in sight. The term Syāt serves this purpose. When annexed to a proposition it reminds one of the limitations inherent in the proposition. Therefore a proposition, having the term *Syāt* as part thereof or at its back-ground, is a correct one. An unqualified proposition is false in as much it ignores the remaining aspects of the object. As complete truth about an object depends upon its nature and not upon any opinion one may hold about it, it must be viewed from every conceivable angle.

7. It is here that the Doctrine of *Naya-vāda* comes into play. By enabling one to view

the object from different angles, it enlightens one on the diverse aspects of the object. It depicts seven main types of stand-points, called seven *Nayas*, from which an object should be looked at. Jain scriptures have given a detailed description of the seven *Nayas*. A sound knowledge of these *Nayas* is a rare achievement

Great is the depth of *Naya-vāda* and rare is its knowledge. It is the only real system of philosophy, imparting right knowledge beyond any shadow of doubt and confusion. Doubt and confusion, that mar the knowledge, cannot be eliminated without the light of *Naya-vāda*, which is a sure remedy for obtaining purity in knowledge and for having a correct comprehension of an object. Without the light of *Naya-vāda*, even a great effort to realise the truth will just amount to an infliction of pain on oneself, for, any action guided by impure knowledge cannot be right. Right attainment cannot be had in absence of right conduct and right conduct cannot be practised in absence of right knowledge.

It may be seen that if a man has deep faith in the absolute belief that soul is eternal and can never be slain, there is no reason why he should desist from violence; for, his act of violence never results in the soul being slain.

Even if such a man practises non-violence, it may some time appear to him that his refraining from the violent acts is meaningless in as much as such acts never result in the soul being slain. Conversely, if a man has deep faith in the absolute belief that the soul is only momentary, he may as well indulge in the activity of violence; for, the soul being momentary, it meets its death every moment and his act of violence is ineffective. In both the above cases, if violence is ineffective and is attended with no harmful effect on the person resorting to it, there is no reason why one should refrain from violence.

In the above instances, one, who understands both the above beliefs pertaining to the soul in their correct perspective, reconciles both the theories pertaining to the soul and appreciates the real merits of non-violence. He believes that the soul is eternal but at the same time he appreciates the fact that so long the soul is enchained in a body, it experiences the feelings of pleasure and pain. He also appreciates that so long a soul is subject to the unending round of birth and death, cessation of one life and change from one body to another amounts to a sort of death for the soul. He also sees that the soul is momentary but he finds that it is not the real nature of the soul

which is fleeting. He sees that it is only the manifestations of the soul which are fleeting. An act of violence results in such a change in the manifestations of the soul, that, that change is painful to the soul, upon which violence is practised. As such, he understands the real purport and meaning behind the conduct of non-violence. It is here, that the doctrine of *Syād-vāda* enlightens a person as to the correct line of approach to every theory that is advanced.

The right knowledge, being relative and being untainted with suspicion or confusion leads to the rejection of the rejectable, the acceptance of the acceptable and the indifference of things worth neglecting. Real happiness and peace of mind can be achieved only by right knowledge. In course of his prayers offered to Lord Mahavir, *Kalikāl Sarvagnya Shri Hemachandra Sūrīshwaraji* states :—

“ O Lord, devoid of the light of *Syād-vāda*, (the only means of Right knowledge), men may observe penance for thousands of years and may strive for ages to attain *Yoga*; but with all their craving for salvation, they are unable to attain the same.* ”

* परः सहस्राः शरदस्तपसि, युगान्तरे योगमुपासता वा ।

तथापि ते मार्गमनापतन्तो, न मोक्षमाणा अपि यान्ति मोक्षम् ॥

अयोगव्यवच्छेदद्वान्निश्चिका श्लो. १,४

Right knowledge is also a pre-requisite condition for right detachment. In absence of a clear perception of its aim, no unattachment can be real and lasting. One, desiring to be immune from the feelings of attachment and aversion, ought to acquire a correct knowledge of the self and the universe. Indispensability of *Syād-vāda* for detachment born of knowledge (ज्ञानगर्भित) is explained in the following lines of *Āchārya Shri Haribhadra Sūrīshwarajī* :—

“ One who has faith in any sort of *Ekānta*, (for instance that soul is absolutely one and alone, that it is absolutely eternal, that it is absolutely evanescent, that it is never enchained or that it is absolutely unreal), may be constantly contemplating the worthlessness of the world and may even be earnestly practising right conduct and zealously refraining from passion, yet his mental state of detachment will be one born of delusion [मोहगर्भित] and not one born of knowledge (ज्ञानगर्भित). He, who in the light of :*Syād-vāda* believes that from the stand-point of *Āmatva*, the soul is one; that from the stand-point of individual entities, there are a number of souls; that viewed from its substance it is eternal; that viewed from its form it is fleeting; that viewed from the angle of *Nishohaya*

Naya it is unchained; that viewed from the angle of *Vyavahār Naya*, it is chained; that as matter it is unreal and that in its own nature it is real, can attain the mental state of real unattachment. He can, by striving for freedom and by renouncing the world, extricate himself from the chain of worldly cycle, wherein he is imprisoned by craving, hatred and passions, arising out of his relation with the material *Karmas*.*

Ekānta-vāda discards the theory of relativity and therefore it cannot depict the real characteristics of an object. Sometimes it gives an explanation which is just the reverse of the truth. Hence, it is incorrect and unauthoritative. *Ekānta-vāda* being at the root of all incorrect stand-points, fosters prejudices, predilections, mental afflictions and quarrels. As such, it can never make a real system of philosophy.

* एको नित्यस्तथाऽबद्धः, क्षय्यसन्वेह सर्वथा ।

आत्मेति निश्चयाद् भूयो भवनैर्गुण्यदर्शनात् ॥

तस्यागायोपशान्तस्य, सद्बुत्तस्यापि भावतः ।

वैराग्यं तद्गतं यत्तन्मोहगर्भमुदाहृतम् ॥

भूयांसो नामिनो बद्धा बाह्येनेच्छादिना ह्यमी ।

आत्मानस्तद्वशात्कष्टं, भवे तिष्ठन्ति दारुणे ॥

एवं विज्ञाय तस्यागविधित्यागश्च सर्वथा ।

वैराग्यमाहुः सञ्ज्ञानसंगतं तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥ अष्टक ६ श्लो. ४-५-६-७.

As the truth of metaphysics and ethics depends upon the correctness of the epistemology, every exponent of philosophy has expounded epistemology together with metaphysics and ethics. The correct epistemology leads to correct metaphysics and correct metaphysics to correct ethics. The epistemology of Non-Jain philosophers, having been mainly imbedded in *Ekānta-vāda*, knowledge imparted thereby cannot be complete. Albeit, that knowledge is right to an extent but as it ignores and challenges other aspects, it ceases to be right. It results in the nourishment of wrong faith. It fails to allay the doubts or to remove the confusion of the people.

Syād-vāda affords the full knowledge and a complete picture of the soul and the *Karmas*, of the relation of the soul with the *Karmas*, of the *Nirvāna* and of the steps leading thereto. Knowledge of the deeper truths pertaining to these objects, which are beyond the reach of the senses, is highly essential to one, who is treading on the glorious path of salvation. With the light of *Syād-vāda*, inner and hidden meanings of the realities disclose themselves to the seeker of the truth and the universe unfolds its mystery to him. He, then, realises the intrinsic worth of *Syād-vāda*, which serves as a

beacon-light to him on the path to salvation till he attains the bliss of *Nirvāṇa*.

Syād-vāda affords great light to a man, who awakes from stupor and launches his journey onwards in search of truth. At the commencement of his journey he may experience embarrassment, may get shrouded in doubts and may fall in errors and illusions. In the midst of a variety of theories, pertaining to deeper truth, he will demand an explanation acceptable both to reason and faith. He will complain that however earnest his craving, he cannot attain appreciable progress on the path to salvation, till he gets a solution acceptable both to reason and faith. To his doubts and problems, the *Syād-vāda*, offers a solution, he woefully needs. He finds that *Syād-vāda* cures the defects inherent in philosophies based on *Ekānta-vāda*. Having attained right knowledge with the help of *Syād-vāda* he learns right conduct and continues his march onward on the path to salvation

A seeker of truth, craving for enlightenment ought to deserve the Light. He must be magnanimous, well-balanced, wise and sedate. He must be unprejudiced and intelligent. His mind must not be a closed compartment, revelling in its own ideas. Predilection for his own opinion must

cease. It is well said by a writer that, "Man has a more liking for his mental children than even physical ones." This liking for mental children must be put an end to. Feelings of love and hatred must cease to have a sway over him. He should appreciate that improper predilection for his own views is a great handicap in the attainment of truth. He must not be self-centred and must be able enough to appreciate the best in others. His intelligence must be great enough to pierce through the complexities of the theories of philosophy. Jain scriptures have laid a great responsibility on the teacher as well as the taught. It is prescribed that a Muni, having right faith and being well-versed in *Naya-vāda*, should expound the doctrine of *Naya-vāda* to an unprejudiced, sagacious and responsible person. The discussions of *Naya-vāda* can be beneficial only if they are held with persons, whose talent is cultivated by scriptural truths. *Shri Nandi Sūtra* depicts three types of students. The first listens to the discussions of *Naya-vāda* but instead of forming conclusions regarding any proposition, he gets embarrassed. The second persists in one particular proposition to such an extent that his vision is clouded by *Ekānta-vāda*. The third, though he does not

become prey to *Ekānta-vāda*, is incompetent to follow the detailed theories of *Naya-vāda* because of his lack of the requisite talent. Hence, only a student who is endowed with a special kind of intellect is regarded in *Shri Nandi Sūtra*, as a student deserving the knowledge of *Naya-vāda*. Unless one deserves the study of *Syād-vāda*, one is likely to form misconceptions about it.

Here it is necessary to remove certain misconceptions created in the name of *Syād-vāda*. Some ancients regard the doctrine of *Syād-vāda* as a doctrine of doubts. Some moderns call it a doctrine of reconciliation. Neither of these is correct.

Really speaking, the doctrine of *Syād-vāda* is not a doctrine of doubts but is a definitive doctrine, which eliminates all doubts. The *Syād-vāda* insists that a proposition is correct from the view point from which it can be substantiated. For instance, one, with the knowledge of *Syād-vāda*, definitely regards the soul as eternal from the angle of *Dravya*, and also definitely regards it as evanescent from the angle of *Paryāya*. He can never maintain that the soul is both eternal and evanescent either from the angle of *Dravya* alone or from the angle of *Paryāya* alone. Though he makes a

definite statement regarding the eternality of the soul from the stand-point of substance or about the fleeting nature of the soul from the stand-point of form, he uses the term *Syāt* to continuously keep before his mind the different qualities of the object appearing from different angles. If he forgets this fundamental truth, he would be a prey to *Ekānta*, which prevents the attainment of true knowledge. It is thus evident that the doctrine of *Syād-vāda* is not a doctrine of doubts but is a right doctrine leading to correct and definite conclusions.

Some moderns call it a doctrine of reconciling all religions. Even this is incorrect. True that it accepts all the infinite *Dharmas* of an object without challenging or ignoring the existence of any one of them and therefore to call it a doctrine of reconciliation of all *Dharmas* of an object is a recognition of its merit and not a demerit. But it is sheer untruth to state in the name of *Syād-vāda* that all religions based on *Ekānta-vāda* lead to salvation. It is imputing a demerit to *Syād-vāda* rather than recognising its merit. The difference between the darkness and the light is the difference between *Ekānta-vāda* and *Anekānta-vāda*. On finding the similarity in outward practices and in certain

positive and negative codes of conduct, if one states that all religions are one, he exhibits his ignorance of *Syāul-vāda*. One, who regards similarity as similarity and dissimilarity as dissimilarity, really understands *Syāul-vāda*. Just as in all religions, there is some similarity in certain practices and positive and negative codes of conduct, there are a number of dissimilarities too. It is manifestly false to state that all religions prescribe the same conduct pertaining to what should be eaten and what should not be eaten, what drink should be taken and what drink should not be taken, and what should be practised and what should not be practised. In the same way, to say that all Religions have uniform views about the positive and negative codes of conduct pertaining to violence and non-violence, truth and untruth, generalisations and exceptions, is wrong and is the result of one's sheer ignorance of the Religions. The difference between the philosophic discussions of *Anekānta-vāda* and of *Ekānta-vāda* relating to soul and matter is the difference between heaven and hell. In spite of this, to say that there is no dissimilarity between the various Religions and that the preachings of all the Religions and their prophets are one and the same, is not permissible in *Syād-vāda*.

According to *Syād-vāda* it is a statement of falsehood, pure and simple.

The doctrine of Reconciliation of Religions as accepted by a *Syād-vādin* is quite different and it lies in accepting the truth and rejecting the untruth after comprehending the truth as truth and untruth as untruth. His real impartiality lies in showing no favour to untruth and in bearing no ill-will towards truth. To fail to distinguish truth from untruth is folly. By no stretch of imagination it can be styled as impartiality. It may as well be said that to regard truth and untruth as equal, indicates a sort of predilection for untruth and prejudice towards truth. The impartiality of a *Syād-vādin* constantly keeps a watch that no injustice shall be done to truth and that no encouragement shall be afforded to untruth. The nature of his impartiality is nicely depicted in the following words of *Shri Hari Bhadra Sūrīshvarajī*:—

“It is improper to bear feelings of hatred towards the scriptures of others. Their statements should be carefully considered. Whatever good they contain is not different from the contents of the *Pravachana* or *Dwādashāngī*.”*

* तत्राऽपि च न द्वेषः कार्यो विषयस्तु यत्नतो मृग्यः ।

तस्याऽपि न सद्वचनं सर्वं यत्प्रवचनादन्यत् ॥ षोडशक १६ श्लो. १३.

The depth of *Syād-vāda* and the real impartiality of a *Syād-vādin* are amply borne out in the above quotation. To a *Syād-vādin* no proposition by itself is true or untrue. Whether a proposition is laid down in his scriptures or in those of others, he regards it as correct or incorrect only after a careful consideration thereof.

When a theory is advanced from any quarter, a *Syād-vādin* approaches it with an open and dispassionate mind. He scans it, scrutinises it, sifts it from irrelevant stuff, tries to see from which aspect it is sustainable and from which aspect it is not, considers its merits and demerits and then alone pronounces judgment upon it. The *Syād-vādin*, therefore, tries to comprehend every thing from every conceivable view-point and then alone formulates a proposition regarding a particular matter in question. He is fully cognisant of the fact that the proposition advanced by him will be right one only, if it is consistent with the *Drishta*¹ and *Ishta*² *Pramānas*.

Thus the *Syād-vādin* gives the widest possible indulgence to every conceivable theory.

1 Knowledge derived with the help of senses.

2 Knowledge derived with the help of Agamas and Logic

In this essay *Shri Harisatya Bhaṭṭāchārya* has thrown a fairly good light on the doctrine of *Anekānta-vāda* as a result of his dispassionate and intelligent study thereof. He has elaborately explained the necessity of *Saptābhāṅgi* in arriving at the correct knowledge of an object. The learned author has, by citing scriptural and practical instances, clearly shown that for having a complete comprehension of an object, the knowledge of *Saptābhāṅgas* is indispensable.

The essay is written elaborately so that an ordinary seeker of knowledge can clearly follow it. Besides *Saptābhāṅgas*, the author has also dealt with, in nut-shell, other matters pertaining to *Nayas*, *Pramānas*, *Darśhanas* and Philosophy. In doing so the theme of the essay is well clarified. In my opinion this essay will serve the reader as a light-house in following the deep truths of *Saptābhāṅgi Syād-vāda*. An unbiased reader will receive new and useful light on the subject.

Before concluding, I would like to draw the attention of the reader to the following proclamation of *Kalikāla saccagnya Shri Hemachandra Sūrīshvarajī*:—

“To all, who argue on the opposite side, I proclaim with thunder that ‘there is no god-hood superior to *Vitarāgatva* and there is no philosophy superior to the *Anekānta-vāda*.’”*

. Muni Bhadrakar Vijaya.

—

* इमां समक्षं प्रतिपक्षसाक्षिणानुदारवोयामवबोधनां ब्रुवे ।

न वीतरागात्परमस्ति दैवतं न चाऽप्यनेकान्तनृने नदस्थितिः ॥

अदोगव्यवच्छेदद्वौत्रिगिक ज्ञे० २८

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INTRODUCTION.

The Syad-vāda, the Añekānta-vāda, the Saptabhāṅga-nāya are variously translated as the " Doctrine of Possibility ", ' Theory of manifold Aspects ' ' Argument in seven-fold statements ". None of the translations in and by themselves give any sense and truly speaking, the translations are all defective and unsatisfactory. They refer to a theory, peculiar to the Jaina Philosophers and it is impossible at the outset to state it with all its implications. The Jainas are realists in the sense that they believe in the reality of knowing subjects and of some substances independent of those enquiring principles. It is claimed that the Syad-vāda yields the true knowledge about things. This means that this doctrine may be considered to have a two-fold aspect. In its realistic aspect, the Syad-vāda presents the true nature of a thing under observation i e., a factual picture of it, while in its psychological aspect, it indicates the true way of knowing the thing. This is, however, the barest possible description of the doctrine and a further approach towards it necessitates some preliminary clearing of the way to it.

The Anekānta-vāda is knowledge about things and like all such knowledge, it must refer to some fundamental and ultimate conditions. Some of these conditions may best be considered in connection with the ordinary statement of one's experience. A man, for instance, says "This mango-tree bears fruits". This statement embodies certainly a piece of undivided cognition on the part of the man i. e., an experienced whole but analysed, it is found to imply many pre-requisites and pre-conditions, some of which are as follows :

(i) First of all, in order that the experience may be possible, the experiencer i. e., the knowing subject must have an existential persistence. To have the experience of a fruit-bearing mango-tree, one must be supposed to be a real cognising being, having some stability in existence and not an unsubstantial shadow or absolute restlessness for which no conscious experience is possible.

(ii) Secondly, for the purpose of the experience its object the mango-tree must also be premised to be an actual stable real, outside its experiencer. An absolute non-est, a perfect void, cannot be the object of any one's knowledge.

(iii) It may next be said that in order that

the man may know the mango-tree to be fruit-bearing and that the mango-tree may be cognised as such, not only should the subject and the object of the knowledge have some stability in existence but that both of them should be properly *conditioned*. The experiencing man must, for instance, be attentive to a certain extent and in a certain manner; otherwise his knowledge about the mango-tree as fruit-bearing would not be possible. The tree in question on its part must also bear distinctive marks upon it and other features, distinguishing it from the other individuals of its species and making it cognisable as a fruit-bearing mango-tree.

(iv) Lastly, the man's making the statement shows that what he says is but an expression of what he has actually experienced. This premises that words are so related to the facts and phenomena of our experience that they signify the latter truly and faithfully.

The first and the second conditions of knowledge as stated above refer to 'to-some-extent' permanent features of the subject and the object of cognition and the third, to their passing phases. Yet these permanent and fleeting features are not separated or sundered from each other. When a man attends to a fruit-bearing mango-

tree you cannot say that the man has a dual personality at the time,—one part of him attending and another part, keeping away from the activity of attention and continuing unaffected and thoroughly unconcerned. The same thing may be said about the mango-tree also. When one cognises it, it cannot be said that the tree has two realities in it,—one bearing fruits and the other, perfectly unconnected with the affair and existing self-identical and unmodified in every way. The fact is that a being passes continuously through changing phases, while its substantial basis, instead of losing itself in these evanescent phases, persists,—these two aspects of a real, being inseparably connected. The *substance* is impossible without a *mode* or *form* in which it is cast and a *mode* is equally impossible without its being the mode of a persisting *substance*. A pure substance unexpressed in a mode or an abstract mode sundered from a basic substance is inconceivable. The Jaina philosophy emphasises this fact by saying that while in an Existent or Real (Śat) we may discover by logical analysis the fact of its origination (Utpāda) and decay (Vyaya) which are its evanescent stages and an underlying substance persisting through those varied phenomena (Dhrauṇya),—these three elements are not to be considered as isolated from

each other but are to be taken as factors, three-in-one, constituting the concrete reality, both factual and experiential.

The third condition of knowledge indicated above means that when suitably conditioned, the subject and the object come into relationship with one another,—that is, the subject knows the object and the object is known by the subject. The fourth condition of knowledge is that language expresses the thoughts of the speaker as well as the true relationships between the object of knowledge.

However obvious psychologically the above four conditions of knowledge and reality may appear to be, each of them has been considered from a metaphysical stand-point and subjected to a relentless criticism

The Buddhists of the nihilist school (Śūnyavāda) contend that there is no persisting substance either as the object or as the subject of knowledge. As regards the objects of knowledge they point out that they are generally material but that matter cannot be an ultimate reality. The ultimate matter cannot be 'gross' for, all gross matter is subject to division and consequent dissolution and destruction. Neither can we say that the ultimate real matter is 'atomic.' If we hold that atoms

were eternally existing, we cannot explain why the atoms should combine at a particular time, in a particular manner and produce a particular thing and then on a different occasion they would produce a different object by combining in a different way altogether. If on the other hand, we hold that the atoms had not their existence from the beginning-less time, how are we to explain their emergence at a particular time? Then again, the question may be asked, how do the atoms produce their effect? Do they exist, when their effects are produced? If not, then something other than those atoms may as well be held to be the causes of those effects. Again, if we hold that atoms exist when they produce their effects, then those atoms would be producing other things also along with those given effects,—for, otherwise their separate existence at that time becomes inconceivable. Another difficulty in the atomic theory, the nihilists point out, is about the combination of atoms. If in combining with another atom, an atom is identified with or lost in the former, then atomic combination would on no occasion result in the production of a gross thing; if on the other hand, the combining atoms be held to maintain their separate existences in the combination, then in that case, every atom must be

supposed to have different edges upon which the other atoms impringe themselves. These and various other difficulties make the doctrine of the atomic reality unacceptable. Thus the ultimate real matter can neither be 'gross' nor 'atomic' which leads to the conclusion that matter is not real, or, what means the same thing to the nihilists that no object external to knowledge really exists

The nihilists take the next step and contend that if there is no real object of knowledge, there cannot be any real subject to know it. Other difficulties about the substantiality of the knowing subject are:—(1) If the subject knows an object because it is co-existent with the latter in time, then why does not the subject know all the objects of the world with which it is co-existent in time ? (2) If, however, the co-existence in time is not the essential condition for the subject in the matter of knowing its object, how does the subject come to have the knowledge ? If the subject be held to be a perfectly formless substance, it cannot have the knowledge of objects having definite forms. It is not possible to avoid this difficulty by saying that the subject of knowledge has a form viz., the form of consciousness; for, consciousness itself being devoid of any material

form, the initial difficulty continues. The conception of the subject of knowledge as a reality is thus untenable.

The knower and the known, both being unsubstantial and unfounded, the so-called world of our experiences is an unreal void, according to the Buddhist nihilists !

So far as the question of the substantiality of the subject and of the object of knowledge is concerned, the idealists of the Buddhist School (*Vijnana-vada*) agree with the nihilists, though they reject their doctrine of the absolute void. The Buddhist idealists take the experience of the moment as the only reality though of a momentary duration. According to them, absolute void is a misnomer, in as much as it is contradicted by the conscious perception or idea which shoots up every moment and the reality of which is undeniable. It is this momentary consciousness which is all in all and beyond this, there is no other real. Neither a permanent subject of knowledge nor a persistent object of cognition is a reality. The feeling of a real persisting subject is accounted for, by these idealists, by the feelings of " I ",—which are in some way similar to each other and which are immanent in the successive momentary consciousnesses. The idea of a real

object existing externally to the conscious points is similarly explained away by the Buddhist idealists, by pointing out that some of our momentary consciousnesses have an idea of externality embedded in them. In reality, however, there is neither any real subject nor any real object of knowledge.

The Vaibhāsika and the Sautrantika Schools of Buddhist philosophy are similarly opposed to the doctrine of the absolute Śūnya-vāda. With the Vijnāna-vāda School, they admit the momentary reality of the cognising state but reject their theory of the absolute unreality of the not-self. The Vaibhāsikas as well as the Sautrantikas admit the reality of the objects of knowledge; but according to them, the reality of these is not permanent or persistent. They hold that like the knowing self, all objects of cognition, including the atoms constituting a material thing are of momentary duration and vanish and are dissolved as soon as they emerge into existence.

(1) In refuting the nihilists' objection to the substantiality of the subject, the Jainas point out that the subject has the capacity to know all the things of all the times. In perception, the subject knows the things that are not only co-existent with it but so, *suitably* (Yogya). In

recollection again, it remembers past matters that come up before it *suitably* and in inference and authoritative knowledge, the subject comes to know things of past, present and future, that are *suitably* presented before it. It is then not the simple co-existence-in-time of the object with the subject but its *suitable* presentation at the time of its cognition which accounts for its actual knowledge by the subject. As for the knowing subject, the Jainas maintain that in the matter of knowing *the subject may be looked upon both as formless and as having a form*. The subject is essentially consciousness which certainly has not the form of a material thing and in this respect, the subject is formless. But consciousness consists in knowing a thing and is varied every moment in accordance with the form of the object cognised. These changing modes of consciousness may be looked upon as its forms and the subject of consciousness in knowing an object may rightly be said to be assuming forms from time to time. These subjective changes of forms assumed by the knowing subject are caused by the removal or mitigation of the obstacles to its knowing. Thus according to the Jainas, the subject of knowledge is a reality which comes to cognise the object when internally the knowledge-enveloping forces become

more or less powerless in the subject and externally the object presents itself *suitably* before it.

Against the Buddhist idealists' view, the Jainas urge that the very apprehension of "I" in conscious experiences shows that underlying them a permanent subject is persistent. A unified whole or a connected series of conscious experience which we have, cannot be made up of disparate moments of consciousness, unless a persistent subject is supposed to permeate and unify those moments.

(2). In their support of the doctrine of the real existence of the knowing self, the Jainas are joined by all the different schools of the Vedic Philosophy, including the Vedānta. The Vedāntic system of Śāṅkara, however, fixes upon the Brahma as the only real soul and denies the reality of the individual selves. This position of the Māyā-vāda School is opposed not only by the non-Vedic Jaina system and the Vedic Schools of the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophy but by such systems of the Vedāntic thought itself as the Dvaita (dualistic e. g. the system of Maḍhava), the Dvaitadvaita (the monistico-dualistic e. g. the system of Nimbārka) and the Viśiṣṭadvaita (the

dualistico-monistic e. g. the system of Ramanuja). We need not enter here into the discussions about the absolute monism of Śankara. For the purpose of the present section it is enough that the Maya-vāda School agrees with Jainas in refusing the nihilistic doctrine of the Buddhist School about the reality of the psychical being. But the Maya-vāda and the Jaina Philosophy are at the parting of their ways, when the former adopts the arguments of the Buddhist Śūnya-vāda School against the reality of the object.

In criticising nihilistic denial of the external reality, the Jainas point out that the Buddhist arguments are directed against the substantiality of matter only. But the objects of our cognition must not be material in all cases. Space (Akasa), the principles of Motion and Rest (Dharma and Adharma), Time or the principle of Mutation (Kāla) are, according to the Jainas, reals external to the knowing self. Often, the object of study and investigation for a cogniser is another conscious self outside him. The Buddhist arguments do not touch the reality of these objective substances. As regards the material objects, the Jainas point out that 'gross' matter may be divisible into subtler parts but this does not mean that the former is unreal. A gross material object

is real and persistent in some respect i. e. in so far as its basal substance, -matter or Pudgala- is concerned. Atoms are real in the sense that they are the constitutive elements in a gross thing; but it is also to be remembered that a gross thing when destroyed, is reduced to atoms and in this sense, the atoms may be looked upon as not absolutely real, -having an origin, so to say. As regards the difficulty urged by the Buddhists, about the atoms generating one thing at one time and then, a different thing at a different time, the Jainas point out that the difficulty is due to the Buddhists ignoring the fact that the origin of a thing is dependent not solely upon the atoms but upon a collocation and combination of suitable conditions and circumstances. These determine what thing is to come out of atoms on a particular occasion. The Buddhist criticism of the factum of atomic combination is also misconceived. The Jainas urge that all difficulties regarding atomic combination will be removed if we hold that when a gross thing is formed, atoms do not exist as independent and mutually exclusive realities but that they exist so far as their underlying substance Pudgala is concerned which is eternally persistent. Atoms according to the Jainas are not simply the minute parts of a material body; they have practically

no dimensions so that when atoms continue, we are not to suppose that one of them impringes itself on a particular edge or part of another; atomic combination is not aggregation but is really the result of a peculiar operation of incorporeal atomic forces (Sakti). There being thus no real difficulty about the conception of matter as an external reality, the Jainas conclude that there are reals which are objects of cognition, outside and independent of the cognising self.

(3) Like the Jainas, the thinkers of the Nyaya-vaishesika school reject the nihilistic doctrine about the unreality of external objects, as propounded by the Vedantic Maya-vāda and the Buddhistic Śūnya-vāda. The philosophers of the Nyaya-Vaishesika line of thought agree with the Jainas that matter, space, time as objects of knowledge are real substances. They agree also that all ultimate substances are manifested in and through their modes and attributes which are also real. Thus according to the Jainas as well as Nyaya-Vaishesika thinkers, (1) matter, for instance, as an ultimate external substance is real; (2) sensible features like visibility etc. are its attributes which are also real and (3) a pot, as a modified form of that ultimate substance, matter— a mode of matter or a material mode, is also real.

Notwithstanding their agreement on these points, however, the Jainas and the Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers differ from each other in respect of the question of relationship between substance on the one hand and the attribute and the mode on the other. The latter take substance to be a strictly self-identical, immutable and transcendental reality. It is in essence, *Kutastha* i. e. like the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*, essentially unconnected with the phenomenal modes and features. These no doubt are attached to the substance 'intimately' but are really separable from it. As regards Moksa or emancipated state, for instance, the Nyaya thinkers propound the theory of *Nava-gunoccheda* or uprooting of nine characteristic features and conceive the soul as existing in itself, thoroughly devoid of all the conscious states or psychical attributes, as we call them. The Jainas criticise this view of the Nyaya School. They admit that if we want to fix upon the persistent character of an object and the indestructible nature of its basic substance, there is some sense in making a distinction between the substantial aspect of an object and its vanishing features. But this does not mean that the substantial and modal are two aspects in a thing, absolutely exclusive of each

other. A thing of experience is an undivided whole, which shows that its underlying substance and the mode are to be identified in an equally real sense. The Nyaya thinkers contend that if the distinction between the substance and the modification be not held to be rigid and real, then the substance underlying a thing would be varied with the variation on the modes and the modes identified with the basic substance would be but one and the self-same after all. The Jainas acknowledge it and assert that it is exactly the position they take. The substance underlying a thing may be said to be manifold, undergoing, as it does from time to time, a change in its form in accordance with the changing modes and the modes, notwithstanding their varying characters, are one with reference to the immutability of their basic substance. A substance is impossible without a form, in and through which it appears and a modification is also impossible without the basic substance, of which it is the form for the time being. The Jainas carry this doctrine even to the extra-mundane sphere and maintain that even in Moksa, the emancipated soul-substance is not without its attributes and modifications. A freed soul, according to the Jainas, has four infinite attributes of joy, power

etc., and undergoes ceaseless modifications within itself and through itself. The substance and the mode are thus essentially related, according to the Jainas.

(4) Lastly, it may be shortly noticed here how on purely theoretic grounds the obviously plain fact that a man's statement truly expresses a phenomenon of his experience, has been controverted. The School of the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara contends that a statement in language i. e. *Words* cannot express the true nature of an object, external to us. The *word and the object are not identical* in their substance. If they were identical in substance, we would have in the world either words or objects; the very fact that we have words on the one hand and objects on the other goes to show that words and objects are not identical in substance. Nor can it be said that words are originated by objects or that objects are originated by words. If objects could originate the words corresponding to them, the world of objects which we have would have been a constantly sounding place. If on the other hand, words be held to originate objects, then an object of desire would have been obtained by the simple utterance of its name, which is

unhappily never the case and a dreadful object would have presented itself as soon as its name was uttered, which is, happily, however, never the case. If then words and objects corresponding to each other are neither identical in substance nor the causes of each other, they cannot be said to be related to one another.

In opposing the Buddhist doctrine of non-relationship of words and objects, the Jainas point out that besides the relationships of causation and identity which obviously do not subsist between words and objects, there may be a relationship between them which is *Vacya-Vacaka-Sambandha*. This means that a word and an object are so related that the former signifies the latter and that the latter is signified by the former. The Nyaya School agrees with the Jainas in affirming this *Vacya-Vacaka-Sambandha* between a word and its object. The Nyaya thinkers, however, hold that it was God who endowed a word with its given significance. The meaning of a term, in other words, was fixed by God in the early misty days of creation, according to them. The Jainas dispense with any idea of God in this connection. According to them, every word has the capacity of expressing all the objects of the world but its particular significance

is due to the environmental circumstances limiting its original unlimited capacity. Any way a statement in words is capable of expressing one's experience of facts, as they exist independently of him.

In the discussions about the conditions of knowledge above, one might have noticed that the views of the objectors were not so much incorrect as they were but one-sided. In other words, some amount of plausibility, they are certainly entitled to claim and they are wrong only when they put forward their partial view as the complete theory about reality. If, for instance, one chooses to fix his attention exclusively upon the transitory experience of the moment and the actual utility of its transitory matter at that moment which is fast-fleeting, he may be inclined towards the Buddhist *Śūnya-vāda*, *Vijnāna-vāda* or *Ksanika-vāda*. He may be right to some extent. But he would be wrong as the Buddhists were, if he takes the unwarranted next step and denies the reality of the persisting elements in both the cogniser and the cognised, which are so insistent in all our experiences. In the same manner, one drawing away his philosophic attention from the endlessly varied and evanescent phenomenal manifold and probing deep into their ultimate basis, may take the *Advaita Vedānta*

stand-point and hold that the fundamental reality consists in abstract substantiality or unvaried existence and as such, is an undivided and indivisible one. This is by no means an unreasonable view. It should be observed that this view does not necessarily involve a denial of the derivative reality of the manifold of our experience. The Vedanta of the Mayavada School, however, lays exclusive emphasis on the ultimate abstract reality,—so much so that it negatives altogether the real existence of all the experiential manifold. The Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, again, were right in positing a substance which persists immutable so far as its essence is concerned, amidst the changing variants but stepped beyond reason's limits in keeping the substance rigidly separate from the modalities of experience. It may similarly be pointed out that even the theory of those thinkers who contend that language cannot express the reality as it is, is plausible to a certain extent. In a sense, all things and their percepts are particular (Svalaksana, as the Buddhists say), while words in a language are essentially but concepts and general ideas. The Buddhists point this out and may claim some justification for contending that words cannot properly indicate the things. They are, however, wrong in laying exclusive emphasis on the abstract

particularity of a thing of experience; they forget on the one hand that a thing of experience is not so much particular as a generality-in-a-particular-mode and on the other, the environmental circumstances provide ways for limiting the *conceptional* character of words. Accordingly, the Buddhist theory about the incapability of words to express a thing is practically an instance of going to the absurd extreme.

It is thus that the objectors' contentions in all the above discussions were correct to a certain extent and were wrong only because they were unreasonably one-sided, clinging obstinately, as they did, to a particular aspect of the thing under consideration. Valid knowledge consists in a comprehensive view of it. Let us revert to our example of the fruit-bearing mango-tree. When in front of the tree one may make any of the following statements:—

(a) Regard being had to the fact that all experience and all phenomena are absolutely unsubstantial, there is the void (Śūnya).

(b) There is an idea, for the moment being of a fruit-bearing mango-tree.

(c) There is an idea, for the moment being,

of a fruit-bearing mango-tree and there is a fruit-bearing mango-tree for the moment being.

(d) The fruit-bearing mango-tree as well as the idea of it, are unreal; it is the ultimate existence that underlies them which alone is the reality.

(e) I, as a real substance, am absolutely devoid of any character; the consciousness of a fruit-bearing mango-tree is attached to this substance *ab extra*, though intimately. Similarly, the substance underlying the mango-tree is one absolutely devoid of any feature; the mode of fruit-bearing is externally attached to this substance.

(f) The particular reality of a fruit-bearing mango-tree is there; a particular experience corresponding to this particular external reality is there, these particular facts, however, are incapable of being expressed in language, even in such words, as 'this mango-tree bears fruits '

Each of the above statements is true in a certain sense; nay, there may sometimes be some usefulness in making any one of those statements in exclusion of the others. But no one of these statements is a complete and true representation of the actual tree under observation. A correct view of the experiential fact would be

had when it is understood as follows and it would be truly expressed when it is put in the following manner: I am essentially persisting conscious real subject, modified for the time being into a real perceiving-self, and am cognising an essentially persisting unconscious real object modified for the time being, into a real mango-fruit-bearing tree.

Correct knowledge is thus a correct cognition of all the particular aspects of a thing under observation,—the particular cognitions of the particular aspects, not simply juxtaposed nor even summed up in a loose total but perfectly harmonised and unified into an all-comprehensive representation of the thing as a whole. It is important to bear in mind this characteristic of "valid knowledge", in as much as the Syad-vāda or the Anekānta-vāda which is the distinguishing feature of the Jaina Epistemology claims to be the only real form of it. In the following chapters, an attempt will be made to show how the Anekānta-Vāda substantiates its claim to valid knowledge, by incorporating into it all the possible partial views regarding a fact of experience and unifying them all in an organised totality and completeness of knowledge.

CHAPTER I.

Postulates of the Seven-Fold Predications.

Correct knowledge consists in a faithful understanding of the exact nature of an object. The object, however, has almost an infinite number of features and tendencies,—some known, some in the process of being discovered e. g. by empirical sciences and many, as yet unapprehended. An ideally complete knowledge would thus practically amount to omniscience. It would involve correct understandings of all the features of the object, known and unknown and require an infinite number of propositions to be expressed and communicated to others. In the mundane sphere such a knowledge is an obvious impossibility.

What then is our ordinary knowledge which we call correct philosophical knowledge? It should be remembered that philosophy aims at no discovery of properties in a thing. It is not its business to enquire what attributes, tendencies

and activities a thing is endowed with. Philosophy starts with the data of innumerable features inhering in a thing and its business is to find out in what manner these features are connected with the thing. There may, however, be an initial difficulty in the way of philosophy in this form viz, that the features of the object being many, some of which are known, some partially known and some wholly unknown, it may not be possible for one to determine the relationship of those features to their basis i. e. the object. This initial difficulty in the way of the correct knowledge of things is not negligible; it has given rise to various forms of scepticism from time to time in the history of philosophy; and many honest enquirers of truth have at last yielded to despair, that it is after all unattainable.

Rigid scepticism, however, cannot retain permanent hold on philosophical thought; the very conclusion,—that truth is unknowable,—is a discovery of some form of truth itself known and determined. The only way of escaping initial difficulty and making valid knowledge possible would be to single out one of those features which is known and to study it in relation to the object. As regards the remaining other features of the thing, it may be held that they

are either identical with that singled-out feature in some respects or different from it. In the former case, there cannot be any question that the relationship found to subsist between the singled-out feature and the thing would also apply to the case of the remaining other features. A little consideration would show that the latter case also should present no difficulty. In philosophy, we deal with the ultimate conditions of all relations. All features or attributes of a thing—no matter whether they are similar to or different from each other,—are but the fundamental features and attributes of the thing; so that the ultimate conditions that govern the relationship of one of them to the object would also govern that between the other attributes and the thing.

Before we consider those ultimate conditions of relationship between a thing and its features, we may briefly note some points regarding the features themselves. As stated above, they may be treated either as identical with or different from each other. Where such successful identification or differentiation is not possible, much useful purpose may be served by a reasonable application (Upachara) of the principles of identification or differentiation, as the case may be. Let us take the example of a mango-fruit, having

(1) sweet taste and (2) yellow colour. In a manner, these two attributes of sweet taste and yellow colour may be identified. (i) They are contemporaneous in time; the mango-fruit is sweet, when it puts on an yellow colour. (ii) The sweet taste of the mango is an attribute just as its yellow colour, therefore the two phenomena of sweetness and yellow colour in a mango are identical, so far as their *nature* is concerned. (iii) Sweet taste inheres in the same mango, in which the yellow colour is also found; thus, with respect to their *basic substance*, the two attributes under consideration may be looked upon as identical (iv) Sweet taste is related to the mango-fruit, being in some sense inseparable from it, its yellow colour also is related to it in the very same manner; accordingly, the sweet taste and the yellow colour in the mango-fruit may be identified in respect of their *relationship to the substance*. (v) Sweet taste affects the mango-fruit and modifies it in its own way; its yellow colour also affects it in a similar manner; hence the two attributes are identifiable from the view-point of their *manner of modifying*. (vi) The sweet taste exists in the same part of the mango-fruit in which there is the yellow colour; accordingly, the two features of sweetness

and yellow colour can be identified in respect of their *place of location* in the object (vii) The *contactual connection* between the mango and its sweet taste is similar to that between it and its yellow colour and the two attributes are identifiable on this ground also. It may be noted here that in Relationship (ii) above, an attribute is more or less merged up in the substance, while in the contactual connection, the former's difference from the latter remains unmistakable. (viii) With respect to their *linguistic expression*, the two attributes of sweet taste and yellow colour in the mango may be identified; when a mango-fruit is said to be of sweet taste, the statement signifies that it is of a yellow colour also and in a similar manner, when the mango is described as of a yellow colour, the description means that it is of sweet taste also; one description thus covers both the attributes.

For the purpose of understanding a thing, the number of its attributes to be considered may thus be *shortened*; the apparently varied features may be identified with one another wherever possible, so that the enquiry into the nature of the relationship of one of them to the object may dispense with fresh studies regarding the similar other features. In fact, the empirical

sciences are investigations into the properties of things as to whether they can be successfully identified with or brought under each other.

Identification of varied features are, however, not always possible; they are neither desirable in cases where the properties of a thing vary from each other in a very real manner. Thus let us take the example of the features of (1) an oval shape and (2) ripeness in a mango-fruit. So far as these two attributes are concerned, they cannot be identified nor can an identification be foisted on them. For the purpose of correct knowledge, these attributes are to be separately considered. (i) The mango had an oval shape even when it was green; accordingly, there is a divergence between the two attributes, in respect of *time* (ii) The mango of an oval shape need not necessarily be ripe; so that the two attributes of ripeness and oval shape are distinct, so far as their respective *natures* are concerned, (iii) What explains the oval shape of the mango-fruit does not explain its ripeness; accordingly, the two attributes differ in respect of their *basic substances* also. (iv) The internal *relationship to the substance* is different in the cases of the two attributes of the oval shape and ripeness. (v) A mango of an oval shape does not carry

the same sense as a mango, ripe; accordingly, the *manners of modifying* the object in the cases of the two attributes are different. (vi) The inherence of the attribute of oval shape in a mango being different from the inherence of the attribute of ripeness in it, the two attributes are distinct from each other, so far as their *places of location* in the object are concerned. (vii) The attribute of oval shape does not attach itself to the mango-fruit in the same sense that the attribute of ripeness does to it and hence the two features of oval shape and ripeness in a mango are different with regard to their *contactual connection*. (viii) The word 'a ripe mango' does not signify that it is of oval shape, so that the two attributes of ripeness and oval shape differ in respect of their *linguistic expression* also.

Now, if it is the business of sciences to discover in an object properties which are similar or identifiable, it is no less their endeavour to distinguish them from one another, where they are really different. And here it is once more necessary to recall the respective provinces of science and philosophy. It is science that establishes by observations and experiments that as a matter of fact some of the features in an object are actually identifiable or disparate.

Philosophy, on the contrary, lays down the categories and conditions, in light of which the identifications or the differentiations are to be judged. The eight considerations, described and illustrated above, appear to constitute a full, complete and dependable list of such categories and it is to the credit of the Jaina Philosophers to have found out those ultimate conditions of assimilation and differentiation of attributes. The eight categories indicated above have been respectively called by them, Kāla (time), Atma-rupa (nature), Artha (basic substance), Sambandha (relationship to the substance), Upakara (manner of modifying), Guni-desa (place of location in the object), Sansarga (contactual connection) and Śabda (linguistic expression).

Knowledge of an object consists in a judgment about it and a judgment consists in applying an attribute or feature to the object. Where one feature is identifiable with the other features of the object in the manner indicated above, we have a synthetic judgment, giving an unitary conception of the object, although it is endowed with numerous features. Where, however, the attribute applied to the object is strictly distinguished from all its other attributes, we have an analytic judgment indicating the relationship of the object

to the particular attribute above. The Jaina thinkers call a synthetic judgment *Sakala* and an analytic, *Vikala*.

In what are called the *Pramānas*, we get a synthetic view of the object under observation. In perception, for instance, we get a whole view of it and in recollection, we remember it with as much fullness of details as possible. In conception we have an idea of either the essential substantiality which persists through its varied modifications or of the class-essence, which is manifested in and through the individuals of a species. Induction presents the general relationship between one class of phenomena and another such class, while in deduction we derive a particular truth from such inductive generalisations. Authoritative sources of knowledge, again, supplies us with whole facts which are eternal verities. Thus in the *Pramānas*, we get complete views regarding an object under consideration and accordingly a judgment in *Pramāna* is always *Sakala*.

The Jaina philosophers regard the *Nayas* as another source of knowledge regarding an object but the results yielded by these are admittedly abstract, in the sense of being partial and one-sided. Of the seven *Nayas* ordinarily recognised, the first is the *Naigama*. Various

forms of incomplete knowledge are brought under it and here for our purpose we shall consider only one of these. It is often the case that one indicates an object or an activity by the purpose to which it is applied. For example, one carrying fuel, rice, water, pot etc., answers that he is cooking; thereby he does not give a description of the objects as they are but refers them simply to the end which they are to serve. This is one of the Naigama ways of describing an object, in which nothing more than a partial idea of it can be had. In the Sangraha Naya, only the general aspect of the object is considered, while in the Vyavahara, the view is taken only of its specific feature. The Bju-sutra Naya considers the object as it is actually modified at a given moment. In all these Nayas, only one-sided pictures of a thing are presented. The remaining three Nayas deal with the meanings of words and here again, each of them fixes upon only the restrictively particular significances. The Śabda Naya does not consider the differences in the *etymology* of the synonyms and the consequent differences in their meanings and holds that all synonyms have exactly the same meaning. The Samabhirudha, on the contrary, goes to the other

extreme and maintains that the synonyms must be held to refer to different objects in accordance with their *etymological* differences. The Ēvambhuta Naya again restricts the meaning of a word to the utmost limit and points out that a word would stand for its corresponding object so long as it exhibits the activity, signified by the word and not for a moment longer. The Nayas thus give but one-sided and abstract ideas regarding their objects and the judgments based on them are consequently Vikala.

It may be observed in passing that like the Nayas, the Nikṣepas which are also ways of referring to real objects may be looked upon as instances of Vikala or incomplete ways of understanding them. In Nāma-nikṣepa, often the person who is known by a particular name, does not possess the attributes connoted by the name. The *Sthāpanā-nikṣepa* indicates the object not by actually presenting it but by representing it in and through materials, other than it, e. g. an image or a picture. The *Dravya-nikṣepa* indicates the thing not by what it actually is at present but by what it was in the past or by what it will be in future. The *Bhavanikṣepa*, on the contrary, fixes exclusively upon what the object is at present and is silent about its past or future.

All these are manifestly partial view-points regarding objects and one-sided manners of representing them. The Nikāepas thus are also Vikāla modes of apprehensions.

It is, however, questionable, if judgments can always be dichotomically divided thus. An object has many aspects and each of its features is particular in some sense and general also in some sense. It is particular in the sense that it indicates some definite attribute in the object, it is somewhat general also in the sense that it is a part and parcel of the course of substance-continuum and as such, can be assimilated to the other aspects in some sense. Dual in the same manner is also the nature of the object. It is the back-ground of a number of varied, yet perfectly harmonised features; it manifests itself also in particular to particular aspects. The nature of both the object and the feature being thus many-sided, it is impossible to look upon a judgment purely as synthetic or purely as analytic. In a synthetic judgment, we have besides the conception of the object as a unitary whole, an indication how the object is particularised in the feature, attributed to it in the judgment. In the analytic judgment, again, we have besides the particular picture of the object in accordance

with the particular attribute, applied to it, a conception of the object as the common ground of varying modifications. A judgment and for the matter of that, all knowledge is thus synthetic in some respects and an analytic also in some respects. This important view-point is taken by the Jaina thinker, Vadi-deva, when he states that every Bhanga or constituent judgment in a theory of correct knowledge is both Sakaladeśa-Svabhāva and Vikaladeśa-Svabhāva. On the other hand, it has been held by some that every judgment consists of an object and of a feature attributed to it and correct knowledge involves a correct understanding of the exact relationship between the object and this attribute. Although our knowledge of the object as related to a particular feature of it, is ordinarily but one cognitive whole, it will, when correct and complete, be found on analysis to have more than one constitutive parts. According to Jaina Sapta Bhanga theory, which will be considered in this essay, the number of these elements of knowledge is no less than seven,—each of these constitutive parts presenting a new aspect of the object in relation to the given feature. Each of these seven constitutive parts of knowledge, however, presenting as it does,

only a partial picture of the object in relation to the given feature is obviously Vikala or analytic and it is only the aggregate of these seven parts which is capable of giving a complete view of the object as a whole,—a truly synthetic or Sakala knowledge. Yet, a third view in this connection has been that, of the seven constituent sub-judgments, the first, the second and the fourth (which will be described and illustrated hereafter) are Vikala in as much as they take one particular and definitely detached view of the object while the rest of the judgment are Sakala as their views of the object are more or less complex, so to say. Be that as it may, the Jainas contend that these seven constituents of a complete knowledge are determined by the seven forms of enquiry or study and the consequent findings thereon regarding the object as related to the given attribute. It is said that these enquiries are started on seven forms of questionings that are naturally made on the application of the feature to the object. What is more important to notice in this connection is that according to the Jaina Philosophers these subjective questionings, enquiries and findings regarding the object have their grounds in the nature of the object itself. So that if our knowledge

of an object, when correct and complete, is found, to have seven constitutive parts, we are to hold that an analysis of the nature of the object itself will be found to present seven corresponding aspects. In Jaina Philosophy, the famous Hegelian doctrine—'the Real is Rational and the Rational is Real'—is thus admitted, though of course, not on Hegelian grounds.

So the above is a cogent answer to rank scepticism. An object admittedly has many aspects and if we are to know all these aspects, our knowledge of the object will necessarily be constituted of infinite parts. Such a knowledge is nothing short of omniscience which is not the actual heritage of ordinary man. Still, true knowledge of a thing on the empirical plane is not unattainable. We may take one of the aspects of the object which is in some sense representative of the other aspects and study the object in relation to it. In such a case, we shall have a synthetic conception of the object as a whole. Or, we may relate the object to aspect of it which is singular in its way and thereby have an analytic view of the object. It will be seen that whether synthetically studied or analytically studied, the object in relation to a given aspect of it will present no less than seven natures in

it,—although all these seven natures are harmonised into one whole i. e. the unitary object of our experience. Such knowledge of object-synthetic and analytic—are possible and are attained by all honest and patient enquirers. According to the Jainas, right knowledge presents an object exactly as it really is and the real object is a correct unity-in-multiplicity in more than one sense. First of all, it stands and continues unchanged in its substantial essence amidst its infinite aspects and varying modifications. Each aspect again when studied in connection with the object will reveal no less than seven sub-natures (so to say) within the unitary total nature of the object. This is roughly the doctrine of the *Anekanta-Vāda*, which in this aspect of it is opposed to a prominent mode of scepticism.

CHAPTER II.

The First Predication.

The first of the seven ways of relating an attribute, feature or modifications to an object-the first predication as it is called-is to think of the relationship as an affirmative one and its expression in language would be a positive statement. The stock example of this first predication in the Jaina philosophical works consists in taking Ghata or a pitcher as the object and Astitva or existence, as an attribute, aspect or modal feature of that object and then stating "The Pitcher Exists."

To the proposition are added two extremely important indeclinables viz. "Syat" and "Eva", the former at the beginning of the proposition and the latter, towards the end, just before the last word expressing the object. In Sanskrit, the first predication accordingly stands as :

Syadastyeva Ghatah
Syat-asti-eva Ghatah

The word, Syat, is often translated as "perhaps" or "may be". The translation is certainly wrong, as it does not carry the sense in which the word, Syat, is used by the Jaina thinkers. The first predication is not intended to mean that 'the pitcher may exist' or that 'perhaps it exists'. No; so far as the Jain philosophers are concerned, they are never in doubt that the pitcher exists. They do hold that existence as a matter of fact must be attributed to the object, pitcher. They mean only that the relationship between the pitcher and existence is not absolute and unconditional. When one says that the pitcher exists, -as it certainly does, -it exists under certain conditions. The statement thus means that 'in some respect', the pitcher is existent and the word, Syat, is intended to refer to those (all-important conditions of existence. The word Syat, suggests also that there are other aspects or attributes equally applicable to the object, pitcher but that these, instead of being denied, are either sub-ordinated to existence or left out of consideration, for the time being.

The indeclinable, Eva, is sometimes omitted in the statement but its usefulness, -nay, its indispensableness, -is not to be forgotten therefore. 'Eva' imports definiteness and certainty in the

relationship. As pointed out above, there is no room for any 'perhaps' or 'may be', so far as the factum of relationship between the pitcher and existence is concerned. The relationship is certain, unambiguous and definite and Eva is intended to emphasise the certainty and definiteness of this relationship.

Words, Eva and Syat, have their place in each of the seven-fold predications and in each of those propositions, their significations and usefulness are the same, as indicated above. In order to guard against the charge of quibbling and substance-less argumentation, the Jaina thinkers take care in enjoining that in the application of the sevenfold predications, it is to be seen at the outset that the relationship between the object and the modal feature under consideration is consistent with facts of observation and reason. Thus, to start wranglings on such predications as "Air is solid" or 'Fire quenches thirst' is to be condemned as misapplications of the doctrine of Syad-vada.

It is not to be thought that the sevenfold predications apply only to cases or highly philosophical interest. The scope of Syad-vada is really unlimited and comprehends every case where correct knowledge is sought for. As will be shown

hereafter, not only metaphysical but ethical, social, political, religious and even scientific problems requiring solution should require the cautious applications of the methodology of the Sapta Bhanga. Our commonplace illustration of the mango-tree assumes a solemn appearance when for the clarification of what is implied in it, the doctrine of Anekanta-Vada is brought to bear upon it. It would then stand as—

In some respects, that mango-tree is undoubtedly a fruit-bearing tree.

The Syad-Vada consists in an exposition of the relation of an object to one of its given modes or features and its exposition is not one or two absolute or unalterable judgments about the relation but it is constituted of seven considerations each presenting one definite aspect of the relationship. It is at once a law of understanding and a law governing all realities, psychical and unconscious. The Sapta Bhanga is a unique theory and is better understood when distinguished from other doctrines regarding the object and its mode.

A new mode presupposes modification of the object and modifications involve some change. Explanation of modifications thus refers to the ultimate question of the substance and the differ-

ent aspects which it successively puts on. These aspects, as is obvious, are changing without stop and elusive in some sense. This elusive character of all changes led Parmenides to hold that the changing aspects are but illusory and the being underlying them is the only reality. This abstract monism, denying the reality of all phenomenal changes is scarcely less rigorous in Spinoza whose speculation is found to lead to acosmism, ultimately. The reality of the phenomena is similarly denied in the Māya-vāda School of the Vedānta. The opposite view was propounded in ancient Greece by Heraclitus whose theory implied that phenomena changing ceaselessly and in quick succession were the only realities that we have and the hypothesis of a persistent substance underlying them is uncalled for. This was also the position, taken by the Buddhist Kśānika-Vāda. So far as our experience is concerned, the doctrines of the exclusive reality of the substance or of the modal changes appear to be equally abstract and are to yield to a theory of a concrete object having substance and mode as its two equally real aspects. The question thus recurs: ~~How~~ How is the substance modified? Leibnitz's ultimate reals were called 'monads.' These units of substance were endowed with an innate sponta-

neity for infinite development. It is owing to this inherent capacity for evolution and self-realisation,—an activity comparable to the energising of life,—that continuous modifications appear in the monads. It is important to bear in mind that each of the monads although “mirroring the universe” in itself was conceived as “perfectly windowless”, having nothing to do with its neighbouring monad,—so that all its developments, evolutions and modifications were strictly from within and governed exclusively by the law of its being.

To Hegel similarly, the idea of the self-centred and rigidly identical substance of the schools of Parmenides and Spinoza was too abstract to be acceptable. Such a substance was too unworking to account for the modal realities that were evolved from it. Accordingly, the substance was conceived by Hegel, as of the nature of an idea and was supposed to realise itself in and through its ‘others’ evolved from within itself and harmonised with it in a higher and concrete unity. Hegel’s was thus a spiritual conception of substance and all modifications of the substance were according to him but steps of the essential substance-idea in its march towards eternal self realisation through continuous self-differentiations and progressive syntheses.

If the Leibnitzian monad-substance was vitalistic and the Hegelian idea-substance was panlogistic, Schopenhauer's conception of the basic substance was voluntaristic. Primal substance according to Schopenhauer, consists in a volitional activity, an unconscious will, a blind urge towards an end, originally unconceived. All changes, all modifications in a substance are evolutions from within itself in its incessant endeavours to satisfy its inherent burning hunger which, so long as primal substance lives and exists is even insatiable.

It will be seen that in all the three explanations above of changes and modifications in an object, exclusive stress is laid on the inherent nature of the substance underlying the object that undergoes the modifications. The evolutionists of the natural selection school, on the other hand, contend that environments influence a being in various ways and thereby bring about changes and modifications in it. Of the modifications thus brought about, some are useful to the animal in the matter of its struggle for existence and of the preservation of its race; these beneficial modifications are selected by nature and conserved. Changes in a living being are thus accounted for by the natural selectionists, by the

outside forces and environmental influences operating upon it.

Between the protagonists of inherent force and of the external influences bringing about modifications in a being, the Lamarkian School may be said to hold the mean. The Neo-Lamarkian biologists admit that the environmental circumstances have undoubtedly a hand in the structural modification of an animal; but they contend that the influence of those external factors is but indirect. The animal in the midst of the outside forces is compelled to adjust itself to them as best as it can. It is the activities for self-adjustment and self-preservation in response to the operations of the environmental forces, that generate the necessary changes in the structures of an animal. This explanation of modifications as due to activities of self-adjustment in an animal answering to outside influences has been applied to the case of mental modifications also by the thinkers of the School of Spencer.

The theories about changes and modifications considered above, relate mostly to organic evolution but the principles underlying them may as well be applied to the cases of all substances. Monads may be,—and as a matter of fact have been—

considered by some to be material points as well. What is matter is but the category of the 'other' in the Hegelian dialectic, which also proceeds, spirit-like by self-estrangement and a higher self-synthesis in the course of its own self-realisation. Schopenhauer himself admits that the basic blind will manifests itself as material forces at the starting steps of the cosmic evolution. The biologists of the evolutionary school find the principles of organic evolution foreshadowed in the actions and reactions of inorganic bodies. Thus all the various theories of modification may be brought under the following heads. On the one hand, we have the theories, according to which all changes in a substance are evolved from within. On the other, there are the views that modifications in a substance are brought about by forces, external to it. The Lamarkian and the Spencerian theories of evolution put forward an unextreme view in respect of the above two stand-points. They agree with the former and admit that changes proceed from within,—in some senses i. e., are evolved from the nature of the object only, when there is the requisite (Yogya) collocation of environmental phenomena. They agree with the latter view also to some extent and say that

in some sense, changes in an object are the results of outside influences, operating upon it,—meaning that it is only when these extraneous forces are harmonised with the inner nature of the object that modifications appear in it.

Essentially similar is the position taken by the Syad-vāda, when a feature or modification is applied to an object. According to the Jainas, a modification is found to be effected in a body, on account of the following factors :—

(1) Kala or time Every phenomenon has its own time for its emergence. A mango-tree would bear its fruit only in the summer seasons and not at any other time.

(2) Svabhava or nature It is from a mango-tree alone that we can expect to have a mango-fruit; to expect mangoes from any other tree would be madness.

(3) Karma or ante-natal tendency Mango-tree is a tree; that this tree should grow into a mango-tree, capable of yielding-fruits, is a fact which was determined by ante-natal causes i. e. circumstances before the tree came into existence.

(4) Udyama or activity. The mango-tree cannot produce mango-fruits, unless the biologi-

cal forces that make a tree bear fruits are put into operation by the tree.

(5) Niyati or accidental element. Events sometimes occur all unexpected i. e. without any assignable causes. A prominent instance of this even in the scientific sphere is the curious result obtained by De Vries in his famous experiments on some trees. Evolution in the organic world is supposed to be continuous ; it always proceeds by small variations—nature preserving the variations that are useful and transmitting them to offsprings. In some of his experiments, however, notably on some trees De Vries found that large variations were suddenly emergent in the progeny without any assignable causes whatsoever. This has led many biologists to doubt the tenability of the current view that organic evolution is uniformly continuous. From many other observations and similar experiments, De Vries came to the conclusion that evolution is often discontinuous, which is another way of saying that sometimes accidental and unknown factors intervene in the emergence of a phenomenon.

It would be seen that of the above factors in the modifications of an object, the first and the last are external and the rest, internal. The five factors or elements do not operate, each indepen-

dently of the other Speaking comprehensively, it may be said that a modification or change in the object occurs, when there being the proper Kala for it and a Niyati, if any,—the central factor i. e. the Svabhava of the object, already determined in a peculiar manner by Karma and equipped with its usual Udyama, adjusts itself accordingly. From this, it will be manifest that a change or modification in an object cannot be an absolute event; it occurs within a limited scope and is regulated and conditioned by the being and the becoming of the object properly adjusted to the circumstances surrounding it. The Jaina philosophers mean this adjustment by the “nature” of the object to the circumstances outside it by pointing out that in the case of a predication about an object, the assertion is to be held to be true only in respect of (1) the peculiar being of the object itself (Sva-dravya), (2) the peculiar location of the object i. e. the place, as adjusted by the object to itself (Sva-Ksetra); (3) the peculiar time i. e. time as adjusted by the object to its being and becoming (Sva-Kala) and (4) the peculiar becoming of the object at the time (Sva-Bhava).

Thus in explaining the stock example of ‘existence’ being attributed to the “Pitcher”,

the relationship between the two is circumscribed with as much precision and exactitude as possible. For the proposition, 'the pitcher exists', taken as it is, may refer to an absolute and inseparable connection between "the pitcher" and "existence" under all circumstances. But to understand that proposition in that way is not justifiable. Suppose the pitcher is made of earth and that being the case, it is only correct to hold that the pitcher exists in respect of its own constituent substance viz., earth; that in other words, it exists as an earthen pitcher only. Suppose again, the judgment, 'the pitcher exists', is made on a day in the summer season; in that case, the existence of the pitcher can be validly affirmed with respect to that time only; in other words, in that case, precision and exactitude would require us not to go beyond saying that the pitcher is existent only on that said day in the summer season. Thirdly, let us assume that the pitcher, of which existence is affirmed is found at Pataliputra; in that case, it would be correct only to say that the pitcher exists as a pot in Pataliputra alone. Lastly, let us assume that the pitcher in question is of red colour; it would then be necessary on our part to be precise by saying that the pitcher exists only as a thing of red colour.

In the same manner, with reference to our commonplace example of the mango-tree bearing fruits it would be competent only to say that the tree in question being possessed of the nature of a mango-tree yields the mango-fruits. Secondly the mango-tree should be held to yield fruits only if it grows in a hot country like India. In the third place, it should be noted that the mango-tree would yield mango-fruits only in a particular season of the year. And lastly, it is to be remembered that inspite of the facts that the tree is a mango-tree, that it is growing in a hot country like India and that the proper season for the mango-fruits has set in, the tree in question would bear fruits only if it is in a particular condition e. g. the state of full growth.

✓ The above manner of limitation and circumscription of the scope of an object in relation to a phenomenal feature of it, is not quibbling or indulgence in abstract philosophical disquisitions, having no theoretical importance or practical utility. To understand a relation in connection with the nature, the time, the place and the peculiar state of the subject of the relation is the only way of determining it exactly; it is the only safeguard against misconception and as such, of great use in our practical life. The following

examples from the present day politics would corroborate what we say.

1. Just at the start of the last world-war, Germany concluded a treaty with Russia and Hitler declared pompously that his country was thenceforward in "eternal friendship" with her. Hitler's was an absolute statement and it was wrong as proved later on. Russia became Germany's friend, no doubt;—but only 'in some respects' i. e. with reference to and for a particular period of time only. Hitler committed the mistake of omitting this "Syat" of time from his consideration of the Russian friendship and the result of this miscalculation as is well known, was his ruin and utter disaster for his country.

2. In the last great world-war, England was united with America in wonderful amity. This amity was more than an ordinary political friendship between any two countries; the English people were freely supplied by America with everything they required and were literally saved from complete destruction. There was friendship of America with France also but this did not save France and the French people from the German subjugation and to observers it appeared not unjustifiably that there was some difference in American dealings, so far as England and

France were concerned. What was the reason ? Some suppose that one reason, *inter alia*, was that the Americans were the kindred of the English people. If this reason be held to be valid, then America's friendship with the English people should be carefully distinguished from that with France. Whereas the "Syāt" in the case of the latter relates to the outward i. e. merely the strategic nature of the French and the American peoples, in the case of the former, the 'Syāt' relates to the inmost i. e., the phylogenetic "nature" of the two nations.

3. Take the case of the Marshal plan. America is supposed to be anxious for reconstructing the prosperous economic position of the peoples who suffered in the last War. She has, however, not yet allotted any amount for the uplift of economic condition of India, the Middle East or Indonesia, inspite of repeated representations to that effect. Is then the sympathetic and charitable disposition of America underlying the Marshal plan to be doubted or denied ? No. The American monetary contribution for the improvement of the economic status of the suffering countries is not to be understood as absolutely unrestricted. It should be taken to be conditioned by a "Syāt" and the "Syāt" in this case is with

respects to "the place" i. e. the countries of the Western Europe.

4. In the last world-war, a friendly united action was possible between England, accused of being the play-ground of capitalism and Russia, the homeland of communism. It was nevertheless clear from the statement of Mr Churchill when he announced the momentous fact about the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian concord, that neither country while entering into the friendship, gave a go-by to its ideology. How then was the concord possible? The 'Syat' of Bhava-mode or *mood*, as it might be called, explained it. Before a common terrible foe, both England and Russia, notwithstanding their ideological differences, were in the anxious attitude for preparing means of self-defence and self-preservation and this mood or attitude accounted for their amity and united action during the war.

A word of caution, however, should be uttered here in respect of the examples which we have selected from the political world of to-day. We do not mean to say that the facts in these examples are the absolutely unchallengeable ones, securely established by way of a strict application of the doctrine of the Syad-Vada. No. Syad-vada establishes truth and nothing but truth; but, for

this purpose, accurate collection and estimation of all relevant evidences are necessary and these being wanting in the cases of the facts of the above examples, it cannot be said that they are absolutely true, being based on Syad-vāda. The examples given above are intended simply to indicate the manner in which one is to proceed in the matter of appraising the evidences, if he wants to tread the track of the Syad-vāda

The true meaning and the exact scope of a relation between facts or phenomena are thus clearly intelligible only from the application of the limiting conditions of nature, time, place and mood. In this connection arises the question about the character of these conditions. Locke, as we know, drew a distinction between what he called the "primary" and the "secondary" qualities of objects. The former were such essential characteristics like extension etc., which permanently existed in the material objects, no matter whether any one perceived them or not. The secondary qualities like colour, sound etc., on the contrary, did not inhere in the essential substance of matter but were dependent on the percipient's apprehensions. Berkeley took the next step and contended that even the so-called primary attributes of material bodies were but

subjective ideas in a percipient's mind and as such, had no existence outside and independent of those ideas. The result was the conception of the world as an aggregate of sensations only with no persistent perceiving self nor any background of outside reality. Kant, however, restored the realities of the self and the not-self but held that these two realities were not only incomprehensible but were perfectly independent of each other. If then the subject-in-itself is essentially unconnected with the object-in-itself, at once the question becomes irresistible,—how is the apprehension of objects possible? Kant pointed out that although the outside object as it is in itself was incognisable, phenomenal ideas of it were possible and effected through the applications, upon its impressions, of the intuitions of space and time. In the same manner, judgments about objects were possible and made through the applications of the categories of understanding. According to Kant, space and time as well as the categories of understanding were intuitions and subjective contributions from within and did not touch the realities outside, as they were in themselves. A barrier was thus created between the knowing self and the objects knowable; the intuitions and the

categories of understanding were purely subjective contributions and objects in themselves were utterly unconnected with the knowing selves; and it was accordingly unintelligible how any ideas about outside objects or any understanding of relations between them could be possible through the applications of those subjective intuitions and categories of understanding. It was difficult to continue in this impossible position and Kant himself in his *Practical Reason* admitted intimate real relations subsisting between the subjective and the objective realities. It was Hegel who finally pulled down and removed the Kantian barrier between the self and the not-self. He held that the so-called objects outside were also of the nature of ideas, so that the laws of the dialectic of ideas were also the laws of the being and becoming of the objects. A section of the Post-Hegelian thinkers of the realist school retained to some extent the Kantian doctrine of the independent realities of the subject and the object but removed the absolute barrier between them. According to these realists, although the objects are not self-estranged subjects, as Hegel contended, the former have among them real relationships of space and time and it is possible for the subjects to have ideas of those objects and

to understand these relationships subsisting among them, exactly as they are.

The Jaina theory of the categories and the ideas about outside objects is similar to that of these Post-Hegelian realists; undoubtedly, we have ideas of objects and of relations between those objects. According to the Jainas, these are not purely subjective as the subjective idealists of the Schools of Berkeley and of the Buddhist Yogachara contended. Nor are these to be thought of as unconnected with the real objects as they are,—as Kant maintained in his Pure Reason. Nor is it to be held in the Hegelian manner of thinking that the object is but the subject transferred and that the laws of the subjective speculations are exactly the laws of the objective evolutions. Space and time are realities; according to the Jainas, the objective reality also is reality independent of the subjective self; and the varying aspects of the objective realities also according to the Jainas are not unreal. The spatial (Kśetra), the temporal (Kala), the essential (Dravya) and the modal (Bhava) relationships between objects or objective phenomena are real relations, pertaining to the objective realities themselves. They are not dependent on the knowing subjects; the knowing subjects can only know those objective

realities and -relations subsisting between those objective realities and modifying their nature. So, if experience and reason make us judge that what is attributed to an object holds good only in respect of the particular nature, location, time and mood of an object, we are to conclude that it is so because those categoric presentations are not subjective schemata for understanding the outside objects but because they have their basis in the real nature of the object itself.

CHAPTER III.

The Second Predication.

The Second Bhanga or the manner of Predication in the Syad-vada is;—

Syannastyeva Ghatah
Syat-nasti-eva Ghatah

In some respects, the pitcher does certainly not exist. Our commonplace example in its second Bhanga would stand thus—

In some respects, that mango-tree does certainly not bear fruits.

It would be observed that just as in the first predication, in the second Bhanga also there is no uncertainty about the relationship between the object and what is attributed to it. The non-existence of the pitcher and the fact of not bearing the fruits by the mango-tree are asserted in the second predication with as much confidence as the existence of the pitcher and the fact

of bearing fruits by the mango-tree were affirmed in the first Bhanga. As in the first Bhanga, so in the second predication, the predication is not absolute but is circumscribed by the determinants which are referred to by the expression, "Syat" i. e. 'in some respects' Absolute statements are meaningless. A pitcher exists but cannot be said to exist absolutely; absolute existence of the pitcher would reduce it to a colourless, unvaried and rigid self-identity. It cannot be disturbed even by its being a cause in any sense i. e. by its producing anything out of it or by modifying itself in any way. Absolute existence is thus tantamount to unreality, so far as our experiential world is concerned. This would be more manifest if we attribute the fact of fruit-bearing to the mango-tree absolutely. There can be no mango tree, the being of which is unconditionally and eternally tacked to or identified with fruit-bearing. The affirmation of something about something is always conditioned by the schemata of time, space, nature and mood, as we have seen. In the same manner, when non-existence is attributed to something, as in the second manner of predication of the Anekanta-vāda, the negation is not to be understood as absolute. The pitcher is non-existent only "in some res-

pects", and the mango-tree is not fruit-bearing only "in some respects",—viz., in respect of time, space, nature and mood.

In the first predication, determinate affirmation was made of the object; in the second predication similarly only determinate negation is made of the object. The implications of the second predication are that with respect to the nature of an object which is other than the pitcher, with respect to the time of this other object, with respect to the mood of that object and with respect to the location of that other object, the pitcher does not exist.

(1) Thus if the pitcher is made of earth, it cannot be said to exist as ear-ring, made of gold or even as a gold pitcher. This is meant by saying that with respect to "Paradravya" or the basic-substance of a different thing, the pitcher is non-existent.

(2) If the pitcher is found in the summer-season, it is non-existent in, say, winter, which is not the time of the given pitcher but which is the time for things other than that pitcher. In respect of 'Para-Kala' i.e. the time for things other than the given pitcher, the pitcher does not exist.

(3) Let us suppose that the pitcher is of red

colour; in that case, a colour other than red would not be the colour of the pitcher; this other colour is the colour for things other than the pitcher. With regard to the other colours which are "Para-bhāvas" or modes or features of things other than the pitcher, the given pitcher cannot be said to exist.

(4) And lastly, let us assume that the given pitcher is found at Pataliputra; places like Saurashtra etc., in that case would not be the places of the given pitcher; they are places for things other than the given pitcher, and in respect of these other places-Parakṣetras-the given pitcher is certainly non-existent

Coming to the example of the fruit-bearing mango-tree, we may similarly say the following:-

(1) The basic substance of an apple-tree is not the substance of the given mango-tree and is "Para-dravya" for it; the mango-tree would not bear mango-fruits, if this Para-dravya were substituted for the "Sva-dravya" of the given mango-tree.

(2) Cold countries like the Arctic regions are places where other trees may grow but are not the regions where a mango-tree would bear fruits; these

cold countries are "Parakṣetra" for the fruit-bearing mango-tree and in these Paraksetras or places where trees other than the mango-trees grow, the given mango-tree would not bear fruits.

(3) The given mango-tree bears fruits where it is in a particular *state* e g. a healthy growth. The stunted growth which is found in the neighbouring trees or even in itself, when it was very young is the "Para-bhāva", a feature other than what is essential to fruit-bearing and in respect of this Para-bhāva the given mango-tree would not bear fruits.

(4) The *time* for bearing fruits for a mango-tree is summer season; other seasons e g. winter etc, are accordingly "Para-kāla" for it, so far as its fruit-bearing is concerned and the given mango-tree would not bear fruits in these Para-kālas.

Towards the close of the last chapter, we saw that affirmative limitations of time, place, essence and mood were not merely the subjective categories for our understanding an object but were inherent in the real nature of the object itself. In the second predication, in the same manner, the negative circumscriptions by time, space, substance and feature are to be understood

as going to the very root of the objective reality. In other words reality has as much a positive element in it as a negative one; an object, if it is existent in certain respects, is also non-existent in some respects. This however, does not mean that a thing is non-existent in the very same way in which it is existent. It is always necessary to bear this in mind. Considerable misconceptions have arisen regarding the Jaina theory on account of losing sight of this fact. The Syad-vada has been attacked as an absurd and self-contradictory doctrine on the ground that it attributes contradictory features to an object. This objection will be discussed at some length later on. Here it is sufficient to point out that by attributing a negative nature to the object in the second Bhanga, the Jainas do not contradict its affirmative nature; contemplated in the first Bhanga. In both the Bhangas, the formal schemes of time, place, nature and mood are no doubt introduced; but the contexts are different in the two predications. The scheme of place in the case of the pitcher, for instance, in the first Bhanga is Pataliputra, whereas the scheme of place in the second Bhanga is Saurashtra. The contradiction is thus avoided. For, there is no absurdity, if a man present in Calcutta be said to be absent in

Bombay. On the other hand, there will be contradiction if the man is said to be both present and absent in Calcutta at the same time.

The relevancy of the second mode of predication depends obviously on the reality of negations. The philosophers of the Sankhya School maintain that there can be no negation or non-existence attaching to an object. In simple language, according to the Sankhya thinkers, a thing is always existent. We say, no doubt that the thing was non-existent before it was made and that it will be non-existent when it will be annihilated, but according to the Sankhya philosophers our assertions are not quite correct. They contend that a thing is always existent. Before it was made, even then it was existent; only, its existence was then not explicit; it existed in an implicit state in its causes. And so, when it will be annihilated, even then it will continue in its existence; only its existence will be once more implicit then; negation accordingly can never be real, a thing can never be non-existent according to the Sankhya philosophers. And if negation be not a real fact, the second Bhanga of the Jaina seven-fold predications would be of no real value, of no use or utility whatsoever.

It may, however be urged against the Sankhya

objection to the reality of negation, that without negation, there would be no difference between one thing or phenomenon and another. To say that 'A' is different from "B" is to admit that some features in "A" are non-existent in B. To admit the reality of difference is thus to admit the reality of negation. The Sankhya thinkers do not maintain that the world-system is but one undifferentiated identity. It admits the reality of the manifold. To start with, it admits the dual realities of the Puruṣa and the Pradhana. From the Prakṛti rise the evolutes of Mahat, Ahankāra, Tanmātras, Bhūtas etc., etc.,—all different from one another. However much the Sankhya thinkers may emphasise the fact of the essential identity of the cause and the effect, they cannot deny that the effect explicit is to all intents and purposes, different from the effect lying latent in the cause. The reality of difference being admitted by the Sankhya philosophers, they cannot deny the reality of negation.

The reality of negation is challenged also by the Vedantists. By denying differences and diversities and declaring the one, unvaried identity or existence as the only reality, the Vedantists rule out initially the reality of non-existence. They point out further that perception cannot

give non-existence. It always consists in the apprehension of a positive fact and non-existence is not a positive fact. Non-existence is moreover a judgment, of the form, "This is non-existent" or "there is non-existence of that in it"—and a judgment cannot be the subject-matter of perception. If it be said that non-existence may be perceived as well as a positive fact, the Vedantists point out that it is impossible. A positive fact is one, but facts negating it are infinite in number so that, if those negative facts be held to enter into the region of perception, they would fill it completely, leaving no room for the positive fact to be perceived at all. Recollection also cannot give us any impression about non-existence; for the scope and function of recollection is simply to identify an object of present perception with the object of some previous perception or idea, similar to the former; non-existence is not similar to an object of perception and so, it is beyond the grasp of recollection. Lastly, it is pointed out by the Vedantists that non-existence being a perfect void, devoid of any determinate character and characteristics,—in other words, being pure "nothing",—no inference about it is possible; for inference deals with positive facts with determinate characters only.

With reference to the above arguments of the Vedantist thinkers against the reality of non-existence, it may be pointed out that Vedantist conception of reality as the one, undifferentiated and unchangeable identity has been challenged by all the other Schools of philosophy. It may next be pointed out that all the *recognised* sources of valid knowledge, whenever they take note of the differences in their subject matters, may yield the fact of non-existence as a reality. An inference with a negative conclusion implies negation as a real fact. Recollection, when it is recognition, may not yield non-existence; but often-times recollection assists differentiation. Perception, no doubt, gives a positive impression; but when perception is aided by a differentiating recollection, it will yield the idea of the object with an element of real negation in it. Let us suppose that a jar was found on a spot previously; subsequently, the spot is found with no jar upon it; here, this subsequent perception is, of course, of the spot only; but recollection at once begins its differentiating operation upon the matter of perception and the result is the judgment about the spot with the non-existence of the jar in it. Then again, the Vedantist is not correct when he says that if perception of

non-existents were admitted, it would make the perception of the existent impossible by sheer weight of their number. The perception of non-existence, on the other hand, is conditioned by the differentiating operation of recollection which admits its own object only as the non-existent adjective to the fact of perception. It is thus that non-existence as a real element in the being of an existing thing can be yielded by all the recognised sources of valid knowledge.

The above may similarly be urged against the Buddhist and the Chārvāka views against the reality of non-existence, according to which negation can never be the subject matter of perception which deals with positive factual impressions and non-existence is at best a conception, more a subjective creation than anything real. It may also be pointed out against Chārvāka and the Buddhist contentions that non-existence often impresses us with as much insistent force as an existent fact,—which shows that it is more than a creature of imaginative conception. Lastly, one may add that the Chārvākas by admitting varieties in the ultimate matter and the Buddhists by distinguishing in the first place the moments of consciousness from one another and then drawing at least a provisional distinction between

the contents of consciousness and consciousness itself, practically admitted the reality of difference and as such, were stopped from denying the reality of non-existence.

A word here about the distinctness of the Jaina view of negation is necessary. According to the Jainas, negation is real. Non-existence is as much a reality as existence. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers agree with the Jainas on this point. The former, however, maintain that non-existence is a reality in and by itself. The Jainas, on the contrary, look upon non-existence as tentative and are opposed to the Vaiśeṣika view. To the Jaina philosophers, existence is real, not in the absolutist sense that it is a reality in and by itself apart from and independent of the existent thing, but in the sense that it is a part or element of the nature of the real thing. Non-existence too, in the same manner, is real to the Jainas, not in the abstract sense that it is an absolute reality, transcending things to which non-existence is attributed, but in the sense that like existence, non-existence also is constitutive of the nature of a real thing. Non-existence, according to the Jainas, like all other attributes is the nature of an essential adjective to a real entity,—whereas according to the Vaiśeṣikas, non-existence is

substantive in itself. The Jainas point out that the *Vaiśeṣika* conception of non-existence is open to all the formidable criticisms of the *Sāṅkhya*, the *Vādānta*, the *Chārvāka* and the Buddhist thinkers and that those criticisms are really unanswerable from the *Vaiśeṣika* view-point about non-existence. By depriving non-existence of an absolute and abstract character and by making it a part of the nature of a real object, the Jainas, on the contrary, steer clear of those criticisms.

Thus the Jainas maintain that like affirmation, negation forms a part of the nature of reality. If the pitcher exists in some respects, in some respects it does not exist. If a tree is mango-fruit-bearing in some respects, it is also in some respects not mango-fruit-bearing. Thinkers of the *Nyāya* School admit that non-existence is real but contend that it inheres not in the thing of which existence is affirmed but in that which is other than it. In other words, according to them, the non-existence of the pitcher is real as much as its existence; but while existence-as-pitcher pertains to the nature of the pitcher, the non-existence-as-pitcher inheres only in the things like cloth which are different from the pitcher. In the same manner, the *Nyāya* position is that while the character of bearing-mango-fruits is essential

to the nature of mango-tree, the character of not-bearing-mango-fruits is to be attributed to things other than the said mango-tree. It appears that like the philosophers of the other schools, the Naiyayikas also have failed to appreciate the position of the Jainas in this matter and are persuaded that affirmation and negation cannot be made of one and the same object. Accordingly, the Nyaya thinkers shift the element of non-existence from the nature of an object, of which existence is affirmed, to objects other than it. The Naiyayikas fail to see that apparently contradictory statements may be made about a matter, if the contexts are altered. There is no harm in saying that a pitcher exists in some respects and that it does not exist in some other respects and that a tree is mango-fruit-bearing on some conditions and that it is not so on certain other conditions. Concrete reality is of complex aspects, so that the applications of apparently different features, to it are not only possible but are unavoidable. The Naiyayikās try to avoid a supposed contradiction by shifting the element of non-existence from the pitcher to things other than the pitcher e. g., the cloth. But what about the cloth? Admittedly the element of affirmation i. e., the element of existence as

cloth is inherent in it; so that when the element of negation (i. e., non-existence as a pitcher)-a real element after all is introduced into it, we have practically the contradictory elements of existence and non-existence in the nature of the cloth. The supposed contradiction in predicating affirmation and negation of a thing is not removed but is only shifted by the Nyaya thinkers from the pitcher to the cloth. With the Jainas, however, as shown already, the difficulty is not real. Even with Nyaya thinkers, the contradictory predications should have appeared as not only not impossible but as necessary. An attribute or feature is applied to an object-e. g., a pitcher not as absolute thing but as an object definitely determined i e, as a definite object having a peculiar nature etc etc., This definite and determinate characterisation involves the process of distinguishing it from other definite things. The characterisation of a pitcher as a pitcher is impossible without distinguishing it from things which are not pitchers and this involves negative considerations. Thus it is that affirmation necessarily involves some amount of negation.

Although definite determination logically involves the consideration of negation and negative

things, it is not however to be thought that affirmation is not more than negation and that a positive thing is nothing additional to a summation of negative phenomena. A matter affirmed presents some aspects and features. The denial of the matter presents also some aspects and features which are appreciable in their own ways. Neither affirmation alone nor negation alone can supply us with all the knowledge about a concrete reality; each has its own scope, limits and contents and each presents before us a new aspect of the object under consideration.

The Buddhist doctrine of Apoha is a notorious instance of negation being made the matter of exclusive importance. The question arose, what is the significance of a word e. g. "Cow"? It goes without saying that the word signifies a creature with four legs, horns, tail etc, The Buddhists point out that a word is essentially a concept which is a matter of our subjective creation and as such, is incapable of positively expressing the object of our perception which is rigidly particular (Sva-Laksana). According to the Buddhists, a word is essentially an Apoha or Anyapoha, as it is otherwise called (meaning 'that which shuts out others'). It is so called because it gives rise to "a negative apprehension

in us, an apprehension, consisting in a negation of all beings other than a cow. The primary function of the word, "cow" is thus to remove from our mind all our ideas about beings other than a cow." Now, the word, "cow" no doubt, does shut out the ideas of creatures other than the cow. This negative function of a word is philosophically undeniable and the Buddhists were right in inviting pointed attention to this negative aspect in the significance of a word. But they were wrong in denying the positive significance in a word and its importance and the Nyaya and the Jaina criticism of the Buddhist Apoha doctrine was accordingly, just. The fact is that a word has two distinct significances each of which is real and important in its own ways. On the one hand, it refers to the positive features found in the object signified by it and on the other, it distinguishes that object from those in which these features are negated. As the Nyaya thinkers say, in their criticism of the Buddhist Apoha doctrine,—"you (the Buddhists), contend that a word is exclusively negative in its significance; but this is not what our knowledge tells us... From words - e. g. Cow, Gavaya, Elephant, Tree etc., arise on the contrary, positive verbal knowledges. If you say that the

significance of the word, "cow" consists simply in shutting out the ideas of other beings, then for our positive apprehension of the cow-creature (which we undoubtedly have, as pointed out above) we are to find out words, other than the word " Cow. "

In the same manner, the Śūnya-vāda doctrine of the Buddhist School can be looked upon as useful to a certain extent, in as much as it considered the nature of the world from the negative stand-point. This negative knowledge certainly presented one aspect of a rational view of the universe. It was a realistic study and its usefulness, -Artha-Kriya-Karitva or practical utility, which the Buddhists looked upon as the sole test of reality, -is manifest when it is remembered that an entire moral system and a body of perfect rules of conduct were built upon it. The Śūnya-vāda; however; was wrong in contending that the negative view of the world which it embodied was the only possible rational view and that any positive conception of the universe to supplement it, was uncalled for.

Negation, as we have seen is implied in affirmation but is not to be identified with it. In negation and for the matter of that, in the 'second' Bhanga of the sevenfold predication, -we

come to be acquainted with a new aspect of reality which is beyond the scope of the first mode of predication in the Sapta-Bhanga. While attaching importance to the negative view incorporated in the second Bhanga, we have seen above how some have laid exclusive emphasis upon it and gone to the extreme of denying the reality of the positive manner of predication. The remarkable utility in approaching a matter in the negative manner may again lead to the identification of the negative and the positive aspects of an object. These are to be carefully avoided in connection with the consideration of the negative manner of predication.

(1) Thus, when considering how the Indian people, once so enlightened and high-spirited, have deteriorated in every way on account of political subjugation extending over several centuries, their leaders determined that a Government based on the free vote of the people was best suited for India. This is one aspect of the matter; the present condition (Bhava) of the Indian people necessitated it; the delay would have been dangerous and the Indian leaders have decided upon the introduction of the system of the adult franchise. But there is another side of the problem. The Indian people are

ignorant about the implications of the popular franchise; the sense of responsibility with regard to its exercise is sadly wanting in them; they are not fully aware of the intricate nature of their country's problems. In connection with the condition of the Indian people considered above, this state of the Indian mind is certainly different; it is like the state of a politically undeveloped nation. If the former state be called the Sva-bhava, this latter state may be looked upon as the Para-bhava. If then the Svabhava of the Indian people requires the immediate introduction of the system of adult franchise, the Parabhava recommends its deferring. As a matter of fact, Sir B. L. Mitra, has expressly stated that the adult franchise in India would be a failure, so far as a strong and enlightened government is concerned and even Mr. Rajendra Prasad goes a long way in acknowledging the reasonableness of Mr. Mitra's apprehensions. This latter consideration presents the question of the introduction of adult franchise in an entirely new light; its reality cannot be ignored; and the Government is seriously thinking about the best ways of awakening the political sense in the Indian People.

(2) There is a deficit of food grains in

India. At the present time, India can import grains from foreign countries. The present may accordingly be regarded as India's own time (Sva-kala) for importing grains. Change mentally this Sva-kala, the present time; and take into consideration the period after 1951; this period after 1951 is the Para-kala. There has already been the declaration of the Premier that no grains shall be imported from the foreign countries after 1951. Accordingly, in consideration of this Para-kala, the period after 1951, India does not import the grains. This negative aspect of the import of grains from outside in the period subsequent to 1951 is not the same thing as the present fact of importing grains. The importing of grains at present is an admitted reality; it has introduced a tendency to complacency and freedom from anxiety. The negative aspect viz., the non-import of grains after 1951 is also a reality; it has already led the Government to undertake big schemes for reclaiming and cultivating waste lands and made the people do their utmost for increasing the yield of crops

(3) In Russia, there prevailed the unmitigated tyranny of the ruling class on the one hand and a spirit of revengeful nihilism in the injured people, for ages. It was accordingly a fit place

(Kṣetra) for the evolution of communism and communism, as a matter of fact, has been good for it. There was tyranny in India too but tyranny in India was not of the style and intensity that could be found in Russia. Besides, with all their faults, the Indian people were peace-loving and charitably disposed even towards their worst enemy. Communism accordingly has failed to establish itself in India. With respect to Russia, its Sva-kṣetra, Communism was successful while in connection with India, its Para-kṣetra, it has failed.

(4) Jealously guarding their own national interests may be said to be a part of the essential nature of the European peoples. In the U. N. O. each of these nations is found to be always alive to the national interest of its country and to support its cause with supreme foresight, intelligence and earnestness. Thus so far as the basic character (Sva-dravya, in a sense) of the Europeans is concerned, advancement of the national interest is their policy. Sincere generosity to the extent of self-sacrifice on the other hand, is the essential nature of the Indian representatives, inspired by Gandhiji's ideal of non-violence. This strictly non-violent and self-sacrificing attitude on the part of the Indian politicians, may be spoken of as the " Para-

dravya " in relation to the European spirit of selfish appropriation, The Indian accommodating spirit is opposed to the self-centred policy of the Europeans and so far as this Para-dravya is concerned, the European policy in the U.N.O. consisting in the attempt to advance one's country's national interest at any cost, may be said to be non-existent. The present European policy based on a spirit of safe-guarding the national interest is admittedly a reality; but the above negative aspect of this policy, its negation and non-existence from the view-point of the non-violent principle is also a reality; for, there are evidences to show that the European members of the U. N. O have begun already to modify to some extent their ultra-selfish policy and consider seriously the implications of non-violence.

Thus the negative view-point, as embodied in the second mode of predication under consideration is always real and useful in its own way. It is, no doubt, complementary to the positive view of it but is not thereby identical with it. The negative view does not contradict the positive view as the contents of time, place, mood and constitutive substance in the two view-points are different. In taking a negative view of an object, we come across new aspects, new implications

and new possibilities regarding it and these features are beyond the purview of the positive conception of the object. It is in this way, that for the purpose of a comprehensive view of a matter under observation, a study of its negative features is as essential as that of its positive characteristics. The second Bhanga in the seven-fold predications is important, not because it is a mere subjective category of our understanding but because like the first mode of predication, it incorporates some real and indispensable features in a real object. Negation in other words, is like affirmation, a part of reality.

Here again it should be noted that the examples given above regarding the political circumstances in each of the cases are not intended to represent any absolute truths. Absolute truths can be established only by the faultless application of the Syad-vada which requires a thorough examination of all evidences. In the examples, such estimation of evidences having not been possible, the conclusions stated therein cannot be said to have been established by a correct application of the Sapta Bhanga Naya. The examples are intended only for showing how one is to begin, if he wants to apply Syad-vada to the facts before him.

CHAPTER IV.

THE THIRD, PREDICATION.

The third proposition in the Seven-fold predications is stated as:—

Syādaśtyeva Syānnastyeva Ghatah.

Syāt-asti-eva Syat-nasti-eva Ghatah

In some respects, the pitcher does certainly exist and in some respects, the pitcher does certainly not exist. The statement about the fruit-bearing mango-tree would similarly stand as:—

In some respects, that mango tree does certainly bear fruits and in some respects, that mango-tree does certainly not bear fruits.

Apparently, the Third Bhanga is a combination of the first and the second forms of predication. The first predication indicated how within the schemata of time, substance, mood and place, the pitcher could be said to exist and the mango-tree, to bear fruits. In the same manner, the

second predication described how within those four determinations, the pitcher could be taken as non-existent and the mango-tree, as not bearing fruits. The first two predications expressed two different aspects of one and the same reality. The third Bhanga is made up of those predications and is apparently a simple summation of those two Bhangas.

The third Bhanga, however, is more than an aggregate of the foregoing two Bhangas. The first predication presents the positive aspect of a real and as such it does not exhaust the whole of it. In the same manner, the second predication expresses the negative aspect of the real and consequently, the real in its entirety is not exhausted therein. The fundamental standpoint of the Jaina philosophy is that a real object is a concrete totality having manifold interrelated aspects,—each of these aspects being expressible in one of the seven Bhangas. This would imply that this third Bhanga which analytically is constituted of the first and second forms of predication really expresses a new aspect of the object under consideration, an aspect which was manifest neither in the first nor in the second of the Bhangas, taken individually.

Experience furnishes us with instances in

which it is found that the totality of an object is more than an arithmetical aggregate of the disparate points, constituting it. Of the object under observation, its wholeness presents an aspect which is new and not apprehended in any of its constituents. And the reality of this aspect is manifest both in the cognition and in its practical utility. Take the case of a chain made up of a number of rings. Each of the individual rings gives an apprehension of a ring and quantitatively speaking, the aggregate number of the rings would consist in a number of such disconnected apprehensions. But the idea generated by the chain which is the aggregate of those rings is that of one whole thing. And the practical use to which the chain may be put is also different from that of the individual rings taken separately. Thus in the chain, the constituent rings are before your eyes in their separatenesses and give disparate ideas about themselves; yet they form the chain and give you an idea which is novel, in comparison with the ideas of the rings. It may be pointed out that from the observation of the mango-tree as fruit-bearing and as not fruit-bearing, there arises a similar novel idea about that tree—viz., the idea of the tree as a living entity, manifesting

its vital activities in various ways,—an idea which is obviously different from the idea of the tree merely as fruit-bearing or as not fruit-bearing.

The new aspect, presented by the third Bhanga is thus to be distinguished from those presented by the first and the second Bhargas and its reality can often be guessed from the perceiver's peculiar attitude and the new course of action, consequent on its cognition.

(1) Thus let us take the case of Marshal Tito. He was one of the most prominent supporters of Russian communism. In some respects thus, he was an extreme communist. On the other hand, his care for the Yugo-Slavian people and his first and the foremost endeavours to uplift their economic condition betrayed a strong nationalist bias in him. In some respects thus, he was not an extreme communist. Many people e. g. the Italians lay exclusive stress on the former aspect of his character " Bhava " or mood, as we may call it, continue to regard him as a dangerous communist and have their differences with him, as yet unsolved. The Russians, on the contrary, take exclusive note of the latter aspect of his character, look upon him as a renegade from the Soviet cause and are about to sever diplomatic relations with Yugo-Slavia. The

American attitude towards him, however, may be said to be based on a consideration of both the above positive and negative aspects of Marshal Tito's "Bhava". Yet, President Truman's estimate of Tito does not consist in a mere juxta-position of these. He has taken a peculiar attitude towards him; he has decided to supply to him goods (not out of any eagerness for it nor taking the initiative in the matter) but only if Tito expresses his desire to have them. This American decision about the course of action in relation to Yugo-Slavia is in pursuance of a view, formed from the third manner of predication regarding the question and this view corresponds to a real trait in Tito's character

It should be noted, however, that in the idea as well as in the real attribute emerging from the juxta-position of the positive and the negative elements, these latter do not sink their individualities but continue their separatenesses within the very frame work of the new idea and the new aspect of reality. There is that peculiar attitude of America towards Tito but in that attitude, the two sides of Tito's character are persistently kept in view.

(2) In connection with application of the third Bhanga in respect of the "Dravya" or

the essential nature of a question, we may consider the position of Pakistan. It has declared that essentially it is an Islamic country which means that it is an out-and-out theocratic state where the laws of Islam will be followed and the interests of the believers in the Islamic faith alone will be recognised and protected. Pakistan is thus essentially an Islamic State. On the other hand, the Pakistan Government has also made the declaration that the personal liberty of every one in the state irrespective of his creed, will be safe in its hand. In this respect, Pakistan is essentially not an Islamic state. The Non-Mohamedan inhabitants of Pakistan have suffered from the first declaration and the intolerant acts of zealots, based on that and have left the country in thousands. The foreigners, on the other hand, have put faith in the latter declaration and are out for founding settlements in connection with business and trade there. Yet there are a large number of people and bodies, including perhaps the great Indian Union itself, whose attitude towards the state of Pakistan can be described as cautious-consisting in utmost circumspection in all their dealings with her. This peculiar attitude is due to a consideration of both the two aspects of the

above mentioned Pakistani declarations. The attitude of caution and the consequent circumspect course of conduct are not mere summations of the views and conducts arising from the said two forms of Pakistani declarations about its nature but are novel in many respects. This novel attitude and this novel course of conduct on the part of the neighbours of Pākistān, point to a real novel element in the political nature of Pākistān As we have noted above, this novel nature of Pākistān and its apprehension by its neighbours, notwithstanding their novelty, keep alive in their very being the two positive and negative elements of the nature of Pakistan

(3) Take again the attitude towards Europe, of the U. N. O which is an organisation of nations, both European and non-European. In some places (Kṣetra) of Europe, roughly in its eastern countries, communism is the accepted political doctrine, while in some other places (Kṣetra) mostly in the countries of the Western Europe, that doctrine is denounced. In respect of *place*, thus, Europe may be said to be both communistic and non-communistic. The U. N. O considers the respective political principles of both these parts of Europe and has a certain definite view about the political aspirations of the nations of

Europe. If we may be permitted to say that this U. N. O. view about Europe is that it is the place where the political ideals are in the melting pot, it will be seen that this U. N. O. view does not consist in a mere putting side by side of the two facts,—that Europe is communistic and that Europe is non-communistic,—but that it is a novel view transcending the said two facts and pointing to a real element in the political mentality of Europe. It should again be remembered that this U. N. O. view regarding Europe, novel as it is and arising as it does from the apparently contradictory political conditions prevailing in the two sets of countries, does not, however, obliterate the positive and the negative ideas but maintains their independent existences within itself.

(4) Lastly, let us consider the case of the nationalist China i. e. the China of Chiang Kai Shaik. In her struggle against the communist onrush she received help from America at times (Kala) and she was successful to some extent. At other times again when she received no help from America, she failed in the struggle most ignominiously. To the people of the world, these alternate successes and defeats of Chiang's forces yielded something which was more

the said successes and defeats considered side by side and one after the other in their temporal order. This something was the realisation of the certain and irresistible truth that Chiang's China was wanting in self-reliance and self-confidence. This truth was not a mere subjective opinion of the politically minded thinkers nor of the war-experts but was grounded in the real nature of the Chinese people,—a truth which has been vindicated by the ultimate success of Mao-Tse-Tung. It should be observed, however, that although this truth emerges from the positive and negative aspects of the Chinese struggles, these aspects continue to remain prominent as the back grounds of that resulting truth.

Once more we think it necessary to warn the readers from accepting the facts stated in the above examples, as absolute truths established by the Syad-vāda. The examples are not intended for showing that the process of the Syad-vāda has been satisfactorily applied to the cases under consideration in those examples. The examples show only problematic applications of the Sapta Bhanga to rather problematic cases.

As in the case of the foregoing two Bhargas, the same limiting determinants of time, place, nature and mood, indicated by the word "Syat",

are there and there is no ambiguity or uncertainty about this third mode of predication. It incorporates a view-point which is as much definite as those incorporated in the preceding two predications. The indeclinable, "Eva" is present in this third predication also, with the same pointed significance as in the positive and the negative Bhangas, considered in the last two chapters. In the instances which we have given, it should be observed that the American decision about Yugo-Slavia, the Indian Union's attitude towards Pakistān, the U. N. O's estimate of the European mentality and the world-opinion about Chiang's capacity, have no uncertainty or indefiniteness about themselves. And this definiteness of the respective views is due to their being faithful pictures or subjective counter-parts of the respective elements of the objective reality as they are.

One may feel inclined to hold that the third predication is only a subjective view which may be psychologically right but which, after all, has no connection with an actually-existing element in the objective reality. In other words, it may be said that while American decision about Yugo-Slavia is a psychological fact, we need not go so far as to hold that an actual real element

in Marshal Tito's character has given rise to it. In the same manner, it may be said that while the Indian Union's adoption of a circumspect course of conduct is a psychological fact, one need not maintain that this has its roots in a corresponding actual element in the real nature of Pakistan. The U. N. O. has no doubt, its own view about the European mentality but is this view grounded in a real element in the objective reality viz, the European frame of mind itself? And lastly, while it is conceded that there is a definite world-opinion about Chiang's capacity, it may be doubted whether one should go beyond that subjective view and posit a real element in the nationalist leader's capacity, corresponding to that view.

The Jainas, however, are pronounced realists and they maintain that there are actual elements in the objective reality which correspond to our subjective view about the object. These elements of the objective reality are according to the Jainas circumscribed by the four objective schemata of time, nature, mood and place and refer to seven forms of real relationships. These seven relationships, subjectively viewed and expressed in language are the seven Naya-Vakyas of the

Sapta-Bhaṅga Naya and objectively viewed they are the seven Bhaṅgas in the reality itself. The Jaina view about the subjective-objective relationships may be compared with the realist theory about an external material object and its attributes. We have already referred to the doctrine of Locke that while the 'primary' qualities of a material object inhere in that thing, its 'secondary' attributes of colour, sound etc., are only our subjective ideas and do not pertain to the reality of the thing itself. We have seen how the idealists deprived the "primary" qualities also of their reality and reduced matter itself to a subjective idea. Modern schools of realism, however, protest against this form of extreme idealism and support the doctrine of the independent reality of matter; indeed, some of them go to the other extreme and contend that not only the "primary" attributes but even the so-called "secondary" qualities have a sort of real basis in matter itself. The Jaina theory of the Syadvada is somewhat like the realists' theory of the "secondary" qualities. The Vakyas or the propositions of the Sapta Bhaṅga are expressions of our subjective views about what we have experienced but these subjective views are also

grounded in the objective reality itself. In other words, it is the real relations subsisting in the objective reality, outside and independent of us that are faithfully reflected in the propositions of the sevenfold Predication.

CHAPTER V.

THE FOURTH PREDICATION.

Syadavaktavya Eva Ghatah.

Syat-avaktavya Eva Ghatah.

In some respects, the pitcher is certainly inexpressible. This is the fourth form of predication,—the pitcher is indescribable. In the case of our example of the mango-tree, this fourth proposition would be:—

In some respects, the mango-tree is certainly inexpressible.

It should be remembered, however, that the inexpressibility which is attributed to the pitcher, and to the mango-tree is in connection with the attribution of 'existence' in the first case and 'fruit-bearing' in the other. The ascription of inexpressibility to the object in the fourth Bhanga is thus not absolute; it is always in connection with the application of certain aspect or attribute.

to a thing that it becomes 'inexpressible'. Secondly,—as in the case of the other propositions of the Sapta Bhanga,—the 'inexpressibility.' attributed to the object is further limited by the time, the place, the mood and the nature of the object, as indicated by the indeclinable "Syāt", attached to the proposition. It is also to be observed that the word, *Eva*, signifies that with all its inexpressibility, there is no uncertainty about the object, so far as the fourth predication about it is concerned. And finally, it is not to be forgotten that "inexpressibility" is not a matter of subjective estimate but that it implies a corresponding element in the objective reality itself.

What then is meant by saying that the pitcher is inexpressible? We have seen how "existence" can be attributed to the pitcher and seen also how in some respects it is "non-existent" also. Both existence under certain conditions and non-existence under certain conditions are thus attributable to the pitcher. In the third Bhanga, an analytico-synthetic view was taken of the pitcher, while considering the pitcher as a whole, it was thus found to contain an element of existence and also an element of non-existence. The synthetic view taken of the pitcher in the third mode of predication consisted in the consi-

derations of its two elements of existence and non-existence separately i. e. one after the other (Kramarpana) and the resulting apprehension of the aspect of the reality, although a novel one, kept the constitutive ideas of affirmative and negative sides of the reality, as much intact as possible and as much prominent as possible. But the two elements of existence and non-existence, instead of being attributed to the pitcher one after the other, may be applied to it simultaneously (yugapat). We may consider that the pitcher is at once both existent and non-existent and the new idea of reality that we get thereby consists in a more or less complete assimilation of the two elements of affirmation and negation, almost beyond recognition. So, the difference between the view-points of the third and the fourth Bhangas consists in this that whereas in the former, the positive and the negative constituents do not obliterate themselves in the new idea but continue to remain prominent as its back-ground, in the latter, they are mingled up into the new idea, although analysis of the new idea may hold them up as its two constitutive elements. It may be definitely stated here:-

(1) That the pitcher, both as existent and non-existent at once is possible;

(2) That to apprehend it as such, is also possible;

(3) But that owing to the incapacity of words to express both existence and non-existence in a pitcher, language is unable to express this aspect of the pitcher as a reality i. e., the aspect of its existence-cum-non-existence. The result is the fourth Bhanga,—the pitcher is inexpressible. In the same manner, it is possible for a mango-tree to be fruit-bearing at some time and to be not-fruit-bearing at other time; it is possible for it to contain simultaneously the element of fruit-bearing-under-certain-conditions and the element of not-fruit-bearing-under-certain-conditions. A conception of the mango-tree at once possessed of those two positive and negative characters is also possible. But language cannot supply any word which would simultaneously signify these two possibilities in a mango-tree and we are led to confess that the mango-tree is 'inexpressible'.

I.

As regards the first of the above three assertions,—that it is possible for a real to be both positive and negative, nay, that a real by its very nature is both positive and negative,—

it is important to recall the significance of the word, "Syat". In other words, we must not forget that when a positive character is there in an object, it is so, only in some respect. A pitcher, for instance, was found to be existent only in respect of its own earthen substance, in its own time of summer, its own mode of red-colour and its own place of Pataliputra. It was non-existent as an object, made of gold (other object's substance), of the time of winter (other object's time), of a blue colour (other object's mode) and of Saurashtra (other object's place). Only under these two sets of conditions, the pitcher can be said to be both existent and non-existent and this is what is implied in the fourth Bhanga. The fourth mode of predication does not signify that an object is positive in those very respects, in which it is negative or that it is negative in those very respects in which it is positive. It does not mean, for instance, that the pitcher in our example, is both existent and non-existent, as an earthen pot that it is both existent and non-existent in summer, that it is both existent and non-existent, as a thing of red colour and that it is both existent and non-existent at Pataliputra. It is obviously impossible for a being to be both

positive and negative with reference to the self-same contexts. It is only when the determinants are different that a thing can be regarded as positive or negative or both, as the case may be. This is the only meaning of the Jaina doctrine of Syad-vāda and a failure to appreciate this fundamental statement of the Jaina Philosophy is sure to lead,—as it has done,—the acutest minds to fall into the most grievous of errors.

The original Vedānta Sūtra,—“ No; because it is impossible in respect of one and the same thing ” (2. 2. 33), is taken to refer to the Jaina theory. In commenting on this Sūtra, Nimbarka says—

“ The Jainas attribute sets of two contradictory features, such as existence and non-existence etc., to every object; the correctness of this is not established. It is impossible for contradictory features like being and non-being etc., to inhere simultaneously in one and the same object, just as (it is impossible for) shadow and heat to exist in one and the same place ”.

The commentary is short but contains the substantial ground of attack on the Jaina theory from the Vedānta stand-point. An elaborate dis-

cussion on Nimbarka's criticism of the Anekanta-vāda need not be attempted here,—his charge being so shortly expressed. Nimbarka's, as is well known, is a monistico-dualistic stand-point and it may be pointed out that his own doctrine of the Brahma being both identical with and different from the Jivas is practically an application of the fourth Bhanga of the Syadvāda.

Acharya Ramanuja also has considered the Jaina theory in his commentary on the above Vedānta Sūtra and the relevant passages from his commentary are as follows:—

“ (The Jainas) maintain that all objects are many-sided in connection with (their contradictory attributes, such as) being and non-being, eternality and non-eternality, difference and identity etc., etc., (They point out that it is possible to) introduce in every case seven-fold predications, viz.,—
 ‘ in some respects (an object) exists ; in some respect it does not exist ; in some respects, it exists and does not exist ; in some respects it is inexpressible ; in some respects, it exists and is inexpressible ; in some respects, it does not exist and is inexpressible ; in some respects, it exists and does not exist and is inexpressible ’.

All objects are constituted of substance and modifications. With respect to their substance, all objects are identical in their being, are one and eternal,—while in respect of their modifications, they are opposite of these. The modifications are the states of the substance. They being of the nature of both being and non-being, everything is proved to be both existent and non-existent etc.,”.

“In criticism of this (Jaina theory) the aphorism (of the Vedānta) states,— ‘No; because it is impossible in respect of one and the same thing’. This (the Jaina theory) does not appear to be well-established. Why? ‘Because it is impossible in respect of one and the same thing;—(which means) that contradictory features like existence and non-existence etc. are impossible to be simultaneously attributed to one and the same thing, just as shadow and heat; (the criticism) is made clear in this way. The substance and what is an adjective to it viz, its particular state, otherwise called the mode, are objects different from each other and as such, inherence of contradictory features in one and the same thing cannot be possible. For existence a thing characterised by a particular feature like exis-

tence etc., cannot at that very time be characterised by a feature like non-existence etc. The non-eternality of a substance consists in its being the abode of origination and annihilation; how can eternality which is opposite of these, inhere in such a substance? Difference (of a thing from another) consists in its being the abode of a feature, opposed (to one inhering in the other); how can identity (with that other thing) which is opposed to difference, inhere in that thing (which has been found to be different from that other)? For instance, horse-hood and buffalo-hood are impossible in one and the same animal at one and the same time...(If Ramanuja be asked,-) How can you, the orthodox people, maintain that the Brahma which is one is at the same time the souls of all?-(his answer is) It has been said that all the conscious and the unconscious beings are but the bodies of that "Best of existents", who is omniscient, all powerful and of irresistible volition. And it has also been said that there is an absolute difference between a Body and the Owner of the Body on the one hand and their features on the other. Besides, the six substances such as the soul etc., (admitted by the Jainas) cannot be brought under one class; and hence it is difficult

to prove that with respect to their substratum, the six substances are but one and with respect to their modifications, they are many. If you contend that each of the six substances is one and many with reference to its own substratum and its own modifications respectively, then your fundamental position,—that all substances are many-sided,—is contradicted, inasmuch as there is no identity between those substances.”

The first point in Ramanuja's criticism is that 'Substance' is the substantive and the 'mode,' its adjective and as such, the substance and the mode are distinct categories and that they being absolutely distinct, substantiality and modification cannot be applied to one and the same object. The Jainas do not admit the absolute separation of the substance from the mode. According to them, the substance is what persists, although it is modified in from modes to modes and the modes, although different from each other are identical with reference to the substance which underlies them. There is thus no absolute line of demarcation between the substance and the mode and there is no contradiction in looking upon one and the same object as substance and mode in the manner indicated in the fourth Bhanga of the Syad-vāda. Secondly, it is pointed out

by Rāmanuja that contradictory features cannot be attributed to one and the same object at one and the same line (Tadanimevā). If, by Tadanimeva, Rāmanuja means 'with reference to the same contexts of place, nature, time and mood,' the Jainas would have no objection to what he has stated. But if these contexts are varied, there is no reason why varying features would not be applied to the object. Rāmanuja contends that origin and decay are non-eternal features and that they are necessarily different from eternality. How can these contradictory features be attributed to the Dravya or the substance? The Jainas would reply that if by substance is meant the abstract eternal, immutable self-identity, then, of course the non-eternal features of origin and annihilation cannot be applied to the substance. But if by Dravya one means the substance which persists in its substantiality, while undergoing ceaseless modifications, there is no reason why eternality and non-eternality cannot be attributed to the Dravya. As the persisting substratum, the Dravya is eternal; as a particular modification of itself at a particular moment, the Dravya which is then technically called the Paryaya is non-eternal. In other words, in one context, the Dravya is eternal; in another context viz., in the content of the

Paryāya, it is non-eternal. Keeping in view this fact of the difference of contexts, one is fully justified in asserting in the manner of the fourth predication that the Dravya is both eternal and non-eternal.

The same may be said of the categories of difference and identity, applicable to an object. It is true, as Rāmanuja points out that to one and the same animal, the attributes of horse-hood and buffalo-hood are inapplicable. The animal which is a horse is not a buffalo. The former animal is possessed of the features of a horse which are different from the features of a buffalo. In this sense, of course one being is different from another. But this does not mean that the two beings are absolutely different from each other. A horse is certainly different from a buffalo in respect of the distinctive features of each but with respect to the common attribute of animality they are the same. It is thus only a question of view-points. In some respects a being is different from another and in some respects, it is the same as the other, as pointed out in the fourth predication.

Rāmanuja's manner of defending the fundamental doctrine of his own philosophy is not clear. The Brahma of his philosophy is said to be one; he is also looked upon as the soul of

all things, which also are all individually real. Ramanuja's Brahma is thus clearly one and many at the same time, which practically goes to support the Anekanta-vada that contradictory features are applicable to an object. In fact, if it be permitted to hold that Brahma is the ultimate Being, consisting in the barest fact of abstract existence which is modified into the manifold, then a Jaina would have no objection to the Brahma-doctrine of Ramanuja. For, such an abstract being, on account of its ultimacy may be admitted by the Jaina to be one; and on account of the universality of its nature, it is necessarily associated with all the beings of the world. Ramanuja's Brahma-theory may thus be easily turned into a doctrine unobjectionable to the Jainas. Ramanuja, however, does not give this turn to his doctrine. He maintains that Brahma is the personal God, endowed with omniscience and omnipotence. By stretch of imagination, one may posit such a God. But can this one personal God be at the same time many, on account of his being the soul of all the objects of the world, conscious and unconscious? Ramanuja contends that the objects of the universe constitute the "Body" of God, so that God continues to be the one soul, although

permeating manifold. This defence of Ramanuja's position is hardly understandable. According to him, each of the things and beings in the world conscious or unconscious, has an independent reality of its own. If God is to in-form and permeate each of these as the Soul, his one-ness is destroyed and he becomes necessarily many. It seems that Ramanuja's theory of God is maintainable only on the principles of the Anekanta-vāda, as indicated above i. e. by indentifying God, not with a personal being, as done by Ramanuja but with the ultimate bare existence which in its abstraction is one but which from the view-point of the varied existent beings is many. Notwithstanding Ramanuja's objection to it, the Syad-vāda alone, in its fourth Bhanga can thus make his own doctrine of God a consistent one.

Ramanuja contends that the six substances of the Jaina philosophy e. g. soul, matter etc., "reals", as we call them, being essentially undérived from one and the same substance cannot be said to be one from the view point of substance and many, as modes. Ramanuja forgets that many-sidedness is not the peculiar characteristic of any particular substance. One-ness in some respects and many-ness in some respects,—this is the ultimate law of being, the fundamental

feature of all substances, according to the Jainas. To be governed by this ultimate law the six substances need not be derived from one ultimate substance but they are to be "substances" only, which they are in fact.

The law of substance, indicated above, dispenses with the last objection of Ramanuja. He seems to think that conceding that one of those six substances has the one-ness and the maniness as its two aspects, there is no reason why the five other substances also should have one-ness and maniness in them, in a similar manner; for, these five latter substances are essentially different from the former substance. The Jainas in reply point out that inspite of the differences which the six substances have in between themselves, they are all substances after all and as such, are governed by the ultimate law of being, that a substance is one with reference to its substantiality and many, in respect of its modifications. The fourth Bhanga—that contradictory attributes are applicable to an object,—is thus vindicated and the Vedanta objection to it from the stand-point of Ramanuja fails.

We have seen above that the Vedantic criticism

of the Anekanta-vāda proceeds from a misconception of the fundamental view-point of the Jaina Philosophy. It is not the Jaina position that an object is and is not, in the same contexts, that a thing is both eternal and non-eternal, with respect to its substance, that a matter is changeable and not changeable in respect of its modifications. The Jainas cannot deny the obvious fact that contradictory features are not attributable to an object under the self-same circumstances. What, however, the fourth Bhanga of the Syadvāda states, is that attributes and features that are applicable to an object under some given conditions of its place, time, nature and mood, can be denied of it, if those conditions are varied. This is a simple stand-point, fully justified by the experiences of every moment, which the Jainas take in the fourth predication of their theory of the Anekanta. Yet they have been often misunderstood in this matter and even the great Śaṅkara was led to criticise the Jaina theory in his commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtras, on the line of the same misunderstanding.

“ In the consideration of everything”, says he “ they (the Jainas) introduce the mode of reasoning which is called the seven-fold Predication, of the following forms :- ‘ in

some respects it is; in some respects, it is not; in some respects, it is inexpressible; in some respects it is and is inexpressible; in some respects it is not and is inexpressible; in some respects it is and is not and is inexpressible'. In this way, in the application of the attributes of one-ness, non-eternity etc, also, they use this seven-fold Predication. To this (Jaina) theory, we reply that it is not proper Why? The simultaneous application of contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence etc, to one and the same object is not possible They (the Jainas) have spoken of seven objects of cognitive determination and of their definite natures (According to the principle of the Anekanta, the questions may be raised) Are those knowables just as they have been described (by the Jainas)? Or, are they not so exactly? Or are they of a different sort? Or, are they not? Such questions make the knowledge of those categories undetermined and being undetermined, such knowledge becomes unreliable like dubitation. The Jainas may say that according to their theory knowledge consists in the definite

cognition that an object has many natures and as such, it cannot be classed with dubitation. We say: No; i. e. they cannot contend like that. Everything according to them is always of many natures; so, the knowledge of an object also must be of many natures; 'in some respects it is' 'in some respects it is not' such forms of determination make knowledge essentially undetermined and indefinite. The knower and the fruit of knowledge meet with the same fate; 'in some respects, they would exist,' 'in some respects, they would not exist' Such being the case, what would be the justification of the Tirthankara for his claim to impart definite knowledge about knowledge, knowables, knower and the sources of knowledge,—matters which are essentially but indefinite? And why will his disciples follow his doctrines which are after all but undetermined? People proceed to do a thing unhesitatingly only when they know its result to be definite and unambiguous and not otherwise. One talking of a body of teachings, the subject-matter of which is essentially undetermined, can have no claim to being heard any more than a drunken or a mad

man. Of the five substances having constitutive parts (admitted by the Jainas), there may be questions,—Are they five in number ? Or, are they not so ? ‘ In some respects, they are five in number; ’ ‘ in some respects, they are not five. ’ In this way, the number of those substances becomes liable to be more or less than five. Then again, it is not possible for objects to be ‘ inexpressible. ’ If they be inexpressible, they cannot be talked of. To talk about the things and at the same time to say that they are inexpressible are contradictory to each other. Matters talked of are ascertained (in some respects); and not ascertained (in some respects) right knowledge as the result of the ascertainment exists (in some respects) and does not exist (in some respects) and in the same way, wrong knowledge exists (in some respects and does not exist in some respects) well, such talks befit more a drunken or mad man than a reliable person. If the Jaina theory is to be followed, we are to hold that the Heaven and the final Emancipation are in some respects real and in some respects, they are unreal; they are in some respects eternal

and in some respects, they are non-eternal. The result of maintaining such indefinite and uncertain ideas would be an utter want of impulse to act. The Jaina authoritative literature describes the eternally free natures of some souls etc. The doctrine of the Anekanta would justify one in questioning the definiteness of the eternally free natures of these. In this way, it is impossible for two such contradictory features as being and non-being, to inhere simultaneously in one and the same Real, e. g. the soul etc. If there is being in it, there cannot be non-being; if there is non-being in it, there cannot be being there. The Arhata doctrine is accordingly improper. And in this manner, are also to be set aside such (Jaina) doctrines as, 'an object is one and many'; 'eternal and non-eternal'; 'different from others and identical with them'.

The greater part of Śankara's criticism is based on the point that to attribute contradictory attributes to an object would lead to doubt and an uncertain or indefinite idea about it. This question has again and again been taken up for consideration before. Here it is enough to point out that the cognition of an object becomes un-

determined only when contradictory aspects are attributed to an object, in one and the same context. One would fail to understand what I mean, if I simply say that the cup which I am holding in my hand is at once eternal and non-eternal. But there would be no difficulty in the way of the correct understanding, if it is remembered that so far as its basic matter is concerned, the cup is surely indestructible, while as a temporary article, made of that matter, the cup is obviously liable to destruction. Different considerations or contexts justify us in, or rather necessitates attributing opposing features to an object. The attribution of contradictory attributes does not thus necessarily render the knowledge of the object uncertain. It is only the omission of the consideration of the different contexts that makes the knowledge indefinite.

It is interesting to note what Vachaspati Miśra says in his Bhamati, on this point. Although the Bhamati is intended for elucidating Śaṅkara's commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra, it is found to go beyond Śaṅkara at many places, in the consideration of the Anekānta theory. Thus while Śaṅkara has totally omitted the consideration of the all important significance of the word, "Syat",-

Vachaspati has rightly introduced it for the right understanding of the Jaina view.

“If the word, Syat”, says Vachaspati, “be not taken to refer to different aspects of a thing, the word, Syat, becomes meaningless in the proposition,—‘Syat, it is...’ If the word, however, be taken to refer to the different aspects of the thing, the word, Syat, although it does not expressly state so, makes the proposition,—‘Syāt it is’ mean that ‘*in some respects*’ a thing exists. So, the word “Syat” in the proposition of the predication is not meaningless.”

As regards Śankara’s contention about the impossibility of attributing contradictory aspects to a thing, it is doubtful if Vachaspati has supported Śankara on this point. Vachaspati no doubt, endorses Śankara’s doctrines of the absolute Brahma and of the unreality of the experiential world but makes the significant admission that the attribution of contradictory aspects to a thing is not only not impossible but is conducive to a correct understanding of the nature of a thing.

“That which is really true”, says he,
“exists in every way, at every place, at

all times, in its entirety and in a form, perfectly understandable or expressible; it is never non-existent. As for instance, the ultimate soul (i. e. the Brahma). What however, is said to exist only at some place in some respects, at some time and in some manner,—as for instance, the world of our empirical experience,—has only a *practical* existence, not the real existence.”

This goes to show that Vachaspati did not consider the application of opposing attributes to a thing impossible. In fact, he roundly admitted that it is by that method that we know the world of our experience and that this method revealed the true nature of that world,—which, according to him, was of course illusory.

Śankara's view that an object apprehended and talked of cannot be said to be 'inexpressible,' i. e. his objection about the reality of the fourth Bhanga will be considered shortly hereafter.

Lastly, the contention of Śankara that the Anekanta-vāda leads to inactivity and want of impulse is best examined in connection with what Vachaspati says in his Bhamati. He says,

“..... The Syādvāda rejects the absolute one-sidedness in a thing.....

and is intended for making a distinction between what is to be avoided and what is to be striven after. Now, if a thing is absolutely existent (and not 'in some respects', as the Jainas say), it will exist at all times, in all places and in the entirety of its nature. No one would, at any place, on any occasion or in any way, feel inclined towards it or would like to recede from it, actuated by a desire to appropriate it or an intention to avoid it. Because with respect to what is already attained (as an eternally existent fact), the questions of appropriation or avoidance do not arise "

The Bhamati indicates the indirect utility of the method of Syādvāda in the attainment of true knowledge, in this way:—

“What, however, is said to exist only at some place, in some respects, at some time and in some manner,—as for instance the world of our empirical experience, has only a *practical* existence, not the *real* existence, (the world of our 'empirical experience, as revealed by the Syād-vāda, according to Vāchaspatī, cannot be said to have real existence) as the view otherwise cannot be supported by reasons. (The Syād-vāda,

according to Vāchaspati, yields only an empirical knowledge). But such empirical knowledge does not yield the reality. If mere empirical knowledge could yield reality, then the cognition of oysters, the perception of a desert mirage etc., would have yielded a real rope, water etc.. If experiential apprehension were the knowledge of reality, the recognition of the Body as the Soul (as is the function of empirical knowledge) would have been the knowledge of reality and thereby the popular realism would be introduced with the consequent agnosticism. Careful discussion, on the contrary, would reveal that the recognition of the body as the soul is contradicted by reason and so is the many-sided world of our experience. ”

Of course, the Jainas would not agree that the scope of the Syad-vāda is limited within the investigation of the nature of the world of our empirical experience and that the transcendental reality is beyond its reach. They would also repudiate the view of Vāchaspati that left to itself, the Syad-vāda leads to popular agnosticism. But that is not the point here. The point to note here is how while according to Śaṅkara,

the Anekanta-vada leads one nowhere and consists in vague and indefinite doubts, Vachaspati openly recognises its utility and usefulness, as the rational method of understanding the experiential world and hints that when supplemented by the superior way of knowing by Intuition it enables the enquirer to realise the ultimate transcendental truth.

III

It has been shown above that an object is in some respects, at once positive and negative; in other words, that both the elements of affirmation in certain respects and the elements of negation in certain respects are co-existent in the real nature of an object. A question, however, may be raised here, as to whether such a reality, at once positive in some sense and negative in some sense, is comprehensible at all. The Jainas, of course answer it affirmatively.

The agnostics contend generally that no knowledge of reality, as it is in itself, is possible for us. Knowledge being a purely subjective process, cannot be indetical with the outside reality or have anything in common with it. Knowledge is thus wholly unrelated to the reality outside. We talk of our cognitions of the reals outside but all such cognitions are necessarily false. This,

however, is an agnostic position which, in its extreme form is self-contradictory. If all knowledge about its contents is false, then the contention of the agnostic becomes unsubstantial itself. The agnostic moots out his theory; he insists that his theory be accepted as correct; but how can it be acknowledged to be valid, if all knowledge is invalid? Then again, the agnostic contends that all knowledge is false; the falsity of knowledge implies a standard of truth, of which the false knowledge falls short; but how can we have a correct idea about that objective standard of truth, if all our knowledge of the outside reality is essentially false? Lastly, the agnostic may contend that although knowledges about outside reality are wrong, a knowledge which is self-consistent, without any reference to the outside objects, may be taken to be valid. Even this position of the agnostic Buddhist is untenable. For, self-consistency of knowledge implies the validity of the laws of thought and these laws of logic transcend knowledge and are independent of it; accordingly, you cannot talk of the self-consistency of knowledge without admitting the validity of the logical laws; and this contradicts the fundamental position of the agnostic that all knowledge of what is independent of knowledge, is false.

! The Jainas thus refute the agnostic contention about the impossibility of valid knowledge about the external reality and maintain that a correct knowledge of the objects outside us is possible. They point out that the very cognitive processes bear in themselves the stamp of their validity. Perception, conception and other ways of knowing things assure us that they are presenting objects in their true nature and we have no reason to question this verdict of our experiences. Errors and fallacies are, no doubt, there but we have means for detecting them. Thus when our cognitions are not vitiated by those errors and fallacies, we must admit that we have knowledge of the outside reality, as it is in itself.

Valid knowledge of the objective reality is thus possible. The fourth Bhanga of the seven-fold Predication, however, is that in some respects, an object is positive and that in some respects, it is negative and that these positive and negative elements inhere in the object simultaneously. It may be said that such a nature of reality having at once a positive and a negative aspect,—although it may be factual,—is incomprehensible. We can only understand a thing if it is existent; or, we can understand that if it is non-existent; it is also possible for us to comprehend

that a thing is sometimes existent and thereafter, non-existent. But the logical principle of consistency stands in the way of understanding a thing when it is at once existent and non-existent. Kant, in his Critique Of Pure Reason confined himself within the limits of logical categories and was led to conclude that the "things-in-themselves" were unknowable. In reply, it must be admitted that the principles of normal logic preclude the possibility of understanding an object when it puts on contradictory aspects at one and the same time. But it may be pointed out that reality is not limited within the bounds of the logical categories; it transcends the schemata of the formal logic. Admittedly a thing has more than one aspect and admittedly we have the experience of the reality as it is. Notwithstanding the protests of the formal logic, we have, as a matter of fact, the cognition of an object with all its varied features, compresent in it. When, for example, we have the experience of the jar having the positive elements of being an earthen pot, an article existing in Pataliputra, a thing of red colour and an existent in the summer-season, have we not the simultaneous experience of its negative elements also,—viz, its not being a golden pot, an article existing in Saurashtra, a thing of blue colour and existent in

the winter-season? However absurd it may appear to formal logic, actual experience yields us the knowledge of reality with its positive and negative features, simultaneously present in it.

It may further be pointed out by the objectors that the 'fourth Bhanga refers not only to the positive and the negative elements in the thing but to something more,—an aspect which is not merely the aggregate of those two elements. The perceptual process can give us the knowledge of the particular features of the object, while the conceptual deals with the general ideas regarding it. The said new aspect of the object, which is presented by the fourth mode of predication is beyond the purview of both the perceptual and the conceptual processes of cognition. It is thus that not only the logical but the psychological principles also leave the subject-matter of the fourth mode of predication outside their jurisdiction. The Jainas admit that the aspect of an object which is presented by the fourth Bhanga is new. The object in this aspect appears as a unity-in-multiplicity, a 'one,' holding together the varying "many" in organic harmony. It depends, no doubt, on the positive and the negative elements in the thing being put together but goes beyond it. It is not,

however, incognisable or unknowable on that account. The view that the subject-matter of the fourth mode of predication is beyond the ken of the direct as well as the indirect forms of knowledge is due to a misconception about the scope of their subject-matters. It is not correct to say that perception grasps only the particular feature of an object. A perception is not rigidly isolated from the conscious flow; it is influenced by what preceded it and is even modified by the percipient's future aims and aspirations. It has elements of imagination, both reproductive and productive, involved in it, a considerable amount of conceptual matter. Besides the apprehension of particularity which is perception proper and the ideational factors mixed up with it, a perception gives us the idea of the object as a whole, as a back-ground of organised unification or harmonisation of its varying elements. In conception, similarly, we have the idea of a group of common features, tinged with the hue of the perception of the particular individual of the moment and in addition to the cognition of this generality and the particularity, an idea of the unified totality of the concept. Thus both in perception and

conception we have, besides the percept proper and the concept proper, and the ideas associated with them, an additional apprehension of the concrete totality of their objects, of their unity-in-multiplicity, of their harmonisation of the varied elements, inherent in them. This sense of the organised entirety in their objects, involved in perception and conception,—in fact, in all the processes of cognition, may 'be called their Intuitional functions. The fields of perception and conception are thus much wider than what they are supposed to be by the objector, and the new feature of the object, its transcendental aspect of unity-in-multiplicity, as revealed by the fourth Bhanga, is well within the said Intuitional range of those fields. A thing presenting its positive and negative elements simultaneously is therefore not incognisable.

Experience furnishes us with instances in which apparently contradictory characters are ascribed to a being, as a result of which, far from being incognisable, it appears to the observers in a new light

(1) Take the case of the Indian Union, fighting in Hyderabad and not fighting in other places. It is in evidence that the state of

Eastern Pakistan has encroached upon some tracts, belonging to the Indian Union. The Union, however, does not fight for those places but chooses to enter into negotiations with Pakistan. As regards Hyderabad on the other hand, the Union resorted to arms. In the Syadvada way of putting it, India fights in respect of some place (Kshetra) and India does not fight in respect of other place (Kshetra). But is the way of the Indian Union, incognisable for this? No: from the apparently contradictory conducts of the Indian Government, its true character is revealed and we come to know that it is essentially a non-violent state which would not fight unless the nature of a place i. e. its strategic position makes it unavoidable.

(2) Take again the attitudes or the moods (Bhava) of the Indian Union Government in connection with the religious questions. It suppresses fanaticisms of the Hindus and the Moslems alike; it safeguards on the other hand, the religious liberty of all the sections of the Indian community. Thus, in some cases, it takes the attitude of actively disapproving acts done by the people in the name of their religions and in some cases, it puts on the mood of re-assuring them as regards their religious

susceptibilities. But the spirit of the Indian Government is not rendered inscrutable thereby. We understand from it that it is a secular state with the aim of meting out even-handed justice to all.

(3) Let us consider the conduct of the ruling princes of India. At the time (Kāla) when the Britishers were ruling India, these princes stuck to their treaty-rights and maintained the separate existence of their states. But when India became independent, they agreed to merge their states into the Union. In the words of the Anekantavāda, the Indian princes remained separate from the Indian dominion at a certain time (Kāla) and they did not remain separate from it at a certain time (Kāla). Here we get an instance of the fourth Bhanga, if we consider together the above two modes of conduct on the part of the Indian princes. The apparently contradictory characters of their conduct do not render the nature of the Indian princes inscrutable in any way; from the application of the fourth mode of predication in the case of the princes, we form an idea of their love for freedom which is a real element in their character.

(4) Lastly, consider the stand taken by India, with respect to Kashmir. The Indian Union

Government has carried on a vigorous campaign against Pakistan. Yet, it has declared to leave the Government of Kashmir in the hands of the people of Kashmir. In respect of Pakistan, the nature (let us say, the Dravya) of the Indian Government is bellicose in connection with Kashmir and in respect of the people of Kashmir, the nature (Dravya) is not bellicose. Taking together these two—positive (bellicose) and negative (non-bellicose) elements in the nature (Dravya) of the Indian Union, we come to understand, not that it is indefinite or unknowable but that it is essentially “democratic”, which would not brook any interference in the affairs of a people from without, but would help them in the matter of their self-determination.

We need scarcely remind the readers that the examples given above should not be understood as having unchallengeable truths established by the correct application of the process of Syadvada. The examples given above are nothing more than supposed cases in which the process of Syadvada is attempted to be applied.

III.

In the first Section above, we have seen that the simultaneous attribution of positive and negative characters (of course, from different

stand-points) to a thing is possible and that as a matter of fact, reality has both affirmation and negation as two of its real constituent elements. In the second section, again, we have seen that the simultaneous attribution of these apparently contradictory characters to a thing does not make it incognisable ; rather, it presents before us a novel aspect of the nature of the thing under consideration. It is thus that the compresence of positive and negative elements in a real object is conceivable. But this does not mean that language has the means of expressing our idea of the real co-existence of contradictory attributes in a thing. The fourth Bhanga states that in some respects a thing exists and has positive features and that simultaneously, in some respects it does not exist and has negative features, and we can have the idea of the thing with its aspects of simultaneous affirmation and negation. A word, however, has the power of expressing only one aspect of a thing ; it can express that the thing exists or that it does not exist. Language can even express, by means of complex or compound sentences that a thing exists and then, it does not exist or vice versa. A word stands for a simple stereotyped and non-complex aspect of a thing ; it is not elastic enough to

express contradictory aspects of the thing. Thus while the implication of the predication of the fourth Bhanga is understandable by means of the processes of cognition, it is not expressible in a short simple language. All words are, of course, the expressions of ideas but not all ideas are expressible in words.

The reality presented by the fourth Bhanga is thus inexpressible. It should not be unnoticed, however that like the other Bhangas, this Bhanga also is controlled by the indeclinable, "Syat". This indicates that so far as the time, the place, the mode and the nature of the object as featuring, in its simultaneously positive and negative character, are concerned, the thing is inexpressible. But the thing is not absolutely inexpressible on that account. It is expressible, as we have seen, in the cases of the first, the second and the third Bhangas; i e. in the cases in which the times, the places, the modes and the natures of the object are altered, it is expressible in language.

All the same, the object under this fourth Bhanga has a distinct character, although this character cannot be expressed in one single word. It should be observed that the word, "inexpressible" does not stand for the distinct character;

for, in that case, the character would not be inexpressible, being expressed through the word "inexpressible" The word 'inexpressible' in the fourth Bhanga has no positive material content; it is only a confession that the nature of the thing under the fourth manner of predication cannot be expressed in language. We have, of course, in the four illustrations of this Bhanga which we have given above, named the characters, attributable to the objects of those illustrations. It should be understood, however, that the characters which we have named are not the exact representations of the peculiar nature, resulting from the simultaneous attributions of affirmation and negation to those objects. In the fourth illustration, for instance, a bellicose nature and a non-bellicose nature were simultaneously attributed to the Indian Government and the nature, emerging therefrom was stated by us to be a democratic spirit in the Indian Union. But this is only a description of its nature and not an exact representation of it. The word, "democratic" does not stand for the exact nature of the Indian Union, as it emerges from the simultaneous attributions of a bellicose spirit and a non-bellicose spirit to it. The word "democratic" does not express that resulting nature but

points only to a fact which is the surest indication of the reality of that resulting nature. As for the resulting nature itself, we have certainly the definite apprehension of it when the positive and the negative attributions are made but so far as its direct expression is concerned, it remains inexpressible; and inexpressibility is due to the nature and function of words themselves, each of which can signify only one definite aspect of a thing.

The Mimamsakas, however, are opposed to the doctrine of the inexpressibility of any reality. According to them noumenon sound is the ultimate reality, from which the world of objects are evolved. Every object and every aspect of the outside reality must be expressible through their corresponding names because the latter as the fundamental Śabda Brahma which is "Anadinidhana" or eternal, from the very basis of the objective reality. Applying this Mimamsa contention to the case of the fourth Bhanga of the Anekānta-vāda, it may be said that the nature of an object when contradictory attributes are simultaneously attributed to it, is not incapable of being expressed in a word; for, if this be an aspect of the real object which it certainly is according to the Jainas, it has for its basic

ground, the word and as such, it must be expressible through it.

The Jainas like all the Schools of Indian Philosophy repudiate this Mimamsa doctrine of the noumenal reality of sounds. Sounds are produced by personal and other efforts ; they are subject to modification i e. capable of being intensified or lowered in tone ; the fact of their annihilation is also manifest to all. If a sound were identical with a reality, the very utterance of the word, " Fire ", would at once have burned one's tongue. The Mimamsa contention about an object being evolved from its corresponding name, is contradicted by the fact of the accidental character of the latter's significance ; for, the meaning of a word is conventional, after all. There being thus no essential and necessary connection between words and objects, it is too much to say that every aspect of reality must have name for its expression. A fact may be inexpressible, if its nature be peculiarly conditioned and the aspect of reality, presented by the fourth manner of predication is conditioned exactly this way ; for, in this Bhanga, affirmation and negation are simultaneously attributed to an object and it is beyond the power of a word to express a reality with opposing aspects, co-existing in it.

If the Jainas are opposed to the Mimamsa doctrine that every aspect of reality (and for the matter of that, the aspect of reality, presented by the fourth Bhanga) is expressible in words, they are also opposed to the other extreme view viz, of the Buddhist that realities as they are, are beyond the reach of words. According to them, a real is rigidly particular; it has its own practical efficiency. This strict particularity—or Sva-lakṣaṇa as it is called,—has nothing in common with or has nothing to do with the character of any other object. In perception, we come across this pure particularity of the real. Conception cannot yield this particular aspect, as it is based on Kalpanā or a recollection of other matters connected with the object. Conception consists in assimilation and yields a general idea which is not real, in as much as the general idea is neither particular (Sva-lakṣaṇa) nor is of any Artha-kriya-kāritva or practical efficiency. (e g. a general idea of ' water ' will not quench one's thirst). Words are built on concepts or general ideas and as such realities characterised by Sva-Lakṣaṇa and Artha-Kriya-Kāritva, are beyond their reach. We have already shown how it is psychologically impossible to isolate perception from conception. Every

ption is mixed up with the general currents of the mental flow and every particularity is apprehended only as a mode of the 'universal'. Conception also is influenced by the particular perception of the individual and a concept in its concreteness is always a general idea, particularised in a certain manner. Perception again is judged to be valid or otherwise, only in light of the conceptions brought to bear upon it. It is, furthermore, from the percepts that concepts are formed. All these go to show how the processes of perception and conception are closely connected and how the percepts and the concepts are alike indispensable to a proper knowledge of reality. Concepts upon which words are founded are thus not essentially unrelated to the perceptions of reality. Therefore, to say that words are unconnected with the reals as they are, is only an abstract view; even the fact that the significance of a word is conventional indicates that the convention is not wholly accidental or arbitrary but is grounded on some real reasons. Reality is thus expressible in words, except where, as in the fourth Bhanga, it is inexpressible by its very nature or rather, because of the very nature of words.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FIFTH PREDICATION.

The fifth Bhanga in the Sapta Bhanga Naya is:—

Syadastyeva Syadavaktavya Eva Ghatah

Syat-asti-eva Syat-Avaktavyah Eva Ghatah.

In some respects, the pitcher certainly exists and in some respects, it is certainly inexpressible.

Obviously, this fifth statement about the pitcher is a combination of the foregoing first and the fourth propositions of the Syad-vada. A Similar statement may be made about the mango-tree of our example. The fifth judgment, although a complex one in appearance is unitary and simple in its implication. In other words, the reality which is presented by this fifth manner of predication is a simple, unitary aspect, though on analysis it may be found to refer to manifold elements. The pitcher or the mango-tree of

our illustration appears in a simple and novel aspect, when considered in and through this mode of predication and this aspect is as much real as the aspects, presented by the other Bhangas. The word, "Eva," signifies the certainty and the definiteness of the knowledge and "Syāt" refers to the determinant conditions of time, place, nature and mode in respect of which the predication holds good.

The first of the two judgments, which constitute the predication, presents the positive elements of the object. We have seen that the word, "inexpressible" although it does not by itself signify any element, nevertheless points to an aspect of the objective reality which is the result of a simultaneous attribution of the positive and the negative features to an object. Although synthetically, the fifth Bhangā expresses but one undivided aspect of reality, analytically it is constituted of the two following propositions,-
 (1) It exists (2) It exists and does not exist. It should be observed that the two propositions do not involve any real duplication. The first proposition affirms the elements of existence and the first part of the second proposition, although it refers to the same elements of existence, is simultaneously joined to the elements. of non-

existence and the two elements of affirmation and negation, mingled together beyond recognition, emerge into a new attribute which by its nature is inexpressible in language. The question of reduplication does not arise because the positive elements referred to in the second proposition have no longer any real and independent existence but are merged up in the inexpressible.

The fifth predication is not a mere subjective synthesis and analysis of ideas but an incorporation of an ontological fact. The question, however, may be asked, if this predication really expresses any novel feature of the object, which is different from the features, expressed by the first of its propositions affirming the positive elements or by its second proposition, indicating the inexpressibility of the object. The pitcher exists; this yields an idea of the pitcher. The pitcher does both exist and not exist; this also gives some idea about the object. Do we have any new idea about the object,—an idea over and above the said two ideas,—by combining the two propositions? The answer is that a combination of the two sides of the reality, indicated by the two ideas of affirmation and inexpressibility, refers to a new aspect of the reality and a resulting new idea. Examples will confirm this.

(1) Thus, let us refer to our first example, in the preceding chapter. The Indian Union fights in some places (Kshetra) e. g. Hyderabad; it does not fight in some places (Kshetra); according to the fourth predication, the nature of the Union was inexpressible therefore. Though inexpressible, we have chosen to describe it as " non-violent ". The Indian Union is thus non-violent—this is one judgment and the other judgment, according to the fifth Bhanga, is that the Union fights in Hyderabad. The combination of these two propositions,—the fifth Bhanga gives us a new idea and a new aspect of the reality i. e. of the Indian Union,—“ A non-violent state fighting or ‘ a fighting state being non-violent ’ is certainly more than a state ‘ simply fighting ’ or a “ state simply non-violent,”—even more than the two phenomena of its fighting and non-violence juxtaposed. The unitary and the non-complex truth that is implied by the fifth predication is that India fighting in Hyderabad is India having been essentially ‘ injured. ’

(2) By application of the fifth Bhanga to the second example of the last chapter, we get the two propositions, 1. The Indian Union Government suppresses some acts, done in the name of the religion. 2. The Indian Union Government

suppresses such acts and it does not suppress such acts,—its nature is inexpressible. The two propositions combined form the fifth Bhanga and points to a mood (Bhāva) of the Indian Union, which was not implied either in the first proposition or in the second proposition or in the two propositions, simply juxtaposed. We described the inexpressible aspect of the Indian Union in this case by referring to its secular character. The fifth Bhanga thus presents the Indian Union as a secular state suppressing some acts done in the name of religion. Such conception is certainly more than the conception of a state being simply a secular one or a state simply engaged in the suppression of religious acts of its people or even the two facts, simply put together. The fifth Bhanga implies something new, viz, that the Indian Union is “perfectly sincere” in its anxiety to see its peoples develop without detriment to each other.

(3) In the third illustration in the last chapter, the inexpressible character of the ruling princes of India was established with reference to the different times (Kāla) of their different modes of activity. It was seen that they remained separate from the Indian dominion at one time

and that they did not remain separate at another time. These two apparently contradictory manners of their actions rendered their character inexpressible by which we meant that the princes were freedom-loving. To this proposition established by the fourth predication, if we add the proposition of the first Bhanga, we get the propositions of the fifth Bhanga, as:—1. That the princes were freedom-loving and 2. That the princes remained separate at one time from the Indian Government. These two propositions put together give us a new idea about the princes which cannot be found in the two propositions, taken separately or in simple juxtaposition. The application of the principle of the fifth Bhanga in the case of the princes, brings out a real aspect of their character,—viz, a tendency to look upon their traditional isolation as the best safeguard for their independence.

(4) In the fourth illustration of the foregoing chapter we saw that with respect to Kashmir, the Indian Government's attitude was in some respects bellicose and in some respects not bellicose. The fourth Bhanga considered together the two apparently opposing features of the Union Government's stand-point and established that the nature (Dravya) of the Indian Govern-

ment was inexpressible. By this, we meant that the Indian Government was essentially a democratic state. The two propositions of the fifth Bhanga in this connection would then be:-1. India has a bellicose spirit in some respect, 2. India is democratic. These two propositions combined present the Indian state in a new light, that it positively acts up to the noble ideals which it puts before it-an aspect which was not evident either in the first proposition of affirmation or in the second proposition of inexpressibility or even in these two propositions, simply put together side by side

One should once more remember that the above illustrations showing the application of the doctrine of Syadvada are not meant to affirm that the application of the doctrine has been perfect in them. It is not intended that the conclusions therein should be accepted as undisputable. The illustrations show only the manner of application of the Sapta Bhanga, may be, in a most imperfect way.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SIXTH PREDICATION.

Syannastyeva Syadavaktavya Eva Ghatah.

Syat-nāsti-eva Syāt-avaktavya Eva Ghatah.

In some respects, the pitcher does certainly not exist and in some respects, the pitcher is certainly inexpressible.

The above is the way in which the sixth manner of predication in the Sapta Bhanga Naya is put. A converse to the fifth Bhanga, this sixth predication consists in attributing a negative aspect to an object and then attributing both a positive and a negative aspect to it simultaneously. It is thus a combination of the second and the fourth modes of predication. This manner of predication presents a new aspect of reality. Accordingly, if you say that the mango-tree of our example is not fruit-bearing under certain

conditions and the mango-tree in its relation to fruit-bearing is inexpressible in some respects, the proposition indicates something more than what are implied either in the first proposition expressing the negative side of the mango-tree or in the next proposition indicating its nature as inexpressible or even in the two propositions simply put side by side. As indicated by the word, "eva" there is no uncertainty about this novel idea or the usual aspect of the reality, revealed by the sixth Bhanga. Although but a partial aspect of the reality, it is nevertheless as much real as the other partial aspects revealed by the other Bhangas and the corresponding idea of it, as much definite as the ideas, corresponding to the other partial aspects, expressed by the other manners of predication. The qualification, "Syat", as in the other cases, refers to the determinates of time, place, mode and nature, within the limits of which the reality as expressed by the sixth Bhanga, lives, moves and has its being.

What has been said about the fifth Bhanga applies exactly to the case of the sixth Bhanga. Notwithstanding the fact that the sixth Bhanga consists of two propositions viz., one expressing negation and the other, simultaneous affirmation

and negation, there is no real reduplication in it. For, in the second proposition affirmation and negation are mingled up and assimilated into a new attribute altogether, so that there cannot be any reduplication in compounding the element of negation with this new attribute, as done in the sixth Bhanga

This sixth mode of predication, as indicated already is not a mere subjective judgment born of a subjective manner of joining a negative view about a thing with another view regarding it. The sixth predication is an objective category, a real relationship subsisting between a real thing and one of its real attributes. The Jaina thinkers maintain that this real relationship between realities outside is faithfully mirrored in our subjective apprehensions, so that from the novelty of the corresponding idea which we find in us, we are justified in concluding that the relationship subsisting between the reals outside and independent of us, is equally novel. Accordingly, we shall end the consideration of this sixth predication by discussing only our examples of the fifth chapter, as we have done in the case of the fifth Bhanga in the last chapter.

(1). In the first example, we found how with regard to some place (Kshetra) e. g. Hyderabad;

the Indian Union fought while with regard to some other place (Kshetra) e. g. the places encroached upon by Pakistan, it did not fight but chose to carry on negotiations with the encroaching State. This rendered the nature of the Indian Union inexpressible in accordance with the principle of the fourth Bhanga. But although language is incapable of expressing the exact nature of the Indian Union in this connection when two apparently contradictory lines of action are attributed to it, we have chosen to describe it as ' non-violent '. This non-violence is a new attribute, transcending the said two positive and negative aspects. Accordingly, when the sixth Bhanga says that the Indian Union is non-fighting in respect of some places and is non-violent in some respects, it gives us a new information about the nature of the Indian Union. It refers to " wonderful patience " on the part of the Indian State which thus is an essential part of its nature, an attribute which was not implied either in the judgment of negation or in the judgment, referring to inexpressibility or in the two judgments if they are simply placed side by side.

(2). The second example referred simultaneously to both the interfering and the non-

interfering attitudes (Bhava) of the Indian Union in the matters of the religions of its peoples and for that, its nature was indicated as inexpressible in some respect. If we add to this judgment of inexpressibility, the negative judgment about the Indian State that it is non-interfering in the religious matters of its people, we get the sixth Bhanga which reveals a new aspect of the character of the Indian State. The sixth Bhanga will in no manner be a re-statement of the matters stated in the second and the fourth Bhangas in as much as it indicates a novel character in the Indian State viz., "a liberal-mindedness" which is neither indicated in the judgment that it is non-interfering in matters of religion nor in its character as a secular state by which we described its inexpressible nature nor even in the said two judgments, if simply juxtaposed.

(3). In connection with the third example of the fifth chapter, we saw that the nature of the Indian princes was established as inexpressible. With respect to the time (Kala) of the British suzerainty, the princes kept their states separated from the Indian Union and with respect to the time (Kala) when India attained her independence they did not keep their states so separated. The consequent inexpressible character of the

princes' attitude, as established by the fourth Bhanga was, however, described by us, as 'freedom-loving' So, when the sixth manner of predication made two judgments,—viz., 1. The ruling chiefs did not keep their principalities isolated from the Indian Union when India became independent and 2. The chiefs were freedom-loving;—we do not get the same attributes restated but come across a new aspect of the princes' character viz, 'a capacity to act in accordance with the Spirit of the time', an aspect which could be found neither in the negative judgment nor in the judgment of the fourth manner of predication nor even in the two judgments, externally put together.

(4). With reference to the fourth example also, we get a similar simple, unitary and novel idea about the object under observation. So far as the people of Kashmir are concerned, the nature (in a sense, the Dravya) of the Indian Union is not bellicose in respect of their country. So far again as the invading people of Pakistan are concerned, the nature (in a sense, the Dravya) of the Indian Government is bellicose The two propositions render the nature of the Indian Government as inexpressible,—bellicose-cum-not-bellicose, and we have chosen to describe this

inexpressible nature as "democratic". The sixth Bhangā puts forward the two propositions— 1. The Indian State is not bellicose by nature in some respects and 2. It is democratic in nature in some respects. The two propositions when compounded reveal a new character of the Union which may be called 'large-hearted sympathy'— a character which could not be traced either in the second or in the fourth Bhangā or in the two Bhangas, simply placed side by side.

It needs scarcely any reminding that the illustrations given above show only how for the purposes of establishing the conclusions therein, the methodology of the Syād-vāda has been applied. Accordingly, those conclusions need not be accepted as absolutely true,— far less, as conclusion arrived at by a faultless application of Syād-vāda. The examples show only the formal aspect of the manner of the application of the doctrine and do not guarantee the material correctness of the application.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Seventh Predication.

The seventh and the last proposition in the seven-fold predications is put as,—

Syadastyeva Syānnastyeva Syadavaktavya
Eva Ghatah,

Syat-asti-eva Syat-nasti-eva Syat-avaktavyah.
Eva Ghatah.

In some respects the pitcher does certainly exist, in some respects the pitcher does certainly not exist, in some respects the pitcher is certainly inexpressible.

Apparently, this seventh form of predication is more comprehensive than the other six Bhangas but still it is not a complete presentation of the reality; it presents, like the other forms of predications, only one particular aspect of an object, which was beyond

the purview of the other modes of predications. The seventh predication is a combination of the first, the second and the fourth forms of predications; or, it may be looked upon as the third and the fourth forms combined. In spite of the fact that it is a compound of a number of predications, the seventh predication yields a novel and unitary idea, and the aspect of reality which is the object of the idea is also novel and unitary. In other words, as the idea of the mango-tree as fruit-bearing in some respects, then, not-fruit-bearing in some respects and inexpressible in some respects, is different from the idea of the mango-tree, simply as fruit-bearing or as not-fruit-bearing or as inexpressible, so the mango-tree as a reality as fruit-bearing under certain conditions, then as not-fruit-bearing under certain conditions and then as inexpressible in some respects, is different from the mango-tree simply as fruit-bearing, or simply as not-fruit-bearing or simply as inexpressible. As in the case of the other Bhangas, the idea and the reality, involved in the seventh Bhanga,—each of which synthetically is after all but one simple unity though analytically complex,—are certain and definite—as the indeclinable “Eva ” attached to the proposition signifies. And lastly, the word

"Syat" indicates, as in the case of the other Bhangas, so in the case of the seventh predication also, that the aspect of reality presented by it is true only within the limits of its own nature, time, place and modification. It remains for us to illustrate the application of this seventh manner of predication and for this, we shall draw upon the examples, mentioned in the foregoing fourth chapter.

(1) In the first example there, we saw firstly that Marshal Tito was an extreme communist in some lines of his action (Bhāva) and was not an extreme communist in some respects. These two attitudes of Tito were kept in successive views by the American people, as a result of which he appeared in an additional aspect before them viz., as a "reasonable man to deal with". This is the result of the application of the third Bhanga. The said two attitudes of Tito, instead of being considered successively may be considered simultaneously and this would make his nature inexpressible, in accordance with the application of the fourth Bhanga. This inexpressible aspect of Marshal Tito's nature may be said to consist in 'a tendency to avoid the extremes of political views'. Now, if we join together these results of the third and the fourth

forms of predications—that “ Marshal Tito is a reasonable man ” and that “ he avoids the extremes of political views ”, we apply the seventh form of predications whereby we get an insight into a new aspect of Marshal Tito’s character viz., that he is ‘ a morally strong man. ’—an idea, which was not yielded by the third and the fourth predications taken singly or by being simply put side by side.

(2) In the second example, as regards its essential nature (Dravya) Pakistan was found to be a theocratic state in some respects and not a theocratic state in some respects. The third manner of predications considers these two characters of Pakistan one after the other and imputes to it the character which may be described as,—‘ opportunism. ’

‘ Those two features of Pakistan, theocratic and untheocratic, may be considered together on the line of the fourth Bhanga and one would apprehend that the nature of the state of Pakistan is inexpressible in certain respects by which we may roughly mean that it is “ unreliable. ” The seventh Bhanga would combine these two views about Pakistan,—that ‘ it is an opportunist state ’ and that ‘ it is an unreliable state, ’ and yield the

idea that it is weak at its basis, a view which is not contemplated in the first, the second, the third and the fourth modes of predications regarding it, either in their severalty or jointness.

(3) Let us now consider the third example. As regards some of its countries (Kshetra) Europe is communistic and it is not communistic in respect of its other countries (Kshetra). The third predication considers these two aspects of Europe, one after the other and thereby points out a novel aspect that " Europe has its political ideals in the melting pot." Considering the communistic and the uncommunistic aspects of Europe simultaneously instead of successively one would find on the line of the fourth predication that the nature of Europe is inexpressible in some respects, by which one may think that after all, Europe has the good of its people at its heart. The seventh manner of predication combines these two views about Europe,—that it has its political ideals in the melting pot and that it has the good of the people at its heart, and indicates a healthy optimism in the nature of Europe, altogether, a new aspect not revealed by any other Bhanga.

(4) In the last example, discussed in the fourth chapter, the present plight of the nationa-

list China was considered. It was seen that she was successful in her civil wars at some time (Kāla) and that she was unsuccessful at other times (Kāla). Taking into consideration these two facts one after the other, it was found on the line of the third Bhanga, that ' the nationalist China was wanting in self-reliance.' Then again considering these two facts simultaneously on the line of the fourth Bhanga, the nature of the nationalist China would appear to be inexpressible in some respects, which may be described as that " She was powerless against the popular upsurge." These two truths combined in the manner of the seventh predication reveal still another novel fact about Chiang's China viz., that ' it is not broad-based on the well-being of the Chinese people.'

It should be remembered that the illustrations above show how the method of the Sapta Bhanga may be formally applied to a mode of arguments. They do not show that the application of the Sapta Bhanga in those cases has been materially correct. It is thus always possible that the conclusions in them may after all be found to be incorrect and no better than the opinions of the protagonists.



CHAPTER IX.

COUNTER-SUGGESTIONS CONSIDERED.

The seven modes of predications have been described in the preceding chapters and the Jaina thinkers maintain that in predicating about a thing all these seven modes are to be applied, in order that the real nature of it in all its aspects may be understood. As has already been pointed out, their number of seven—neither more nor less—is due to the fact that (in the words of Vadideva) with reference to each attribute or mode in connection with the thing, seven forms of relationships are possible; this is due to the number of questions which arise in their connection and which are seven; and the questions are seven because the doubts from which they arise are seven; the doubts again are seven in number because the aspects of the thing in connection with which the doubts may arise are seven. In short the doctrine of the seven-fold

possibility is based on the recognition of the seven aspects of a thing.

It may, however, be pointed out that a thing, according to the Jainas themselves, has an infinite number of aspects. If so, why confine the predications to seven only? Instead of the Sapta or seven Bhangas why should we not recognise Ananta or an infinite number of Bhangas? The Jainas urge that the doctrine of the Sapta Bhanga does not mean that a thing is possessed of only seven attributes or that it has only seven modes. It recognises on the contrary that the thing has an infinite number of attributes and modes but holds that if one of these attributes or modes is considered in relation to the thing, the thing would present seven aspects, neither more nor less. The question of the Ananta Bhanga, as an epistemological theory in respect of the nature of a thing does not thus arise.

One may be tempted to contend that the number of the Sapta Bhanga can at least be increased by one Bhanga and that, in this way. The fourth Bhanga, as we have seen, attributes 'inexpressibility' to the thing. If so, why should not 'expressibility' also be supposed to be an

attribute of it ? The contention is based on a three-fold misconception. Firstly, 'inexpressibility' attributed to the thing by the fourth Bhanga is not a real attribute of it. 'Inexpressibility' as we have already pointed out, does not form a real element of the nature of a thing; it is only a confession that the real element of the thing as found out by the fourth Bhanga cannot be expressed in language. To call a thing 'inexpressible' is not to express any real nature of it but is only to make a negative statement about it. If, then, 'inexpressibility' is not a real attribute, no question of including 'expressibility' as a category of understanding or of reality can arise. Secondly, the inclusion of 'expressibility' as an additional category as opposed to 'inexpressibility' is wholly uncalled for, because in the first three Bhargas, 'expressibility' of the nature of a thing is distinctly assumed in three ways viz., its 'expressibility' as a positive real, its 'expressibility' as a negative real and then, its 'expressibility' as a real, successively positive and negative. And lastly, it may be pointed out that if one insists on 'inexpressibility' being acknowledged as an attribute of a thing,—well, he is welcome to consider it in connection with the thing in the way of Sapta

Bhanga. But to consider 'expressibility' as a Bhanga in itself is wrong. The Sapta Bhanga points out the real relationships in which a given attribute or mode stands to a thing and 'expressibility' cannot be looked upon as a real relation between them.

It may next be urged that if by combining the first, the second and the third predications with the fourth, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh forms of predications have been obtained, then additional propositions may be obtained by combining the same three propositions with the third. The view is illogical. The positive and the negative ideas that give rise to the resulting idea in the fourth predication are mingled up and assimilated beyond recognition, so that in combining the ideas of the first, the second and the third Bhanga with the idea of the fourth Bhanga, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh predications enter into fresh relationships with a fresh idea and as such, yield fresh ideas and fresh aspects of reality. The same, however, cannot be said of the three proposed Bhanga. For, what is, for example, the third Bhanga? The pitcher exists and then, it does not exist. It is true that this third Bhanga yields a new idea in some respects, which is beyond the ken of

the first and the second predications. But as we have pointed out, inspite of the novelty of the idea involved in the third Bhanga, the ideas of the first and the second Bhargas are nevertheless *prominently* present in it. The result is, the third Bhanga remains essentially as 'the pitcher firstly exists' and 'the pitcher thereafter does not exist'; and if we add to this the proposition of the first predication, 'the pitcher exists' or the proposition of the second predication, 'the pitcher does not exist' or the proposition of the third predication itself, we gain no new idea thereby, but only tautologous reduplications. Accordingly, any attempt to increase the number of the predications of the Anekanta-vada by combining the first, the second or the third with the third manner of predication is futile

The number of predications in the Sapta Bhanga cannot thus be increased to more than seven. But it may be asked: cannot the said number be decreased? It is urged by the Mimamsa thinkers that the first predication and the second predication are essentially the same. To say "A is B" is the same thing as to say "A is not not-B" i. e. to say that 'the pitcher exists as a pitcher' is the same as to say that 'the pitcher does not exist as the not-pitcher'.

Therefore, when either of the first and the second Bhangas is stated, the other becomes unnecessary and tautologous. In reply to this contention, it may be pointed out that the two Bhangas, the first and the second, are not the same, either logically or ontologically. Logically, the first predication is based on the principles of Identity and second, on that of contradiction. In the next place, the second predication, although it implies and is implied in the first, presents the object in a new light, as every body's experience tells him and as we have attempted to show in our illustrations. To reduce the number of the seven predications by eliminating either the first or the second is thus not possible, without ignoring the verdict of experience.

The first and the second Bhangas give real sides of the object under investigation and both of them are indispensable on that account. It may, however, be urged that the other five predications are only the combinations of these two fundamental propositions and as such, are not so indispensable. But as has been pointed out and attempted to be shown by illustrations, the remaining five predications including even the fifth, the sixth and the seventh predications

do refer to new aspects of reality. If this is so, their relevancy cannot be denied and their eliminations from the Sapta Bhanga cannot be advisable, if a complete view of the reality is one's aim and object.

It may next be urged that in the fourth Bhanga, we get the first predication as well as the second predication. The fifth, the sixth and the seventh predications are nothing but the same first and the second predications entering into combination with the fourth which already embodies a combination of them and the fifth, the sixth and the seventh are practically reduplications of the fourth. Accordingly, nothing can be expected to be gained from the fifth, the sixth and the seventh Bhangas beyond what is contained in the fourth. It may, however, be stated in reply to this contention that the first and the second predications when they form the fourth, lose their individual matters in it, so much so, and so completely, that the fourth Bhanga emerges as a fully independent judgment with its own peculiar novel matter. The fourth predication embodies a new idea about the object and its combinations with the first, the second and the third predications give newer aspects of reality. It is therefore not possible to eliminate

the fifth, the sixth and the seventh predications from the Sapta Bhanga.

The last but not the least attempt to decrease the number of the judgments of the Anekantavāda consists in a sort of identification of the third with the fourth Bhanga. It is pointed out that both the Bhangas consist after all in applying the apparently contradictory attributes to one and the same object. It is true that in the case of third predication, the applications of the attributes are successive i. e. one after the other, whereas in the case of the fourth Bhanga the applications of the attributes are simultaneous. Time, however, is but a formal affair, the material point in both being the application of contradictory attributes to one and the same object so that there cannot be any real use in looking upon them as two separate predications. This contention may be shown to be unsound both on formal and material grounds. In the third proposition, the two predications are made one after the other and the proposition stands as : 'the pitcher is existent and non-existent,' a compound judgment with its two elements appearing separate from each other. The fourth predication, although in appearance a similar compound judgment, is put in the form of a simple pro-

position as; "the pitcher is inexpressible". A compound judgment is different from a simple judgment and on this formal ground, the third predication is different from the fourth. Syadvāda however, is not a mere system of formal logic; it is more than that, in as much as it deals with real relations between objects as they are in themselves. It transcends the limits of formal logic and appeals to experience for the knowledge of realities as they are. It finds that an object to which contradictory aspects are attributed one after other is not the same as the object to which those aspects are attributed simultaneously. The very fact that when those different attributes are applied to the thing successively in the manner of the third predication, the nature of the thing continues to be expressible in language, while in the case of those attributes being applied to the thing simultaneously, its nature becomes inexpressible in words,—goes to show that there is a material difference between the nature of the thing, as revealed by the third Bhanga and its nature as presented by the fourth Bhanga. The difference between the two natures in the self-same thing as manifest respectively in the two Bhangas may be better understood by the following analogy.

Take a number of rings of the same size. Arrange them in a continuous line putting them side by side close to one another and suppose they are made to stick to one another. You get a long chain thereby in which each of the individual rings is clearly perceptible along with their perception as a numerical total viz., as a long chain. Now, disengage the rings from the chain and put them one upon another. Thereby you do not get any longer the perception of the rings in their individualities but you get instead the impression of a thick belt-like object. The idea that emerges from the third Bhanga is somewhat like the perception of the long chain, made up of a number of rings, put one after the other, while the idea that we get from the application of the fourth Bhanga is like the perception of the thick belt-like whole into which the individual constituent rings are mingled up. The idea issuing from the third Bhanga is different from the idea involved in the fourth, just as the perception of the chain is different obviously from that of the belt-like totality. The third and the fourth forms of predications have their own matters different from each other. Each of them reveals one particular aspect of the object and from the consideration of the particular features, expressed

by them, it is never possible to identify the third Bhanga with the fourth. The reduction of the number of propositions in the Sapta Bhanga cannot thus be effected by assimilating the above two Bhanges into one.

Reality is thus not confined to any one or more (less than the above seven) of its attributes, modes or features. Each of those features is not of course illusory but real in its own way i. e., each expressing only a partial aspect of the real whole. This real whole is comprehensive, incorporating in itself all the above seven partial aspects and organising them all in a perfectly harmonious unity.

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSION.

The present cultural age is marked by an historical study of every problem. In matters philosophical, attempts are often made to trace the origin of any system in the earlier speculations. The metaphysical theories of one Indian system have thus been sometimes referred to those of another Indian system and been looked upon as outgrowths of the latter. We have, however, maintained that so far as the Indian philosophical systems are concerned, any attempt to derive one system from another, is bound to fail. We have seen, for example, the endeavours of sincere scholars to look upon the Jaina philosophy as an *offshoot* from Buddhism or from the Vedic systems as also the contrary attempts to regard the Jaina system as the original speculation from which Buddhism and even the Vedic systems have arisen. The arguments and evidences on these lines have never appeared

to us to be convincing and the conclusions, acceptable. We think, however that although such chronological determinations in respect of the different systems of Indian Philosophy are never possible because the rudimentary stages of each of them have irretrievably been lost yet a study of them in their logical relationships to one another is not only possible but essential to a proper estimate of each of them. You cannot, for example, finally decide whether the Jaina system has chronologically arisen from the Sankhya philosophy or whether, as the Jainas contend, the Sankhya system has arisen from the Jaina philosophy,—yet it is always interesting and useful to see how the speculations of each of these two systems, easily lead to or just recede from those of the other. Our ancient thinkers studied the philosophical systems always in this comparative way and this logical comparison is not only profitable but the only possible manner of estimating them correctly.

The Anekanta-vāda is the distinctive feature of the Jaina philosophy, and notwithstanding the attempts of some scholars to trace the doctrine in some of the speculations of the Vedic or the Buddhistic systems, we maintain that the Anekanta-vāda is chronologically underivable

from the principles of any other system. It is thus a unique doctrine of the Jaina philosophy and it is its original contribution to the course of the world-thought. Reality is never absolute, self-centred or abstract but is always many-sided in accordance with the plurality of its relationships to the manifold other reals. It is one and many, eternal and evanescent, general and particular, immutable and changing, real and phenomenal and so on,—always the abode of apparently opposite features all harmonised into a concrete whole. This is the essence of the Syād-vāda and this Syād-vāda is the soul of the Jaina philosophy. The attitude of the Syād-vāda towards the other systems of Philosophy is what befits its above nature. An object is Anekānta or possessed of many aspects, each of which expresses only a partial aspect of the object. None of the seven predications of the Anekānta-vāda is thus either absolutely correct or absolutely wrong. Each is correct in its own way and each is wrong as every partial view of an object is wrong. The Jainas do not contend that the theories of the other systems of Philosophy are wholly wrong. They hold that each of those theories has admittedly a rational basis and is acceptable to some extent. The Jaina

thinkers point out that the theories of the other schools of Philosophy being but partial views of the comprehensive reality, are naturally at variance with each other; and that they would find their final reconciliation in the Syad-vāda. In short, the Jainas would not object to the admissibility of any theory of the other schools of Philosophy, provided it is qualified by a "Syst."

Let us now examine the standpoints of the Syad-vāda regarding some of the theories of the Indian systems, in light of what we have stated above. With respect to the ultimate Reality or substance, the Vedānta says that it is one, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga says the Realities are two-fold viz., the Prakṛti or the ultimate material reality and the Puruṣas or souls which are many, while according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the material atoms as well as the souls, as also Kāla or time, Dik or directions are the ultimate Realities. In a way, it may be said that so far as the number of the ultimate realities is concerned, the Vedānta takes a strictly monistic, the Sāṅkhya, a dualistic and the Nyāya, pluralistic view and each of these Schools opposes the others. The Jainas would say that each of these views is correct to a certain extent and each suffers from one-sided partiality. They point out that if by

substance we are to mean that which is the basis of all phenomenality, then the Vedāntic view that the substance is one is certainly right. But in consideration of the fundamental differences in their nature i. e., that between the conscious and the unconscious, a dualism between the psychical and the unpsychical realities is maintainable. In view, again, of their exclusiveness of each other, the material atoms, time etc., are reals, as held by the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika. The difference between the three views about the ultimate reality is thus a difference of standpoints only and the three Schools oppose each other, because, as the Jainas point out, each of them regards its stand-point as the only possible stand-point and forgets that there may be other stand-points as well. From the Syād-vāda point of view—, (1) the ultimate reality is one (the Vedānta theory) in some respects, (2) it is dual, (the Sāṅkhya theory) in some respects, and (3) it is manifold (the Nyaya theory) in some respects, as explained above. In the Jaina Syād-vāda doctrine then, 'the validity-to-some-extent,' to which each of the three Schools can rightly lay claim, is acknowledged while their mutual oppositions are avoided.

Regarding modes, again, the Vedānta contends

that Modes are unreal while the Nyaya holds that Modifications are real. According to the Syad-vāda doctrine, a Mode has no existence (as the Vedānta maintains) apart from its underlying substance ; it is unreal in this respect. A Mode, again, is the cast or the form in which the substance is presented ; it is real (as the Nyaya urges) in this sense. The Jainas thus maintain that a Mode is real in certain respects and that it is unreal also in certain respects. According to them, the real Reality is always the Modified substance or the substantiated Mode and both the Vedānta and the Nyaya, inspite of the partiality of their views as pointed out above, are wrong in creating a barrier between the substance and its mode.

In respect of the famous doctrine of causality again, the Nyaya, the Sankhya and the Vedānta theories are opposed to one another. The Sankhya position is known as the Sat-kārya-vāda and according to it, the effect is pre-existent in the cause, even from before its manifestation as the effect. According to the Asat-kārya-vāda theory of the Nyaya philosophy, on the other hand, the effect is a totally new phenomenon, not pre-existent in the cause. The Vedānta, again,

maintains that it is the cause which has reality and that what is called the effect, is Anirvachaniya or indescribable, being neither the same as the cause nor distinct from it. The Jainas solve the problem of the cause and effect, by applying their theory of the Anekanta to it. They point out that the Sankhya view is correct in some respects; for so far as the substance underlying the effect and the cause is concerned, it is the same, it persists in its immutability through the cause and the effect which are two modes of its expression; therefore, in a very real sense, the effect is existent even before its emergence as an effect. On the other hand, effect is also a new phenomenon, in some respects; it has its own significance, own practical efficiency and all those features which pertain to a real feature were not in evidence before its emergence. Thus the Jainas admit the partial validity of both the Sankhya and Nyaya views; from the standpoint of its underlying substance, the effect is existent from before its emergence; from the consideration of the effect as a mode, it is a new phenomenon not existent before its actual appearance. The "Syat" would thus reconcile the two contending views. The Jainas would even go further and show that even the Vedanta view

is acceptable to a certain extent and this is in this way. It has been seen that the effect is pre-existent in some sense and that it is not pre-existent also in some sense. The Vedantists, however, take a negative view of the position and say that the effect is, therefore, neither pre-existent nor not pre-existent; from this, they would firstly conclude that the effect is Anirvachaniya or indescribable and in the next place, that it is unreal. The Jainas, on the contrary, prefer to take a more realistic view and face the facts as they are i. e. as they are experienced,—which are that the effect is pre-existent in some sense and that it is not pre-existent in some sense. They would combine these two facts and in light of the fourth form of predication, say that the effect is Avaktavya or inexpressible. This Jaina view sounds something like the Vedānta view. According to both, the effect cannot be exactly defined in language and the Vedānta theory would be unobjectionable certainly in this sense. Unfortunately, the Vedānta goes definitely towards absolutism and contends that the ‘indescribability’ of the effect means its ‘unreality’. The Jainas, on the contrary, maintain that the ‘inexpressibility’ of the effect is not absolute, that the effect is ‘inexpressible

only in some respects' and that far from its 'inexpressibility' meaning the 'unreality' of the effect, the 'inexpressibility' indicates a real aspect of the character of the effect, viz., a definitely positive-cum-negative nature of it.

Instances may thus be multiplied of cases where contending philosophical views find their reconciliation in the Jaina doctrine of the Syād-vāda. We shall deal only with one more such a case and close this part of our survey of the comprehensiveness of the Anekānta-vāda. It is well known how the Mīmāṃsā school maintains the doctrine of the eternity of sounds. On the other hand, the Nyāya thinkers lay stress on the adventitious character of sounds and contend that sounds are impermanent product-phenomena having both a beginning and an end. These two are extreme opposite views and it is the Jaina theory which mediates between them, shows where each of them is partially correct and indicates how both of them may be reconciled. According to the Jainas, the Nyāya view is correct in some respects,—in as much as sound is obviously produced by human efforts or other activities and is certainly impermanent on that account. On the other hand, sound is a mode of matter; the

substratum underlying sounds is Pudgalā which as a substance is eternal; and from this point of view viz., in respect of its basic substance, sound is eternal and the Mimāṃsā contention about the eternity of sounds is correct to this extent. It is in this way, that both the contending views of the Nyāya and the Mimāṃsā philosophy are shown to be correct in some respects,—the former considering the aspect of modifications in sound and, the latter, its ever-lasting substantial basis. The two views are incorrect when they take the respective partial considerations to be the complete theories about sound. The Syād-vāda, in the way shown above, takes a comprehensive view of sound,—i. e. in both of its aspects of modification and substantiality and thus reconciles the otherwise irreconcilable theories of the Nyāya and the Mimāṃsā Schools.

In the next place, various instances may be given where other philosophical systems, though always taking an absolutist position, resile from it and take a course, essentially on the line of Syād-vāda in order to make their theories understandable. Take, for instance, the Nyāya theory of the Samānya (Class-idea and the substance-idea) and the Viśeṣa (idea of particularity). The Nyāya thinkers take their stand

on the fact that *Samanya* consists in a group of features common to a number of individuals and as such, is absolutely different from the *Viśeṣa* which are peculiarities characterising each of the individuals. Yet experience gives us the idea, not of the *Samanya* and the *Viśeṣa* asundered from each other but of the individual in which the *Samanya* and the *Viśeṣa* are organically united. To explain this, the Nyāya Philosophers have to deprive the *Samanya* and the *Viśeṣa* of much of their absolutely separatist characters and to assert that they are united in the individual *ab-extra*. The Nyāya theory thus amounts to this that the *Samanya* and the *Viśeṣa* are different and yet are united. This is, no doubt, the correct position but hardly understandable from the orthodox stand-point of the Nyāya; for, the question arises; how can two essentially separate matters so unite as to appear as a unity? The solution of this lies in the *Anekantavāda*, according to which, the *Samanya* and the *Viśeṣa* differ, not absolutely but only in some respects. The *Samanya* is the group of common features, while the *Viśeṣas* are the peculiar features; absolutely considered in this way, they are different. On the other hand, neither of the *Samanya* and the *Viśeṣa* has any real existence

independent of the other. In the individual of our actual experience, the *Sāmānya* manifests itself through the *Viśeṣa* and the *Viśeṣa* appears as the particular mode of the *Sāmānya*. This is the *Syād-vāda* view, in which the apparently inexplicable contradictions involved in the *Nyāya* doctrine of the *Sāmānya* and the *Viśeṣa* find their satisfactory solution.

Essentially similar is the difficulty of the *Vedānta* with respect to the nature of our experiential world. The *Brahma* is the only existent reality with it. Yet, it cannot deny that the world exists, at least as the object of our empirical experience. And admittedly, apart from its basic substance, whatever it be, it is non-existent. Thus the *Vedānta* which has refused to recognise the reality of anything beside the *Brahma* and in consistency with this its fundamental stand has got to declare openly that the world is non-existent admits that the world is not non-existent nor absolutely unreal, although it is not absolutely existent or real, either. The *Vedāntic* stand-point, however, is purely negative; yet all the same, it acknowledges the varied aspects of the world,—‘it is neither existent nor non-existent’ The *Vedānta* concludes that the world,—being the sum of contradictory negations, its nature is

indescribable. The Vedānta view that the world presents contradictory aspects is quite correct; but its conclusion therefrom is hardly warranted or understandable. Instead of resorting to a purely negative way of putting matters, the Vedānta ought to have frankly admitted that the world is real in some respects i. e. in respect of its basic substance and is unreal in some respects i. e. in respect of the changes of the phenomena. This would have made its position clear and its conclusion understandable and would have avoided the hazy character of its theory of the world.

The Śūnya-vāda of the Buddhists, with all its negations, cannot be summarily dismissed by any serious thinker. It is correct when it states that 'an object does not exist'; it is also correct, when it points out that 'an object is not non-existent'; it is not wrong, again, when it says that 'the object is neither existent nor non-existent'; and finally, it is also right in maintaining that 'the object is not something other than the existent and non-existent'. The Śūnya-vādins form a purely negative view about an object from these premises. But it can be pointed out that each of those propositions is correct,—not absolutely but only in some respects. This is the Syād-vāda way of viewing those facts, whereby the

absolute negationism which is an inconceivable position is easily avoided and an understandable conception of the world is arrived at.

In fact, every system of philosophy which first admits a cut and dried scheme and then has got to face facts which are not identical with that scheme but which vary from it in some form is bound to admit different aspects in the Original Scheme and have recourse to the Jaina Doctrine of the Syād-vāda by implication. The Buddhist subjective idealists cannot deny the heterogeneity in the individual ideas and yet they hold that all ideas are but ideas and as such, homogeneous. This is admitting only the many-sidedness of an idea. The Chārvāka-sophists contend that consciousness is a product of the material elements. Yet, what is this product? Is it identical with each one of the elements e. g. the earth etc,? No; in that case, all things made of that element e. g. pitcher etc, would have consciousness. Is the consciousness different from each of those elements? No: for, in that case, the elements would not be four in number, as the Chārvākas say, but would be five. This shows how consciousness is admitted by the Chārvākas to have many aspects,—it being in some respects identifiable with the material elements and in some respects, diff-

erent from them. The Mimamsa School practically admits the Jaina Syadvada doctrine of the unity-in-plurality when it points out that cognition, inspite of its three elements viz., the knower, (Praman) the act of knowledge (Pramana) and the content of cognition (Prameya) is one. The Sankhya thinkers also indirectly admit the soundness of the Anekanta principle which it shows that Prakṛti, the ultimate unitary material principle has three separate tendencies of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas in it. The Indian view of the Soul, as free (so far as its essential nature is concerned) and as in bondage (so far as its empiric existences are concerned) is based on an acknowledgment of the many-sidedness of a reality. The Mimamsa thinkers of the Bhatta School, in saying that a thing is Samanya and Viśeṣa, practically admits the doctrine of the Syadvada. The Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas, in holding that Atoms constituting a material pot are eternal while the pot as a product and a passing phase of matter, is non-eternal, are practically admitting the Syad-vada position which is that a pot is non-eternal in some respects, (i. e. as a mode of matter) and that it is eternal also in some respects (i. e. in respect of its constitutive substance). The Mimāṃsakas maintaining that the same eternal

word, Vak, manifests itself in the evanescent phases of the Vaikhari, the Madhyama and the Pasyanti and the Vedantins contending that the same immutable self appears in the changing states of the Jāgrat (the waking), the Svapna (the dream) and the Śūṣupti (the dreamless sleep) are basing their views on the Anekanta-vāda or the theory of many aspects.

In the same manner, Plato's archetypal and eternal ideas manifesting themselves in the passing phenomena; Aristotle's immanent ideas realising themselves in and through the particularities, Spinoza's transcendental substance, manifesting itself through its attributes of extension and consciousness; Libnitz's "windowless" Monads mirroring the universe, Kant's abstract things-in themselves of Pure Reason being the self-manifesting active principles of his Practical Reason; Spencer's "Unknowable" revealing itself in the worlds of matter, life and mind; Fichte's absolute Self in its self-limitations; Hegel's Idea realising itself in and through the others, evolved from within itself,—are all acknowledgments that Reality does not consist in an immutable and abstract nature but that it is a dynamic principle, involving manifold aspects.

The above nature of the Sapta Bhanga

implies the great practical use to which it may be put. If the teaching of the Sapta Bhanga is that for a true conception of reality, we must take a comprehensive view of it i e., consider it in all its possible aspects, the utility of an undertaking may also be subjected to the same test. The goodness or the badness of a decision, of a social order, of an institutional organisation, of a matter of belief and so on, may also be judged by that standard. In all such matters, the question which one is to put to himself is: What is the other aspect of it?

The history of the world is at many places blackened by the horrors of wars, carried on in the name of religion. Those who began the religious wars, fought them obstinately and not unoften sacrificed their very lives in them, were not necessarily bad men. In fact, in their decisions and undertakings, they were sincere and had the rare virtue of the courage of their convictions. What led them to do those dreadful acts in the name of their religions was not the selfish aimings for personal gains or other material benefits. It was a grievous mistake and an error of judgment on their part to decide on wars. It was their omission to take into consideration the other side of the whole matter.

They were honest in their beliefs about a point in their religions but they omitted to consider that those who dissented from their views might have been as sincere in their views as themselves. To arrive at the right decision about that religious point, they ought to have taken into consideration the views of the dissenters also, just as a seeker of truth, instead of relying solely on the first Bhanga of Syadvada, considers also the negative aspect put forward in the second Bhanga as also the third, the fourth, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh manners of predication. This would have given a comprehensive view of the matter under consideration, supplied them with all informations regarding that matter and prevented them from taking a fanatical attitude. The notorious crusades, however much they may be glorified, were certainly grievous misdeeds, which could easily have been avoided. Each of the contending parties was guilty of an error of judgment,—each omitted to appreciate that its opponent had reasons for its religious persuasion and the result was a series of horrid wars, extending over several decades.

The social atmosphere of to-day is filled with the dins of a clash between the communist idea and the time-honoured social system. The

difference is so keenly felt that the near future of humanity is fraught with dangerous possibilities. Yet, it is not impossible to avoid the conflict. Each side feels that regard being had to the time, the nature, the attitude of the people and the local circumstances, its ideal is perfectly right and feels further that thereby it has the right to impose it upon the other side. What, however, each side forgets is that regard being similarly had to the time, the nature and the attitude of the peoples on the other side as well as to the local circumstances in which they are placed, the other side has the justification for adopting its own ideal.

Even as regards the moral conduct of the peoples of to-day, the norms are sharply varied from each other. Hitler's followers believed that the Teutonic High German people were the flowers of humanity and that as such, the purity of their blood should be preserved at all costs; as a result of this persuasion, the highest duty of a German was held to consist in all attempts, too often cruel and inhuman, to preserve the said purity of his blood. The highest virtue for a trading people in modern times, on the other hand, is considered to consist in acts which are calculated to increase the national wealth; this

supposed virtue leads these people to exploit the backward peoples right and left. Both these views about moral acts are bad. Each of these is one-sided and does not consider the other side of the question viz., that other peoples have a right to exist as well.

Such have been the conflicts of ideals and opinions to-day, leading or likely to lead to dangerous consequences. The well-wishers of humanity actually see the certain signs of an impending third world war in the near future and are at pains to find out ways for avoiding it. United organisation of nations has been established and is functioning, but how far its efforts to prevent wars will be crowned with success is highly doubtful. To us, it appears that the said organisation is proceeding on a wrong track. The preventives of war that it proposes are mostly mechanical. Proposals for the limitation of armaments, for inspection of a nation's armed strength and such other proposals may be efficacious for the time being; but these will not permanently prevent wars,—unless the mentalities of the nations are made to change radically. To avoid wars in the future, every nation should judge a matter not only from its own standpoint but from the standpoint of other nations as well,—

in other words, consider the question in all its aspects. This is the principle which should govern the moral conduct of nations, if wars are to be avoided and this should also be the principle, governing the moral acts of an individual person, if his behaviour and conduct are to be morally unimpeachable.

The above attitude of considering every problem in the social, political and religious domains—either in a nation or in an individual,—is sure to avoid conflicts and to lead to peaceful solutions. This attitude we may be permitted to point out, is a truly Anekanta way of viewing a problem. It is the Syad-vāda, then, which holds the secret key for solving the present day world problems and the intricate problems of an individual's life. It may, however, be contended that such practical applications of the Anekanta are not met with anywhere. This is true but this does not show that the doctrine is inefficacious in any way; it shows how the present day world in its mad rush for selfish gains is treading the wrong path. In India at least, acts of complete selflessness were very common. Mightiest of monarchs here in the height of their power, were found to give up all they had and cheerfully adopt the life of a beggar—The great Chandra Gupta left

his empire and entered the homeless order of a Jaina monk. His grandson, Aśoka in spite of his great temporal power and opportunities did not use arms to conquer other lands. His descendant, the worthy Samprati, an illustrious Jaina monarch was equally forbearing and large-hearted. So was Khāra-Vela, the great Jaina king of Kalingas. At times, Emperor Harsa-Vardhana, used to employ his treasury in gifts to the poor. It is well known how the Jaina minister, Bhama-Shah gave away all his life's earning to serve a worthy cause. All such acts of highmindedness are based on a view which is not confined within one's own self but extends over a wider range and to the consideration of facts and circumstances, relating to the selves of others. And this is essentially the Syād-vada way.

An instance of how war was avoided by a prudent consideration of it in all its aspects, is furnished by what is recorded of the king of Taxila.

"As he was a man of great prudence", says Plutarch, "he waited on Alexander and after the first compliments, thus addressed him: 'What occasion is there for wars between you and me, if you are not

come to take from us our water and other necessities of life,—the only things that reasonable men will take up arms for? As to gold and silver and other possessions, if I am richer than you, I am willing to oblige you with part; if I am poorer, I have no objection to sharing in your bounty ”.

Now, this attitude of the king of Taxila avoided the catastrophic war between him and Alexander. Was this attitude due to any poverty and consequent want of resources for war, in Taxila ? No.

“ It is said the dominions of Taxila in India ”, says Plutarch, “ were as large as Egypt ; they afforded excellent pasturage too and were the most fertile in all respects ”.

Was the King of Taxila, a moral wreck ? No He is recorded to have been not only a very prudent man but to have had great influence over the saints of India, which was impossible for a coward and a weak prince. A great Indian saint whom the Greeks called Calanus, was bold enough to treat Onesicritus, a disciple of Diogenes, who was deputed by Alexander to ask him to come to him, “ with great insolence and harshness,

way to war. Is the war avoidable, ? Not on the mechanical devices, cogitated upon by the U. N. O. but only on the awakening of a sincere moral sense. If, for instance, the heads of the two contending powers, Stalin and Truman, could think of wars in the Anekanta way, really feel like that ancient king of Taxila and say, from the depth of their hearts to each other, the exact words of that king, as quoted above, then the war would certainly be avoided and in no other way. And not only that. There would be sincere amity and a spirit of follow-feeling among nations in the place of mutual suspicion and jealousy that prevail to-day. Let us revert to the case of the king of Taxila, when these memorable words were spoken by the ruler of Taxila.

“Charmed with his frankness”, records Plutarch, “ Alexander took his hand and answered ‘ think you, then, with all this civility to escape without a conflict ? You are much deceived, if you do, I will dispute it with you to the last ; but it shall be in favours and benefits ; for, I will not have you exceed me in generosity ”.

Alexander followed in acts what he said and good feelings and regard for each other marked

thence-forward the relationship between him and the king of Taxila, to the benefit of both.

Permanent avoidance of war involves a tolerance of other's views and a laying of emphasis on essential points upon which the contending parties are agreed or can be made to agree,—on matters above all of the social and political status of their respective religions. This again requires a careful and patient consideration of all these problems in all their aspects. We shall end our discourse with an indication of the ways in which these problems are to be dealt with, in order that a lasting peace—"the kingdom of God" may be established on earth

As regards the political condition of a people the principle should be the old old doctrine of India,—“The Raja or the king is so called because he pleases the people”. The immortal poet of India, Kalidasa, has explained this motto of pleasing the people by pointing out that the king “because he instils into his people humility, because he protects them and even maintains them, is their real father, their fathers being simply their progenitors.” Such self-denying king being not available these days, modern times have thought it fit to transfer the government

to popular representatives. But the principles of good government remain the same,—the all-round development of the people. In the present days, however, the question has arisen: who are to represent the people? The Communists believe that it is the labouring classes who are to lead and represent the people and they accuse the capitalists and others of having so long only exploited the labour. The democrats, on the other hand, while they do not deny that the popular leaders should form the Government, maintain that places in it for intelligent and really capable men must always be preserved. The advocates of the principles of democracy and of communism are at logger-heads with each other, each side maintaining their own ideal to be the faultless. The way out of this dispute is to hold that both the views are acceptable to a certain extent. The Communists' contention that the Government should be broad-based on the will of the people is certainly right while the democratic view that intelligence and capability should have a place in the Government, is also correct. Each side is wrong when it goes to the extreme. Extreme communism is liable to be morally weak and mediocre, while the democratic Government may degenerate into oppressive oligarchies. The

Syad-vada way of thinking would respect the views of the other side, keeping in constant view the old, old principle of good Government, described above, would try to find out a form of Government which should be popular and at the same time intelligently guided, capably controlled. The establishment of such a Government in each country would go a long way in the prevention of wars between nations.

As regards the social and individual virtues the principle of morality should be based on the old pregnant saying of India - "As one's own life is dear to one's own self, so the life of other beings is dear to them". In other words, "live and let live" should be the basis of the moral code. Instinct of life is undoubtedly active in every living being and it is no wonder that an animal does always try its best to preserve itself. But every one, while preserving himself should also look to the other side of the question i. e. consider his own living along with the living of others. This means the practice of "non-violence" in acts, speech and thought, which consists in its negative form, in not doing any injury to any being and in its positive form, in being kind to all. The sincere adoption of "non-violence" as the moral virtue for the

individual and for the society is the second requisite for the establishment of permanent peace on earth and for avoidance of all future wars.

Lastly, we may refer to religious differences. It may be said that a religious sense is innate in man and this sense consists in accepting something other than himself as an object of veneration. This something has been called God and conceptions of God have been many, mutually antagonistic. Some have conceived God as the creator of the universe; others have opposed this doctrine. According to some, God removes sins and raises man to the higher level of being; in other quarters again, this view of God has also been opposed. Religious differences among people have been so severe that most sanguinary battles have been fought on this account. Even now, the difference in the religious views is at the root of many other differences in two men. Here again, the Anekanta position is the only way. God is the creator of the world, according to some; while according to the others, God cannot be the creator, for the obvious reason that he thereby becomes finite. The second opposition again is between the two propositions—God is the redeemer and God is not the redeemer. The solution of these differences lies in a rational

conception of God,—a conception which is acceptable to all the contending parties. Now each of the religious parties admits that when God is realised, the man is raised to a higher status, the status of bliss. This state of bliss is attainable by man, if it is only in its nature to be blissful. The doctrine of Fall in the Christian, the Jewish and the Mahomedan religions as well as the Indian doctrine that Karma is the cause of the miseries of existence,—presuppose that man is blissful by his original nature. If we suppose the Soul of man to be God, all differences about the theories of God become harmonised. God,—in the sense of the human soul,—is the creator in some sense, in the sense that man is the creator of his own destiny. And then, God,—in the sense of the human soul in its pristine purity,—is not the creator; because such a soul is not affected by the world as it is. And then in consideration of the fact that none but man himself can redeem himself by the purity of his conduct and that the original nature of man which is ever blissful, does not require any redemption. God, in the sense of human soul,—is in some respects the redeemer and in some respects, not the redeemer. This view of God, thus sets at rest all the contending

theories of God and the removal of differences in religious conceptions is one of the requisites for securing the world-peace. It may thus be said that the Anekanta view is supremely necessary for the solution of the burning problem of today viz, the avoidance of the impending world-war.



प्रशस्ति

जेण विणा लोगस्स
वि ववहारो सवहा न निघडइ ।
तस्स भुवणेकगुरुणो
नमोऽणोगतवायस्स ॥

Salutation to Anekantavada, the sole Guru of all the worlds ! Indeed without the guidance of Anekantavada, the activities of people in this world cannot function properly and successfully.

संमतितर्क (ग्रान्ते)

यौदानामृजुसूत्रतो मतमभूद्वेदान्तिनां सङ्ग्रहात्
मादृशानां तत एव नैगमनयाद् योगश्च वैशेषिकः ।
शब्दमक्षविदोऽपि शब्दनयतः सर्वैर्नयैर्गुम्फिता
त्रैनी दृष्टिर्गितीह सारतरता घनघनानीकान्ते ॥

in essence, for it is adorned by all possible standpoints (nayas).

(अद्यात्मसार-जिनमतस्तुत्यधिकार श्लोक. ६)

उदधाविव सर्वसिन्धवः

समुदीर्णास्त्वयि नाथ ! दृष्टयः ।

न च तासु भवान् प्रदृश्यते

प्रविभक्तासु सरित्स्त्ववोदधिः ॥

O Lord ! all the view-points are expressly present in thee as all the rivers are in the ocean. But you cannot be singled out and shown to the gaze of the world even as the ocean into separate rivers

सि द्वा. २ श्लो.

प्रकाशितं जनानां यै-

मेतं सर्वनयाश्रितम् ।

चित्ते परिणतं चेदं

येषां तेभ्यो नमोनमः ॥

Salutations to those Jnanis, in whose minds this philosophy of naya has matured and who have illumined the views of those persons whose knowledge rests upon the foundations of nayas !

(ज्ञानसार अष्टक-श्लोक ६ उपाध्याय यशोविजयजी)

नयास्तव स्यात्पदलान्छना इमे

रसोपविद्धा इव लोहघातवः ।

भवन्त्यभिप्रेतफला यतस्ततो

भवन्तमार्याः प्रणता हितैषिणः ॥

O Lord Jina ! all the various nayas which are adorned by the term 'Synt' are like bits of iron transmuted into gold by an alchemical process. (Our unreflective thoughts and deeds are like iron pieces) The wise resort to the nayas which yield fruit. Hence the pure and wise in heart, who work for the welfare of all, offer their salutations to you !

वि द्वा. २ श्लो०

य एव दोषाः फिल नित्यवादे

विनाशवादेऽपि समास्त एव ।

परस्परव्यसिषु कण्टकेषु

जयत्यभूष्यं जिनशामनं ते ॥

The fallacies which appear in the Eternalist philosophy are equally present in the doctrine of Nihilism. Such systems of thought are like thorns which destroy each other. O Lord Jina ! your teaching is invincible and victorious over all !

अमरकोशप्रयोगशालायाः श्लो. २६

भहं मिच्छादंसणसमूहमइयस्स अमयसारस्स ।

जिण वयणस्स भगवओ संविगसुहाहि गम्मस्स ॥

May the teaching of Lord Jina confer biss-
the teaching which is like the harmonising
synthesis of all defective or fallacious philosophies,
which bestows immortality upon aspirants and which
is easily understood and grasped by all men !

संमतिप्रकरण ६९

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